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 SUMMARY 
 
Before 1994 criminal procedure was subject to the sovereignty of Parliament and the 
untrammelled law enforcement powers of the executive which resulted in the 
authoritarian and oppressive criminal justice system of the apartheid era. The 
Constitution, Act 108 of 1996 has since created a democratic state based on the 
values of the supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law. The basic principles 
of criminal procedure are now constitutionalised in the Bill of Rights. The Bill of 
Rights protects the fundamental rights of individuals when they come into contact 
with organs of the state which includes the police. The Criminal Procedure Act  51 of 
1977 authorises the police to search for and to seize articles, and has long provided 
the only legal basis for obtaining warrants to search for and to seize articles and for 
performing such actions without a warrant in certain circumstances. Generally the 
standard for these measures and actions taken under their purview has been one of 
reasonableness. Since the birth of the Constitution there has been additional 
constraints on search and seizure powers. Not only are there now constitutionalised 
standards by which such legal powers are to be measured, but there is also the 
possibility of excluding evidence obtained in course of a violation of a constitutional 
right.  The provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act are now qualified by the 
Constitution. Where feasible a system of prior judicial authorisation in the form of a 
valid search warrant obtained on sworn information establishing reasonable grounds 
is a precondition for a valid search or seizure. Search and seizure without a warrant 
is permitted only in exceptional circumstances such as an immediate threat to 
person or property. By prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures the 
Constitution places important limits on police efforts to detect and investigate crime. 
The Constitution appreciates the need for legitimate law enforcement activity. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXTUAL CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The subject matter of this study is “A Constitutional Perspective of 
Police Powers of Search and Seizure in the Criminal Justice System”. It 
examines search and seizure from a constitutional perspective in the 
South African criminal justice system. Starting with the interim 
Constitution1 of 1993 and the culmination of the 1996 Constitution2, the 
fundamental principles of criminal procedure are now constitutionalised. 
The courts, with the Constitutional Court reigning supreme, as 
guardians of the Constitution, now has the final say as to the values and 
rules, which determines how society deals with crime. This replaces the 
central tenet of the criminal justice system in pre-1994 period which 
gave Parliament and the executive a free hand, which resulted in the 
oppressive and illegitimate criminal justice system of the apartheid 
years.3 
 
An important part of crime investigation is the obtaining of evidence 
through the search of persons and places, and the seizure of things. At 
the same time our Constitution recognises that state authorities should 
not be permitted untrammelled access to search for and seize items 
belonging to individuals. It is a necessary incident of democracy that 
individuals must be protected from unjustified intrusions on privacy and 
property by agents of the state. Otherwise, arbitrary state actions could 
                                                 
1 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa  Act 200 of 1993 (hereafter referred 
   to as the “Interim Constitution”).  
2 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa , 1996 (unless otherwise mentioned all 
references to “Constitution” in this thesis refers to the said Act, hereafter referred to 
as either the 1996 Constitution  or Constitution”). 
3  Steytler  Constitutional Criminal Procedure: A Commentary on the Constitution of the  
   Republic of South Africa 1998 v. 
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severely affect privacy and affected fundamental rights that are intended 
to be a predominant feature of democratic society, which our 
Constitution guarantees. Historically, the police and other state agents 
have required legal authority for undertaking such measures.  
 
The Criminal Procedure Act4 has long provided the main legal basis for 
obtaining warrants to search for and seize property or for performing 
such actions without a warrant in certain circumstances. Generally, the 
standard for these measures and the actions taken under their purview 
has been one of “reasonableness”. Many statutory and common law 
search and seizure  powers are, and have been  for many years, 
predicated on ‘reasonable grounds’ for believing that evidence will be 
located at the place to be searched. Even where the grounds have been 
set at a lower threshold, reasonableness has usually been included as a 
constraint against arbitrary or capricious conduct by the police or other 
authorities. 
 
Since the advent of the Constitution there have been additional 
constraints on search and seizure powers. This has come through the 
guarantee to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure. There 
are now constitutional standards by which such legal powers are to be 
measured. The Constitution is now the guiding light for the criminal 
justice system. The idea that individuals can enjoy privacy from 
governmental intrusions with regard to themselves, their possessions, 
and their homes, is what we have come to expect, rather than what we 
desire. The right to privacy includes the right, not to have one’s person 
or home searched, one’s property searched or possessions seized. 
Section 10 of the Constitution preserves the right to dignity, whereas 
section 14 of the Constitution prescribes that everyone is entitled to “the 
right to his or her privacy, which shall include the right not to be subject 
to searches of his or her person, home or property, the seizure of 
private possessions or the violation of private communications.” On the 
                                                 
4 51 of 1977 (hereafter referred to as the “Criminal Procedure Act”). 
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face of it, this appears to be an absolute prohibition, which would mean 
that it would have the effect of overriding the provisions contained in 
Chapter 2 of the Criminal Procedure Act, providing for search and 
seizure operations in certain defined circumstances. This in turn would 
deprive the police of an essential tool and technique of the criminal 
investigative process, namely the power to search and seize those 
objects found. 
 
Search and seizure is currently regulated by Chapter 2 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act, which employs the standard of reasonable belief that a 
particular article located on a certain premises is connected with the 
commission of an offence. The test is therefore objective and the courts 
have been empowered to set the standard. The general requirement is 
that information justifying the suspicion should be placed before a 
Justice of the Peace, justifying the latter to issue a search warrant 
authorising a particular search and seizure operation.5 However 
provision is also made for the conducting of search and seizure 
operations, without a warrant in circumstances where a warrant would 
have been granted, but the delay in obtaining one would have defeated 
the objects of the search. 6 
 
In general, searches and seizures that invade privacy must be 
conducted in terms of legislation clearly defining the power to search 
and seize. They are only permissible to achieve compelling public 
objectives. Furthermore they must be endorsed as necessary for such a 
purpose by an independent authority before they may be conducted. In 
other words, as a rule, searches and seizures that violate the right to 
privacy must be authorised by a warrant.7 
 
 
                                                 
5  Section 21 of the Criminal Procedure Act.  
6  Section 22 of the Criminal Procedure Act .   
7  Janse Van Rensburg NO v Minister van Handel en Nywerheid NO 1999 (2) BCLR  
   204 (T) 246A. 
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2. Constitutionalism in relation to search and seizure 
 
All constitutions concern themselves with the exercise of public power.8 
In modern democratic constitutions such as the South African 
Constitution9, such power is divided between the legislature, the 
executive and the judiciary.10 The Constitution also concerns itself with 
the form in which power is exercised. Law is the medium through which 
power is exercised and disseminated, beginning with the Constitution 
itself.11 No rule may be made except in accordance with the 
Constitution. A democratic Constitution is a rule-making machine.12 No 
public body may exercise power except in terms of an authorising rule 
and no person is above the law.13 The Constitution also concerns itself 
with values and principles. These values are a priori commitment upon 
which the whole edifice of democratic government is structured. They 
are the a priori assumptions that justify and give the Bill of rights a 
particular form.14 Encapsulated around human dignity, privacy and 
associated fundamental rights these values inform the Constitution. 
  
The courts play a pivotal role in the development and application of a 
fair law of criminal procedure. The success of the Bill of Rights will not 
only depend on how the courts and the legal profession deal with it, but 
also how assertively and judiciously those whose rights are entrenched, 
will invoke this instrument.15The spirit, purport and object of the 
                                                 
8 Cheadle, Davis and Haysom South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights  
  2002 1. 
9 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
10 Cheadle, Davis and Haysom supra 1. 
11 Ibid 1. 
12 Ibid 1. 
13 Ibid 1. 
14 Ibid 1. 
15 Du Plessis and Corder Understanding South Africa’s transitional bill of rights (1994)   
   137. 
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Constitution was expressed by Mahomed DP in Shabalala v Attorney-
General of Transvaal16 where he maintained that: 
 
[T]he dominant theme of the Constitution.....is to emphasise the “historic bridge” 
which  the Constitution provides between a past based on ‘conflict, untold suffering 
and injustice’ and a future which is stated to be founded on the recognition of 
human rights.17  
 
He warned that: 
 
   [T]he Constitution is not simply some kind of statutory codification of an acceptable 
or legitimate past. .....It constitutes a decisive break from a culture of apartheid and 
racism to a constitutionally protected culture of openness and democracy and 
universal human rights for South Africans of all ages, classes and colours, 
   ... The past was pervaded with inequality, authoritarianism and repression. The 
aspiration of the future is based on what is ‘justifiable in an open and democratic 
society based on freedom and equality’. It is premised on a legal culture of 
accountability and transparency.18  
 
Infringement by the executive of the right to privacy of the individual is 
an everyday occurrence. The Criminal Procedure Act authorises the 
police service, to search for and seize articles. On the one hand the 
Criminal Procedure Act authorises the police to infringe the privacy of 
the individual but on the other hand it guarantees the privacy of the 
individual. The provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act are qualified by 
the Constitution, specifically section 36 and 35 of the Constitution.  
 
In all systems it is recognised that the police exercise the powers of 
search of person or premises, the power to seize property uncovered in 
such searches, and power to arrest persons whose possible guilt is 
indicated by the evidence discovered during the investigation. 
The right to search, seizure and arrest is not left entirely in the discretion 
of the police. In both the inquisitorial and adversarial systems these 
                                                 
16 1995 2 SACR 761 (CC) par 18. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid par 21. 
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powers may be exercised only with the authorisation of a judicial officer. 
It is however universally recognised that the police may in certain 
circumstances act without prior authorisation. 
Pre-trial procedures constitute an important consideration in the 
application of the Bill of Rights for two main reasons: firstly, while it is 
conceded that law enforcement officials may require special powers in 
order to conduct criminal investigations, such powers will inevitably 
constitute a violation of ordinary fundamental rights and freedoms of the 
individual: 
 
     The powers of search and seizure constitute also “the first and most effective 
       weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary government. Human personality 
       deteriorates and self reliance disappears where homes, persons and possessions 
       are subject at any hour to unheralded search and seizure by the police.”19 
 
Secondly, there exists the risk that abuses at the pre-trial stage could 
well taint the fairness of a subsequent criminal trial. Thus many Bills of 
Rights provide protection against improper exercise of pre-trial 
investigative powers. The United States Constitution, in the Fourth 
Amendment,20 confers on individuals the right “to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures. Section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Fundamental Rights 
and Freedoms guarantees the “right to be secure against unreasonable 
search and seizure.” South African and foreign legislation, namely, that 
of United States of America and Canada, share certain similarities which 
will be discussed later in this thesis. 
 
A search warrant should comply with strict requirements as to who may 
execute the warrant, where, how and when the warrant will become 
invalid.  At this critical juncture in the history of South Africa, when a 
constitutional democracy based on the rule of law must take root, 
rampant crime is one of the greatest public concerns. In S v 
                                                 
19  Brinegar v US 338 US 160 (1949) 223. 
20  USA Constitution, The Fourth Amendment (ratified December 15, 1971). 
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Makwanyane,21 Chaskalson P observed that the level of crime has 
reached such “alarming proportions” that “it poses a threat to the 
transition of democracy and the creation of development opportunities 
for all, which are primary goals of the Constitution.” Crime empties the 
right to freedom and security of person and the right to property of 
meaning.22 
 
The Constitution aims at advancing an ethical criminal justice system 
that is accountable to society. The Bill of Rights is a powerful instrument 
in the reconstruction and transformation of South African society. 
However the Bill of Rights should not be regarded as a panacea for all 
ills. It should rather be understood and used within the structural context 
of the whole Constitution, from which it must draw its strength.  
Today, law enforcement officials must be highly skilled in the use of 
investigative tools and extremely knowledgeable about the intricacies of 
the law. One error in judgement during initial contact with a suspect can, 
and often does impede the investigation and could effect the fairness of 
the trial. For example, an illegal search may so contaminate evidence 
obtained that it will not be admitted as evidence in court. In addition to 
losing evidence for prosecution purposes, failing to comply with 
constitutional mandates often leads to liability on the part of the law 
enforcement official. 
 
2.1 Application of the Bill of Rights to Criminal Procedure 
 
Section 39(1) of the Constitution provides the following interpretive 
commands: 
 
When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum – 
(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society  
     based on human dignity, equality and freedom; 
                                                 
21 1995 6 BCLR 665 (CC) par 44. 
22  See E. Cameron “Rights, constitutionalism and the Rule of Law” 1997 114 SALJ   
     504- 508. 
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(b) must consider international law; and 
(c) may consider foreign law.    
 
 The Bill of Rights is a distinctive feature of the South African 
Constitution. The Bill of Rights ensures the perpetuation of democratic 
governance. It also articulates the fundamental values that the different 
branches of government must prescribe to. The Bill of Rights also limits 
the exercise of power by defining the limits of fundamental freedoms. 
The Bill of Rights contains general provisions which are applicable to 
criminal procedure, such as the right to privacy, the right to dignity, the 
right to life and the right to freedom and security of person, as well as 
provisions directed specifically at criminal justice, namely the rights of 
arrested, detained and accused persons. The Bill of Rights brings about 
profound changes to the law of criminal procedure as legislation and 
common law is no longer determinative. The Bill of Rights affects the 
administration of criminal justice in a number of ways. Firstly, some 
rights are capable of being invoked directly in the day to day functioning 
of the criminal justice system.23 Secondly, other rights set broad 
standards of constitutionality against which legislation and common law 
are to be measured and law or conduct inconsistent with these 
standards is invalid to the extent of the inconsistency.24 Any deprivation 
of freedom amply provided for in legislation must meet the broad 
standard of not being arbitrary or without just cause.25 Thirdly, the Bill of 
Rights also applies indirectly to the ordinary rules of criminal procedure. 
Section 39(2) of the Constitution provides that: 
 
When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary 
law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the 
Bill of Rights. 
                                                 
23 For example, on the arrest of a person for allegedly committing an offence, section 
   35(1)(b) imposes a duty on the police to inform the arrested person of the right to 
   remain silent.   
24 Section 172(1)(a) of the Constitution. 
25 Section 12(1)(a) of the Constitution. 
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Where the language of legislation permits the court must for example 
interpret the Criminal Procedure Act in conformity with the Bill of Rights. 
Apart from constitutional rights that can be applied directly, criminal 
justice will continue to be administered in terms of statutory and 
common law rules of criminal procedure.26 The constitutional standards 
set by the Bill of Rights serve, then, only as a safety net and an 
interpretive norm.27 While the Bill of Rights sets the foundational norms 
of criminal procedure, it is no replacement of the ordinary rules and 
principles of criminal procedure. The Bill of Rights constitute a minimum 
set of guarantees. Therefore ordinary rules of criminal procedure can 
provide more protection than what the Constitution demands.28  
 
2.2 Limitation of a constitutional right 
 
Section 36 of the Constitution reads:  
 
(1)  The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general 
application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an 
open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including – 
         (a) the nature of the right; 
         (b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
         (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
         (d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and  
         (e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
 
The truism that no right is absolute perhaps applies more to privacy than 
to any other right. The balance is struck in the Bill of Rights read 
together with legislation authorising searches. The Bill of Rights confers 
certain rights on individuals but it also authorises the limitation of those 
rights in the limitation clause. According to section 36 of the 
Constitution, rights in the Bill of Rights, may be limited by a law of 
                                                 
26 Steytler supra 3. 
27 Ibid 3. 
28 Ibid 3. 
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general application, provided that the limitation is reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom. Search and seizure will therefore be constitutional 
if it is authorised by a law of general application, such as the Criminal 
Procedure Act (which in itself contains reasonable requirements to be 
complied with before a search may be conducted and which indicates 
how it must be conducted). 
 
The starting point in a limitation analysis would be to ask whether the 
purpose of the search and seizure is important enough to override a 
specific manifestation of the right to privacy. Legitimate expectations 
would be much the same as those expressed in the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR),29 namely, the interests of national security, the 
public safety, the economic well being of the country, the prevention of 
disorder or crime, the protection of health or morals or the protection of 
the rights and freedom of others. In the context of the South African 
criminal justice system, the search for and seizure of articles should be 
regarded as legitimate for the following purposes: (a) to be used as 
evidential material in a prosecution,30 (b) to be confiscated because their 
possession is unlawful,31 (c) to return them to their rightful owner,32 and 
(d) to be forfeited to the state if they were used in the commission of an 
offence.33 
 
The two main safeguards to ensure the reasonableness of a search are 
the requirements of objective grounds for the search and prior judicial 
authorisation. These safeguards are inherent in the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights, the United States Supreme Court and 
                                                 
29  Art 8(2) (November 4, 1950). 
30  Section 20 (b) of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
31  Section 31 of the Criminal Procedure Act.  
32  Section 30(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act.  
33  Section 35 of the Criminal Procedure Act.  
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the Supreme Court of Canada, and have in the main been an integral 
part of South African law. 
 
The requirement that a right may be limited only to “the extent that the 
limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society 
based on human dignity, equality and freedom” introduces a 
proportionality test.34 Legitimate limitations on a constitutional right must 
occur through and be justified under the prescribed criteria in section 36 
of the Constitution and not by giving a restricted definition to the right.35 
Constitutional rights should as far as possible be given a broad and 
generous interpretation, that is not to say that they are unlimited.36 The 
limitation of a constitutional right for a purpose that is reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society involves the weighing up of 
                                                 
34  S v Makwanyane 1995 6 BCLR 104. 
35   National Director of Public Prosecutions and Another v Mahomed [2008] 1 All 181 
(SCA)184:  Two search and seizure warrants were issued, authorising search and 
seizure operations at the respondent’s residence and offices. All items seized were 
sealed and deposited with the Registrar of the Johannesburg High Court, but the 
respondents claimed privilege in respect of all but three items. On application by 
the respondent the warrants were set aside by the High Court and the appellant 
was ordered to return all items seized under the warrant. The appellants conceded 
that the warrants were invalid in so far as no case had been made out for the 
search and seizure of the objects listed in certain paragraphs, the appellants 
contended that those paragraphs could be removed from the warrants and that the 
remainder of the warrants could be found to be valid. Prior to the hearing of the 
appeal the appellants indicated that they were prepared to concede the appeal 
provided that the parties could reach consensus on the variation of the order of the 
court (a quo) by the addition of a preservation order. The respondents did not 
agree. 
36  Ibid 184. The majority of the Court held that a preservation order should be 
     granted, but were not unanimous on the extent of the preservation order. It was 
     held that in so far as a preservation order infringes upon the constitutional rights of 
     the owner of the seized property, a court may exercise its powers to allow the  
     infringement only within the parameters of section 36 of the Constitution.  
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competing values and ultimately an assessment based on 
proportionality.37 
 
With regard to searches and seizures a balanced and proportional 
approach is apparent in Canadian law: In Descoteau et al v Mierzwinski 
and AG Que38 it was maintained that in cases where search warrants 
threaten fundamental freedoms the issuing judge must consider whether 
a reasonable alternative source or method is available from which the 
information might be sourced, and whether reasonable steps were taken 
to obtain the evidence from that alternative source. 
 
In R v Oakes39 the court laid down the following two tier test to establish 
that a limitation is reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society. Firstly, the objective, which the measures 
responsible for a limit on a Charter right or freedom are designed to 
serve, must be of ‘sufficient importance to warrant overriding a 
constitutionally protected right or freedom’. The standard must be high 
in order to ensure that objectives which are trivial or discordant with the 
principles integral to a free and democratic society do not gain section 1 
protection. It is necessary, at a minimum, that an objective relate to 
concerns which are pressing and substantial in a free and democratic 
society before it can be characterised as sufficiently important. 
Secondly, once a sufficiently significant objective is recognised, then the 
party invoking section 1 must show that the means chosen are 
reasonable and demonstrably justified. This involves “a form of 
proportionality test.” Although the nature of the proportionality test will 
vary depending on the circumstances, in each case courts will be 
                                                 
37  S v Makwanyane 1995 6 BCLR 665. See also National Director of Public 
    Prosecutions  and Another v Mahomed 2008 (1) SACR 309 (SCA) 336:   
    “Constitutional rights as far as is possible, must be given a broad and generous 
      interpretation.” 
38  [1982] 1 SCR 860 at 870-875 (1982) 70 CCC 385 (SCC) 409. 
39  (1986) 26 DLR (4th) 200 (SCC) 227. 
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required to balance the interests of society with those of individuals and 
groups. There are three important components of a proportionality test: 
 
• First, the measures adopted must be carefully designed to 
achieve the objective in question. They must not be arbitrary, 
unfair or based on irrational considerations. In short, they must 
be rationally connected to the objective.  
• Secondly, the means, even if rationally connected to the objective 
in the first sense, should impair “as little as possible” the right or 
freedom in question. 
• Thirdly, there must be a proportionality between the effects of the 
measures which are responsible for limiting the Charter right or 
freedom, and the objective which has been identified as of 
“sufficient importance.” 
 
Even if an objective is of sufficient importance, and the first two 
elements of the proportionality test are satisfied, it is still possible that, 
because of the severity of the deleterious effects of the measure on 
individuals or groups, the measure will not be justified by the purpose it 
is intended to serve. Initially the Constitutional Court adopted a more 
reserved approach40 concerning the application of criteria adopted by 
Oakes for the interpretation of section 1 of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights, but it nevertheless accepted that these criteria may be of 
assistance to our courts and have a bearing on the way in which the 
limitation clause should be approached.41  
 
Another important consideration is whether the limitation serves a 
legitimate purpose in an open and democratic society. It has been held 
that the objective of the limitation must relate to concerns which are 
pressing and substantial in a free and democratic society before it can 
                                                 
40  S v Zuma supra 35 where Kentridge J observed that “I see no reason in this case 
     ....to fit our analysis into the Canadian pattern....” 
41  S v Makwanyane supra par 110. 
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be characterised as sufficiently important.42 Although it is accepted that 
the current climate of lawlessness calls for effective prosecution of 
crime,43 it cannot in itself justify all measures aimed at curbing crime. 
Not even the prevalence and severity of certain crimes may in 
themselves justify a limitation.44 The overall crime prevention objective 
of legislation as well as the specific contested provision ought to be 
justified. 
 
2.3 Exclusion of evidence unconstitutionally obtained 
 
Section 28 of the Criminal Procedure Act45 provides: 
 
(1) A police official- 
(a) who acts contrary to the authority of a search warrant issued under section 21 or a   
     warrant issued under section 25(1); or 
(b) who, without being authorised thereto under this Chapter- 
     (i) searches any person or container or premises or seizes or detains 
         any article; or  
     (ii) performs any act contemplated in subparagraph (i), (ii) or (iii) of  
          section  25(1), 
shall be guilty of an offence... 
 
Section 35(5) of the Constitution reads: 
 
    Evidence obtained in a manner that violates any right in the Bill of Rights 
     must be excluded if the admission of that evidence would render the trial 
     unfair or otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice. 
 
Section 35(5) of the Constitution is closely modelled in structure and 
wording, on the Canadian Charter’s exclusionary rule which is contained 
in section 24: 
                                                 
42  R v Chauk (1990) 62 CCC (3d) 193 (SCC) 216, quoted in S v Coetzee 1997 1  
     SACR 379 (CC) par 13. 
43  S v Zuma supra 41. 
44  S v Coetzee 19971 SACR 379 (CC) par 9. 
45 51 of 1977. 
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     Where, in proceedings under subsection (1), a court concludes that 
      evidence was obtained in a manner that infringed or denied any rights or 
      freedoms guaranteed by this Charter, the evidence shall be excluded if it is 
      established that, having regard to all the circumstances, the admission of it  
      in the proceedings would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. 
 
The exclusion of evidence as a constitutional remedy pursues the same 
object as the general remedy cause – vindicating a constitutional right 
and deterring and preventing the recurrence of its infringement.46 The 
purpose of disallowing the use of unconstitutionally obtained evidence is 
the indirect vindication of the right that was violated.47 Directly it 
prevents the violator of the right from benefiting from the violation if it 
would render an accused’s trial unfair or be detrimental to the proper 
administration of justice.48  
 
In accordance with the principle that constitutional remedies should be 
employed as a last resort,49 the constitutional exclusionary rule does not 
replace other admissibility rules.50 It operates in addition to ordinary 
rules to exclude evidence that would otherwise be admissible. 
 
An accused is faced with the threshold requirement of showing that the 
contested evidence was “obtained in a manner that violates any right”.51 
Section 35(5) of the Constitution places a duty on the court to exclude 
evidence if its admission would render the trial unfair or otherwise be 
detrimental to the administration of justice. The court is vested with a 
value judgement whether the admission of such evidence would have 
either of the two consequences.52 In Mthembu v S53 the court 
                                                 
46 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 7 BCLR 851 (CC) 138. 
47 Steytler supra 34. 
48 Ibid. 
49 S v Mhlungu 1995 7 BCLR 793 (CC) par 59. 
50 R v Garfoli (1990) 60 CCC (3d) 161 (SCC) 189. 
51 Steytler supra 35. 
52 S v Madiba 1998 1 BCLR 38 (D) 44F. 
53 2008 4 All SA 522 (SCA) para 27. 
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maintained that section 35(5) of the Constitution requires the exclusion 
of evidence improperly obtained from any person, not only from an 
accused.  In S v Madiba54 a search was conducted without a warrant. 
The court assumed that the search was unlawful and constituted an 
invasion of privacy. However it held that section 35(5) of the Constitution 
did not require the exclusion of the evidence obtained. The court 
maintained that the limited extent of the infringement of privacy paled in 
significance when compared to the importance of achieving the object of 
arresting the suspect. In S v Gumede and Others55 the police allegedly 
contravened section 48 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 by not 
demanding entry before they kicked down a door. The court focused on 
the question of whether admission of the evidence, even if unlawfully 
obtained, would render the trial unfair or otherwise be detrimental to the 
administration of justice, and held that it would not. 
 
The notable feature of the Constitution’s specific exclusionary provision is that it does 
not provide for automatic exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence. Evidence 
must be excluded only if it (a) renders the trial unfair; or (b) is otherwise detrimental to 
the administration of justice. This entails that admitting impugned evidence could 
damage the administration of justice in ways that would leave the fairness of the trial 
intact: but where admitting the evidence renders the trial itself unfair, the administration 
of justice is always damaged. Differently put, evidence must be excluded in all cases 
where its admission is detrimental to the administration of justice, including the sub-set 
of cases where it renders the trial unfair.56 
 
3. Direction and focus of this study 
 
This study examines search and seizure as employed in the criminal 
justice system, from a constitutional perspective. Here the Criminal 
Procedure Act, the South African Police Service Act57  and the 
                                                 
54 Ibid. 
55 1998 (5) BCLR 530 (D) 37. 
56 Mthembu v S  2008 4 All SA 522 (SCA) para 25. 
57  68 of 1995 (hereafter referred to as either the “South African Police Service Act or  
     the SAPS Act” unless otherwise indicated). 
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constitutional position are examined. Under comparative law only the 
jurisdictions of the United States and Canada are examined, due to 
length constraints of this study. This study will attempt to show how 
South African courts have risen to the challenge in attempting to protect 
fundamental human rights in line with the new constitutional 
dispensation, when it comes to search and seizure. This study will also 
address to what extent approaches from foreign jurisdiction namely 
United States of America58 and Canada can be implemented in the 
South African context. Thus, principles extracted from these foreign 
jurisdictions are applied to the relevant South African context if they are 
workable. In both these jurisdictions there is a constitutionally mandated 
right to protection from unreasonable searches. It is therefore instructive 
to analyse the case law of these countries and to consider how our law 
fares and might be reformulated. 
 
This study focuses on the powers granted to police officials to conduct 
searches and seizures and to gather information in support of the 
investigation and suppression of crime. This study will examine the 
extent and efficacy of those powers in the light of constraints imposed 
by the Constitution. A pervasive theme is the question of whether an 
appropriate balance can ever be achieved between the inherently 
conflicting interests of the public in crime control and of the individual in 
protecting personal privacy and autonomy. However, before any 
detailed analysis can be made, it is imperative to consider what is meant 
by the concepts “search” and “seizure”. These concepts have developed 
pragmatically in South Africa. They have been moulded by many 
factors, including expediency, changes in investigation and trial process 
and more recently by the introduction of our “Supreme Constitution”. 
 
Chapter 2 examines the concepts “search” and “seizure” with reference 
to an understanding thereof in various jurisdictions. 
                                                 
58 Henceforth “United States” will be used to indicate court decisions and/or position  
    unless otherwise indicated. 
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Chapter 3 will examine the right to privacy, the right to dignity and the 
right to freedom and security of person, focussing upon the general 
nature of the rights and, specifically upon the search and seizure 
aspects of these rights. Relevant constitutional provisions will also be 
examined. International law will also be discussed. 
Chapter 4 examines the warrant clause, the requirements for a valid 
search warrant where the concepts of prior judicial authorisation, 
reasonable grounds, particular description of things to be seized, 
particular description of the place or person to be searched and 
information on oath to a magistrate or justice are critically discussed. 
Finally, the execution of search warrants is examined in Chapter 4.  
Chapter 5 examines warrantless search and seizure, the provisions for 
warrantless searches and seizures in terms of the Criminal Procedure 
Act 51 of 1977 and the SAPS Act 68 of 1995 are discussed. 
Chapter 6 contains conclusions and recommendations. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
THE CONCEPTS OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE 
WITHIN THEIR LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The modern South African law of search and seizure is part of extensive 
government regulation of social and commercial activities.1 Approximately 39 
statutes pertaining to criminal and non-criminal regulation deal with powers of 
search and seizure. Some of these statutes are well defined, others open-
ended. This implies that the individual is prone to invasion of his rights. 
Swanepoel2 maintains that our Constitution and the Bill of Rights entrenched 
therein, have introduced a new element into the equation because they call 
into question the constitutionality of these laws. Certain provisions of the 
above mentioned statutes curtail certain fundamental rights of the individual. 
This curtailment must however be reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on “human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into 
account all relevant factors.”3 
 
Search and seizure is one of the most powerful investigating tools at the 
disposal of police officials in the investigation and prevention of crime.  
 
     The task of combating crime and convicting the guilty will in every era seem of such a 
critical and pressing concern that we may be lured by the temptations of expediency into 
forsaking our commitment to protecting individual liberty and privacy.4  
 
 
 
                                                 
1  Swanepoel “Warrantless search and seizure in criminal procedure: A constitutional 
    challenge”1997 30 CILSA 341. 
2  Ibid 341.  
3  Section 36 of the Constitution, 1996. 
4  United States v Leon 468 US 897 (1984) 347. 
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Section 14 of the Constitution provides as follows: 
 
     Everyone has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have- 
  (a) their person or home searched; 
  (b) their property searched; 
  (c) their possessions seized; or  
  (d) the privacy of their communications infringed. 
 
Section 14(a) of the Constitution specifically protects the right not to have 
one’s person or home searched. A person’s home, it is widely accepted, 
constitutes the highest expectation of privacy, which reflects the old adage 
that the home is a person’s castle.5 Similarly section 14(b) of the Constitution 
guarantees persons the right “not to have ….. their property6 searched.” 
Further section 14(c) of the Constitution guarantees persons the right “not to 
have …. their possessions seized.”7 The most important legislative provisions 
that prima facie infringe these rights are to be found in the Criminal Procedure 
Act, followed by the South African Police Service Act.8 The right to enter 
premises, search those premises and remove goods therefrom is a significant 
invasion of the rights of an individual and must therefore be exercised within 
certain clearly defined limits so as to interfere as little as possible with the 
rights and liberties of the person concerned.”9 
 
 
                                                 
5  R v Silveira (1995) 97 CCC (3d) 450 (SCC) 127. 
6  “Property” apparently includes both movable and immovable property, see   
    Cheadle, Davis and Haysom South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights 
    2002 51. 
7 See also Rudolph and Another v Commissioner for Inland Revenue and Others 1996 4 SA 
552 (CC) 297, in which the Constitutional Court held that the word seizure should be given 
its ordinary grammatical meaning for it is not a term of art. See also Bernstein and Others v 
Bester and Others 1996 (4) BCLR 449 (CC) 452, where it was maintained that the 
compulsion to produce a document on pain of a criminal sanction is as much a seizure as 
the physical removal of that document by another person. 
8  See also Cheadle, Davis and Haysom supra 51. 
9  National Director Public Prosecutions and Another v Mahomed 2008 (1) SACR 309. 
   (SCA) 756. 
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2. The concepts of search and seizure in various jurisdictions 
 
2.1 In South Africa 
 
 2.1.1 The concept of “search” 
 
In the South African legal context, the terms search and seizure are not 
clearly defined.10 The question of what constitutes a search is left to common 
sense and is determined on a case by case basis. Steytler11 and Cheadle12 
refer to American and Canadian jurisprudence in an attempt to define search. 
It is maintained that an element of physical intrusion concerning a person or 
property is necessary to establish a search.13 “Search” where it relates to a 
person must be given its ordinary meaning in its context.14 The South African 
Police Service National Instruction 2 of 2002 defines search as “any act 
whereby a person, container or premises is visually or physically examined 
with the object of establishing whether an article is in, on or upon such 
person, container or premises”.15 The latter approach to the concept of search 
is questionable. What is meant by “visually” is not defined and could include 
merely looking at something.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10  Swanepoel “Warrantless search and seizure in criminal procedure” CILSA 30 1997 341. 
11  Supra 67. 
12  Supra 51. 
13  McQuiod- Mason The Law of Privacy in South Africa 1978 807. 
14  In Minister of Safety and Security v Xaba [2003] 1 All SA 596 (D) the court emphasised the 
     the ordinary meaning and stated that: 
     “...search when used in relation to a person had to be given its ordinary meaning in  
      context..”      
     The second edition of the Oxford English Dictionary gives the following meaning to 
    “search” where the verb relates to a person: “To examine (a person) by handling,  
     removal of garments and the like, to ascertain whether any article (usually something  
     stolen or contraband) is concealed in his clothing. 
15  Ibid 97. 
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2.1.2 Search of arrested person and seizure of articles 
 
Section 23 of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that: 
 
  On the arrest of any person, the person making the arrest may: 
(a) if he is a peace officer, search the person arrested and seize any article referred to in 
section 20 which is found in the possession of or in the custody or under the control 
of the person arrested, and where such peace officer is not a police official, he shall 
forthwith deliver any such article to a police official; or  
(b) if he is not a peace officer, seize any article referred to in section 20 which is in the 
possession of or in the custody or under the control of the person arrested and shall 
forthwith deliver any such article to a police official.16 
 
In South African law a peace officer may without a warrant or a reasonable 
belief search an arrested person and seize “any article” referred to in section 
20 of the Criminal Procedure Act, which is found in the arrestee’s possession, 
custody or control, and which may afford evidence of the commission of an 
offence. The parameters of section 20 of the Criminal Procedure includes all 
articles relevant to the crime committed. Further in terms of section 23(b) of 
the Criminal Procedure Act, the peace officer may place in safe custody any 
object found on the person of the arrestee, which he or she may use to cause 
bodily injury to himself or herself or others. Although the reasonableness of 
such a search is not constitutionally doubtful, the following principles should 
be observed when applying section 23 of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
Steytler17 puts it best when he says, firstly, that the “search should pursue an 
object not inconsistent with the proper administration of criminal justice”.18  
                                                 
 
16  Section 23 of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
     Section 20 of the Criminal Procedure Act reads: 
     The State may, in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter, seize anything (in this  
      Chapter referred to as an article) - 
(a) which is concerned or on reasonable grounds believed to be concerned in the 
commission or suspected commission of an offence, whether within the Republic or 
elsewhere; or 
(b) which may afford evidence of the commission or suspected commission of an offence, 
whether within the Republic or elsewhere; or  
(c) which is intended to be used or is on reasonable grounds believed to be intended to 
be used in the commission of an offence. 
17 Steytler supra 98. 
18 Steytler supra 98. 
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Secondly that, “although it might be constitutionally permissible to search the 
environment in which the accused is arrested, section 23 provides statutory 
authority only for the search of the person of the arrestee, not the area within 
which the arrest takes place”.19 Thirdly section 20 restricts the search to 
specific categories of goods related to the commission of the crime. 
 
2.1.3 Search of premises  
 
2.1.3.1 Defining the term “premises” 
 
Section 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act defines the term premises as, 
“includes land, any building or structure, or any vehicle, conveyance, ship, 
boat or aircraft...” 
 
2.1.3.2 Search of premises by owner or lawful occupier  
 
Section 24 of the Criminal Procedure Act provides for the search of premises 
by an owner or occupier thereof. Any person who is lawfully in charge or 
occupies any land and who reasonably suspects that stolen stock or produce, 
as defined in any law relating to the theft of stock or produce, is on any 
premises upon that land, or that any article has been placed on such 
premises or is in the custody or possession of any person upon such 
premises in contravention of any law relating to intoxicating liquor, 
dependence-producing drugs, arms and ammunition or explosives, may at 
any time, if a police official is not readily available, enter such premises with 
the purpose of searching such premises and any such person thereon, and if 
any such stock, produce or article is found, he shall take possession thereof 
and forthwith deliver it to a police official. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 Ibid 99. 
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2.1.3.3 Entering of premises for purposes of obtaining evidence  
 
If a police official who is investigating an offence or alleged offence 
reasonably suspects that a person who may furnish information with regard to 
such offence is on any premises, such police official may enter such premises 
without a warrant for the purposes of interrogating such person and obtaining 
a statement from him provided that such police official shall not enter any 
private dwelling without the consent of the occupier thereof.20 It should also be 
noted that the Criminal Procedure Act does not differentiate between search 
of a private dwelling and other premises. Where a police official wishes to 
enter a private premises for the purpose of a search for and seizure of an 
article mentioned in section 20 he is generally required to have a search 
warrant or search with the consent of an authorised person.  
 
2.1.3.4 Resistance against entry or search 
 
In terms of section 27 of the Criminal Procedure Act, a police official who may 
lawfully search any person or premises in terms of section 26 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act, may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to 
overcome any resistance against such search or entry of such premises, 
including the breaking of any door or window of such premises, provided that 
such police official shall first audibly demand admission to the premises and 
notify the occupier and others on the premises of the purpose for which he or 
she seeks to enter such premises. The proviso of a previous warning shall not 
apply where the police official concerned reasonably believes that any article 
which is the subject of the search may be destroyed or disposed of if entry to 
the premises is demanded. Although the inherent purpose of section 27 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act is to prevent infringement of privacy it has the 
potential for misuse if applied without proper control. 
 
                                                 
20 Section 26 of the Criminal Procedure Act. See also Minister van Polisie en ‘n  
    Ander v Gamble en ‘n Ander 1979 (4) SA 759 (A) at 764D-F. 
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2.1.3.5 Power of police to enter premises in connection with state 
            security or any offence 
 
If it appears to a magistrate or justice from information on oath that there are 
reasonable grounds for believing that the internal security of the Republic or 
the maintenance of law and order is likely to be endangered by or in 
consequence of any meeting which has been held or is to be held in or upon 
any premises within his area of jurisdiction, or that an offence has been or is 
likely to be committed or that preparations for the commission of any offence 
are being made or are likely to be made upon any premises within his area of 
jurisdiction, he may issue a warrant authorising a police official to enter the 
premises, at any reasonable time for the purposes of carrying out such 
investigations and taking such steps as such police official may consider 
necessary for the preservation of law and order or the prevention of crime.21  
In terms of such warrant the premises may be searched and any person in or 
upon the premises may be searched for any article referred to in section 20 of 
the Criminal Procedure Act which such police official on reasonable grounds 
believes to be on such premises, or in the possession of such person and 
such article may be seized. 
 
A warrant of this nature may be issued on any day and shall be in force until it 
is executed or cancelled by the person who issued it or a person of similar 
authority, if the former is not available. A police official may act without a 
warrant if he on reasonable grounds believes that a warrant would be issued 
to him if he applied for it and that the delay in obtaining such warrant would 
defeat the object thereof.22 
 
 
 
                                                 
21  Section 25 of the Criminal Procedure Act.  
22  See discussion in Chapter 5 (5.2). 
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Section 24 of the Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and 
Related Activities Act23 provides as follows: 
 
(1) If, on written request under oath to a judge in chambers by a police official  
     of or above rank of director, it appears to the judge that it is necessary in  
     order to prevent any terrorist or related activity, the judge may issue a  
     warrant for the cordoning off, and stopping and searching of vehicles and  
     persons with a view to preventing such terrorist or related activity, in a  
     specified area, and such warrant applies for the period specified therein,  
     which period may not exceed ten days. 
(2) Under such warrant any police official who identifies himself or herself as 
      such, may cordon off the specified area for the period specified and stop  
      and search any vehicle or person in that area, for articles or things which  
      could be used or have been used for or in connection with the preparation 
      for or instigation of any terrorist or related activity. 
(3) The police official may seize any article or thing contemplated in  
      subsection (2), and Chapter 2 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act 51 
      of 1977), applies with the necessary changes required by the context in 
      respect of any such article or thing. 
(4) Section 29 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act 51 of 1977), applies in 
      respect of the powers conferred upon police officials in terms of this 
      section.      
(5) The provisions of this section shall not be construed as affecting the rights  
     of any police official or law enforcement officer to use any other power in  
     any other law in respect of cordoning off, search or seizure. 
 
2.1.4 Search and other affected rights 
 
Since a search may also infringe upon the rights to dignity24 and to bodily 
security, including the right against cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment,25 it 
must be conducted consonant with those rights. In terms of section 29 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act the search of a person must be conducted with strict 
regard to decency and order. A woman must be searched by a woman only 
and if no female police official is available, the search must be conducted by 
                                                 
23  33 of 2004. 
24  Section 10 of the Constitution. 
25  Section 12(1) of the Constitution. 
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any woman designated for the purpose by a police official. When conducting a 
search a police official may use force only if, and to the extent to which it is 
reasonably necessary to overcome any resistance against such search.26 
 
Section 37 of the Criminal Procedure Act provides for the ascertainment of 
bodily features of an accused person, including the taking of blood samples. 
In the United States and Canada such evidence is regarded as obtainable 
through a process of search: a search of the person of the subject.27 In the 
Canadian case R v Pohorestsky28, Justice Lamer, referring to a blood sample 
taken from an unconscious person for the purpose of obtaining evidence 
stated: 
 
 I consider this unreasonable search to be a very serious one … a violation of the sanctity of a 
person’s body is much more serious than that of his office or even of his home.  
 
In terms of section 37(2)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act a medical officer 
when so requested by a police official, may take a blood sample of a person 
who is in custody or has been arrested but released, as may be deemed 
necessary in order to ascertain a characteristic or condition. It is submitted 
that in the absence of exigent circumstances, a warrant should be obtained.29 
On a charge of drunken driving for instance, where time is of essence in 
obtaining a blood sample, prior authorisation could usually be dispensed with. 
The exercise of this power by a district surgeon to take a blood sample 
without any authorisation from a warrant or arresting officer should be 
dependent upon the existence of reasonable grounds that such sample may 
be relevant to any criminal proceedings.30 
 
 
 
                                                 
26  Section 27(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
27  R v Dyment (1988) 55 DLR (4th) 503: US v Weir (1981) 657 F2d (8th Cir) 1005. 
28  (1987) 39 DLR (4th) 699 at 702. 
29  Steytler supra 1998 97. 
30  Section 37(2)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
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2.1.5 The concept of “seizure” 
 
In Ntoyakhe v Minister of Safety and Security31 the court held that the word 
“seize” encompasses not only the act of taking possession of an article, but 
also the subsequent detention32 thereof. Otherwise the right to seize would be 
rendered worthless.33 The court then went on to determine that the right of 
further detention of a seized article is not unlimited and thus does not confer 
upon the State the right to deprive a person of lawful possession of an article 
indefinitely. 
 
2.1.5.1 The State may seize certain articles only  
 
The power to seize is limited to articles which are either involved in, used 
during or may provide proof of the commission of an offence in the Republic 
of South Africa or elsewhere, or may provide proof of the fact that the 
commission of the offence was planned. 
 
The State may in terms of section 20 of the Criminal Procedure Act seize 
anything which:  
 
(a) is concerned or on reasonable grounds believed to be concerned in the commission 
or suspected commission of an offence, whether within the Republic or elsewhere; or 
(b) may afford evidence of the commission or suspected commission of an offence, 
whether within the Republic or elsewhere; or  
(c) is intended to be used or is on reasonable grounds believed to be intended to be 
used in the commission of an offence.34 
 
                                                 
31  2000 (1) SA 257. 
32  “Detention” in the Oxford dictionary is defined as: “the action of detaining or the state of  
    being detained.” 
33  Ntoyakhe v Minister of Safety and Security supra 257. 
    The objective of section 20, read with section 31 [of the Criminal Procedure Act] is to  
     enable the police to obtain possession of articles for the purpose of investigating crime and 
     prosecuting suspected offenders. 
 
34  Section 20 of the Criminal Procedure Act.   
 29
Evidence which was obtained in conflict with these provisions, or in conflict 
with the Constitution, may still be allowed to be produced as evidence 
provided the trial is not rendered unfair as a result thereof and the admission 
of such evidence does not cause the administration of justice to come into 
disrepute.35 A suspicion of the commission of an offence and a reasonable 
belief are considered sufficient basis for the seizure of articles. It is submitted 
that the threshold here is very low particularly when cognisance is taken of the 
importance the Constitution places on fundamental rights. 
 
2.1.5.2 Article to be seized under search warrant  
 
In terms of section 21 of the Criminal Procedure Act unless the circumstances 
set out in section 22, 24 and 25 of the Criminal Procedure Act exists, an 
article may only be seized in terms of a search warrant. If it appears to a 
magistrate or justice of the peace that there are grounds for believing that 
such article is in the possession or under the control of a person or upon any 
premises, and such information is provided to him or her under oath a search 
warrant may be issued. In order for the search to be lawful, the premises to be 
searched must be clearly and properly identified in the warrant.36  
Once a criminal trial has started, the presiding  judge or judicial officer may 
issue a search warrant if it appears to such judge or judicial officer that such 
article is required in evidence before him. The search warrant requires a 
police official to seize the article in question and authorises such police official 
to search any person identified in the warrant or to enter and search any 
premises identified in the warrant and search any person found on or at the 
premises. A search warrant must be executed by day unless the police official 
is specifically authorised therein to execute it by night. A police official 
executing a warrant shall after such execution hand to the person affected by, 
or searched in terms of the warrant a copy thereof upon demand by the 
affected person. This will ensure that the person understands why his rights 
enshrined in the Constitution are being limited. It is first constitutionally 
                                                 
35   Section 35(5) of the Constitution – see discussion in chapter 1. 
36  Toich v The Magistrate, Riversdale and Others 2007 (2) SACR 235 (C) 176. 
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questionable that in terms of section 21(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act, a 
police official executing a warrant after such execution, only “upon demand” of 
any person whose rights in respect of any search or articles seized under the 
warrant have been affected, hand to him or her a copy of the warrant. 
Secondly a search warrant should be interpreted strictly and may not 
authorise the seizure of articles not strictly relevant to the investigation 
concerned. 
 
2.1.5.3 Circumstances under which an article may be seized without a  
            search warrant37  
 
A police official may without a search warrant search any person or container 
or premises for the purpose of seizing any article referred to in section 20: 
(a) if the person concerned consents to the search for and seizure of the 
article in question; 
(b) if the police official on reasonable grounds believes that a search 
warrant will be issued to him under section 21 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act and that the delay in obtaining such warrant would 
defeat the object of the search.38 
 
2.1.6 Concluding remarks on the South African perspective 
 
The keywords “search” and “seizure” are often used interchangeably. They 
are however two separate and distinct concepts. Protection against 
unreasonableness extends to both concepts. In South Africa the ambit of 
“search” and “seizure” are not defined comprehensively. It appears that each 
case is to be assessed on its own merits on an ad hoc basis. An essential part 
of crime investigation is the obtaining of evidence through searches and 
seizures. At the same time South African law recognises that state authorities 
should not be granted untrammelled access to search and seize items 
                                                 
37  See Chapter 5 for discussion. 
38  Section 22 of the Criminal Procedure Act. See also Ntoyakhe v Minister of Safety and  
    Security and Others 2000 (1) SA 257 (ECD) 147. 
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belonging to citizens. It is an imperative incident to constitutionalism that 
citizens must be protected from unjustified intrusions on their privacy and 
property by agents of the state. Historically, the police have required legal 
authority for undertaking such measures. The Criminal Procedure Act has 
long provided the only legal basis for obtaining warrants to search for and 
seize property or for performing such actions without a warrant in certain 
circumstances.  
Generally, the standard for these measures and the actions taken under their 
purview has been one of reasonableness. These powers have been 
predicated on reasonable grounds for believing that evidence will be located 
at the place to be searched. Since the birth of the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa, there have been additional constraints on search and seizure 
powers. This has come through the guarantee in sections 10 and 14 of the 
Constitution to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure.  
 
Search and seizure is arguably the single most complicated area of criminal 
procedure. Not only are there very detailed legal provisions and an almost 
infinite variety of factual situations, but the overlap of the Bill of Rights and the 
Criminal Procedure Act has raised the need for complex and nuanced 
analysis in order to determine whether the Constitution has been violated. 
 
2.2 In the United States of America39 
 
2.2.1 The concept of “search” 
 
“Searches” and “seizures” are conceptually distinct in the law of the United 
States of America. Justice Stevens explained how they differ in his concurring 
opinion in Texas v Brown40: 
 
Although our Fourth Amendment cases sometimes refer indiscriminately to searches and 
seizures, there are important differences between the two… The   Amendment protects two 
different interests of the citizen – the interest in retaining possession of property and the 
                                                 
39 For the sake of brevity “United States” will be used throughout hereafter. 
40  460 US 730 103 S.Ct. (1983) 443. 
 32
interest in maintaining personal privacy. A seizure threatens the former, a search the latter. 
As a matter of timing, a seizure is usually preceded by a search, but when a container is 
involved the converse is often true. Significantly, the two protected interests are not always 
present to the same extent. 
 
The United States Supreme Court defined “search” to mean, “a governmental 
invasion of a person’s privacy”.41 The court developed a two-way test to 
determine whether such an invasion has occurred. The party seeking the 
suppression of evidence obtained in the search must establish that he or she 
had a subjective expectation of privacy and that society has recognised that  
expectation as objectively reasonable. The Fourth Amendment specifically 
contemplates that “persons” and their “effects” or things can be seized. The 
term “search” is said to imply: 
 
Some exploratory investigation, or an invasion and quest, a looking for or seeking out. The 
quest may be secret, intrusive, or accomplished by force, and.......... 
 
A search implies a prying into hidden places for that which is concealed and that the object 
searched for has been hidden or intentionally put out of the way. While it has been said that 
ordinary searching is a function of sight, it is generally held that mere looking at that which is 
open to view is not search.42 
 
The power to search an arrestee’s person without probable cause or a 
warrant appears to be constitutionally inoffensive.43 In Chimel v California44 
Justice Stewart justified such a search as follows: 
 
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested 
in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist or effect his 
escape. Otherwise, the officer’s safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself 
frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize 
any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. 
 
                                                 
41  Rakas v Illinois (1978) 439 US 128.  
42  LaFave and Israel Criminal Procedure: Constitutional limitations in a nutshell 2001 
     302. 
43  Steytler supra 1998 97. 
44  395 US 752 762-763 (1969). 
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In United States v Robinson45 the United States Supreme Court allowed a 
general search incident upon arrest despite the fact that there was no 
possible danger to the arrestor and no further evidence could be discovered 
to prove the offence for which the accused was arrested. The court held that a 
search incident upon a lawful arrest required no further justification. At a 
police station a further search of an arrestee may be conducted without a 
warrant and probable cause as part of a routine inventory search incident on 
him or her being booked into custody.46 It is also reasonable upon arrest to 
search the area within the arrestee’s immediate control, in other words, the 
area from within which he may for example acquire possession of a weapon 
or destructible evidence.47 This power however does not include a general 
search of the premises in which the arrest took place.  
 
2.2.2 The concept of “seizure” 
 
The “act of physically taking and removing tangible personal property is 
generally a seizure.”48 A seizure of property occurs when there is some 
meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interest in that 
property.49  
 
Terry v Ohio50 indicated that seizure of a person occurs when an official uses 
physical force or makes a show of authority, that in some way restrains a 
person’s liberty, so that he is not free to leave. 
 
2.2.3 Concluding remarks on the American perspective 
  
In the United States of America, as in South African law, the words “search” 
and “seizure” are often used interchangeably. They do, however, form two 
                                                 
45  414 US 218 (1973). 
46  Illinois v Lafayette 462 U.S. 460 (1983). 
47  Chimel v California supra 763. 
48  LaFave supra 299. 
49  United States v Jacobsen, 466 US S.Ct (1984) 437. 
50  Supra 328. 
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separate and distinct concepts. Similarly, an element of intrusion concerning a 
person or property is necessary to establish a search. In the United States of 
America, the act of physically taking and removing tangible personal property 
is generally considered a seizure. However, in South Africa “seize” 
encompasses not only the act of taking possession of an article, but also the 
subsequent detention thereof. Further in the United States of America the act 
of seizure also includes “seizure of a person”. 
 
2.3 In Canada 
 
Section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees 
everyone a broad and general right against unreasonable search and seizure. 
Conduct is either a search or a seizure whenever the situation commands a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.51 However, in some situations the courts 
have determined that there is a reduced expectation of privacy relative to 
Hunter v Southam52 but which nevertheless entail searches or seizures. In 
others, the reasonable expectation of privacy varies, depending on the 
context. Where there is no expectation of privacy, then section 8 of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms need not even be considered 
because no search or seizure has occurred. 
 
2.3.1 The concept of “search” 
 
A search is said to be any intrusion, other than arrest upon an individual’s 
person, property or privacy for the purpose of seizing individuals or things or 
obtaining information by inspection or surveillance.53  Only if a “form of 
examination” by government intrudes upon a reasonable expectation of 
privacy is it considered search under the Canadian Constitution.54 
                                                 
51  Quigley Procedure in Canadian Criminal Law 1997 168. 
52  Supra 184. 
53  Finkelstein and Finkelstein Constitutional Rights in the Investigative Process 1991 89. 
54  R v Evans (1996) 45 CR (4th) 210 (SCC) 279. 
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The Supreme Court of Canada, in Cloutier v Langlois55 referring to the United 
States Supreme Court,56 required no reasonable grounds, only that the 
search should be conducted for a legitimate purpose. The court laid down the 
following rules: 
 
1. This power does not impose a duty. The police have some discretion in conducting 
the search….. 
2. The search must be for a valid objective in pursuit of the ends of criminal justice, such 
as the discovery of an object that may be a threat to the safety of the police, the 
accused or the public, or that may facilitate escape or act as evidence against the 
accused. The purpose of the search must not be unrelated to the objectives of the 
proper administration of justice,…. 
3. The search must not be conducted in an abusive fashion and, in particular, the use of 
physical or psychological constraint should be proportionate to the objectives sought 
and the other circumstances of the case.57 
 
2.3.2 The concept of "seizure" 
 
Seizure was defined in R v Dyment58 as “the taking of a thing from a person 
by a public authority without that persons consent.” A seizure also includes 
compelling a person to give up an item. This type of seizure usually occurs in 
the regulatory field where documents are ordered to be produced,59 or where 
authorities are empowered to make copies of documents.60 
 
 
 
                                                 
55  (1990) 53 CCC (3d) 257 (SCC) 277. 
56  United States v Robinson 414 US 218 (1973) 417. 
57  Cloutier v Langlois (1990) 53 CCC (3d) 257 (SCC) 278. 
58 (1988) 55 DLR (4th) 503 this case concerned a blood sample taken by a doctor from a 
    motorist injured in a car accident and later giving it to the police after being analysed for  
    blood alcohol. It was found that the use of a person’s body to obtain information about him 
    violated a constitutionally protected area of personal privacy. 
59  Thomson Newspapers Ltd v Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) (1990) 76 
     C.R. (3d) 129 (S.C.C.) 127. 
60  Quigley supra 369. Comité paritaire de l’industrie v Potash 1994 168 N.R (S.C.C.) 243. 
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2.3.3 Concluding remarks on the Canadian perspective 
 
Like South Africa and the United States of America, Canada views the 
concepts of search and seizure as separate. Therefore it is possible to have a 
search without a seizure or vice versa even though both commonly occur 
together. In South Africa the position pertaining to search and seizure is 
similar to that of Canada, and South African authors61 commonly refer to 
American and Canadian jurisprudence in an attempt to define search and 
seizure. 
 
 3. Conclusion 
 
The concepts “search” and “seizure” are construed in a similar way in the 
United States of America, Canada and South Africa and, accordingly, South 
African authors draw from American and Canadian jurisprudence in 
attempting to explain these concepts appropriately. 
 
In the South African legal context, the terms search and seizure are not 
clearly defined.62 The question of what constitutes a search is left to common 
sense and is determined on a case by case basis. A search is construed to be 
any intrusion, other than arrest, upon an individual’s person, property or 
privacy for the purpose of seizing individuals or things or obtaining information 
by inspection or surveillance. Seizure is considered to be the taking of a thing 
from a person by a public authority without that person's consent.  A seizure 
also includes compelling a person to give up an item. 
 
In Chapter 3 I will turn to a discussion of the right to privacy and other affected 
constitutional rights, and will focus upon the general nature of the rights and 
specifically upon the search and seizure aspects of those rights. Relevant 
Constitutional provisions, together with international law, will be examined and 
                                                 
61  See, for example, Cheadle, Davis and Haysom South African Constitutional Law: The Bill 
of Rights 2002 51. See also Steytler  Constitutional Criminal Procedure: A commentary on    
the Constitution of the  Republic of South Africa 1998 28. 
62  Swanepoel “Warrantless search and seizure in criminal procedure” CILSA 30 1997 341. 
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discussed. The jurisdictions of United States of America and Canada will 
again be visited for the purposes of comparison. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
SEARCH AND SEIZURE: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND 
OTHER AFFECTED CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The South African Constitution is regarded as the product of the struggle for a 
democratic society in South Africa. The Bill of Rights in Chapter 2 of the 
Constitution aspires to be the “historic bridge” between the past, ridden with 
strife, suffering and the injustices of apartheid and the future where human 
rights and democracy will prevail. The primary function of the Bill of Rights is to 
protect the fundamental rights of individuals when they come into contact with 
the organs of the state.1 
 
The Bill of Rights constrains police, prosecutorial and judicial powers, thereby 
making the enforcement of criminal law more onerous than before. The Bill of 
Rights imposes positive duties on the state to protect the interests of South 
Africa’s inhabitants. Constitutionally every individual has the right to have his or 
her dignity protected.2 Everyone has the right “to be free from all forms of 
violence from either public or private sources,”3 and a duty is placed on the 
state to protect individuals against criminal violence. The right to freedom and 
security of the person,4 the right to privacy5 and the rights of arrested, detained 
and accused persons6 have placed the courts as guardians of the Constitution, 
in a pivotal position, to prevent abuse of the criminal justice system and to 
contribute to the development of a fair law of criminal procedure. 
Section 14 is the privacy clause in the South African Constitution. 
                                                 
1  Steytler Constitutional Criminal Procedure: a commentary on the Constitution of the 
   Republic of South Africa 1998 1-2. 
2  Section 10 of the Constitution. 
3  Section 12(1)(c) of the Constitution. 
4  Section 12(1) of the Constitution. 
5  Section 14 of the Constitution. 
6  Section 35 of the Constitution. 
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The qualification made in the Interim Constitution that only personal privacy is 
protected has been omitted in the 1996 Constitution.7 Any invasion in a 
constitutionally protected sphere of privacy is therefore prima facie a violation of 
section 14, which might be justified in terms of the limitation clause. 
 
 In Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor 
Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit8 Justice Langa DP (as he then was) referred to 
section 14 of the 1996 Constitution as the “right to privacy in the social 
capacities in which we act”. In Mistry v Interim Medical and Dental Council of 
South Africa and Others9 Sachs J also explained the historical setting of this 
constitutional safeguard and stressed the unrestricted discretionary powers of 
state officials and this includes the police, and its impact on privacy rights: 
 
The existence of safeguards to regulate the way in which state officials may enter the private 
domains of ordinary citizens is one of the features that distinguish a constitutional democracy 
from a police state. South African experience has been notoriously mixed in this regard. On the 
one hand there has been an admirable history of strong statutory controls over the powers of 
the police to search and seize. On the other, when it came to racially discriminating laws, 
security legislation, vast and often unrestricted discretionary powers were conferred on officials 
and police. Generations of systemised and egregious violations of personal privacy established 
norms for citizens that seeped generally into the public administration and promoted amongst a 
great many officials’ habits and practices inconsistent with the standard of conduct now required 
by the Bill of Rights. 
 
Prior to the inception of the interim Constitution10 South African common law 
recognised an action for the invasion of privacy. McQuoid-Mason maintains that 
                                                 
7  Steytler supra 1998 82. Section 13 of the Interim Constitution reads:  
         “Every person shall have the right to his or her personal privacy, which shall include the 
         right not to be subject to searches of his or her person, home or property, the seizure of  
         private possession.......” The right to privacy is no longer qualified by the word “personal”   
         and the word “private” is not included in the 1996 Constitutional text. This allows for a  
         much wider and less restricted privacy right.  
8  2000 BCLR  1079 (CC) 15-20 para 33. 
9  1998 (4) SA 1127 (CC) 76 para 16.  
10  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993 (Act 200 of 1993). 
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section 14 of the Constitution creates a constitutional right to privacy,11 but this 
does not mean that “all previous notions of privacy will be forgotten and fall in 
disuse.”12 The courts of today continue to employ those common law actions, 
which “are in harmony with the values of the Constitution.”13 The protection 
provided by the law to privacy was a logical and consequential development 
under the actio-iniuriarum, which affords a general remedy for wrongs to 
interests of personality. Privacy by its intrinsic nature is profoundly cherished by 
all individuals, in relation to intrusion into their private lives14 by the state or by 
other individuals. The right to privacy is a basic human need, essential for the 
development and maintenance both of a free society, of dignity and to ensure a 
mature and stable personality.15 
 
This discussion of the right to privacy and affected rights focuses both upon the 
general nature of the right and more specifically, upon its application to search 
and seizure. The right to privacy and affected rights can be limited in terms of 
the general limitation clause16 by law of general application if the limitation (i) is 
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, freedom and equality, and (ii) does not negate the essence of the right. 
The right to privacy can also be suspended17 in consequence of the declaration 
of a state of emergency, but only to the extent necessary to restore order.18 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11  McQuoid- Mason The Law of Privacy in SA  1978 18. 
12  Ibid 18. 
13  D v K 1997 2 BCLR 209 (N) 236. 
14  Devenish The South African Constitution 2005 79. 
15  Ibid 79. 
16  Section 36 (1) of the Constitution. See chapter 1 for discussion on limitation of rights. 
17  Section 37 of the Constitution. 
18  Section 37(4) of the Constitution. 
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2. The ambit and scope of the right to privacy and other affected 
    constitutional rights in various jurisdictions 
 
2.1 In South Africa 
 
2.1.1 The right to privacy 
 
Section 14 is the privacy clause in the Constitution and it reads as follows:  
 
       Everyone has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have- 
(a) their person or home searched; 
(b) their property searched; 
(c) their possessions seized; or 
(d) the privacy of their communications infringed.19 
 
This section provides for a general right to privacy, together with a direct 
guarantee of a right to privacy with regard to home life, private communications 
and the prohibition of unlawful entry and search.20 The general right to privacy 
extends to those aspects of a “person’s life in regard to which a legitimate 
expectation of privacy can be harboured”.21 This requires that a person must 
have a subjective expectation of privacy that society accepts as objectively 
reasonable.22 Persons cannot legitimately complain about violation of privacy if 
they explicitly or implicitly consented to waive their rights in this regard. 
 
An actionable invasion of privacy at common law occurs when another party 
commits an act, which has the effect of violating a person’s privacy, and that act 
is unlawful and intentional. An act which amounts to an invasion of privacy, is 
unlawful when it is contrary to the subjective desire on the part of the aggrieved 
person that the facts should remain private, and which is, objectively, 
                                                 
19  Section 14 of the Constitution. 
20  Davis, Cheadle and Haysom  Fundamental Rights in the Constitution 1997 91. 
21  Currie and De Waal The New Constitutional and Administrative Law 2001 361. 
22  Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd :  
    In re: Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit 2000 10 BCLR 1079 (CC) 235. 
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unreasonable. The boni mores, or norms prevailing in the community, is the 
standard by which the objective unreasonableness of an act is determined.23 
 
In Bernstein v Bester NO24 Ackerman J noted that, “the concept of privacy is an 
amorphous and elusive one” and he went on to say: 
 
     The truism that no right is to be considered absolute, implies that from the outset of 
interpretation each right is always already limited by every other right accruing to another 
citizen. In the context of privacy this would mean that it is only the inner sanctum of a person, 
such as his/her family life, sexual preference and home environment, which is shielded from 
erosion by conflicting rights of the community. This implies that community rights and the 
rights of fellow members place a corresponding obligation on a citizen, thereby shaping the 
abstract notion of individualism towards identifying a concrete member of civil society. 
Privacy is acknowledged in the truly personal realm, but as a person moves into communal 
relations and activities such as business and social interaction, the scope of personal space 
shrinks accordingly.25 
 
 The United States Supreme Court developed a two-part test to delineate a 
practical definition of privacy. Justice Harlan, in the landmark decision Katz v 
United States 26 explained the test as follows: 
 
                                                 
23  Ibid 167. 
24  1996 4 BCLR 449 (CC) para 65. 
25  Ibid para 67 
26  389 US 347 361 (1967). See also  I Glasser Visions of Liberty: The Bill of Rights for all     
    Americans 1991 177-178: 
   More and more, the Court has relied on a concept called ”expectation of privacy” to justify 
governmental searches and surveillance…. In a series of decisions the courts have upheld 
the power of the government to wire trap phones, infiltrate undercover agents, conduct 
camera surveillance by helicopter, search people’s trash cans, obtain their bank records, 
stop and search their automobiles, stop and seize people in public on the basis of “drug-
courier profiles” rather than tangible evidence, test the urine of people not suspected of using 
drugs, and gain access to telephone-company records that register every phone number one 
dials. In all these cases, the courts have ruled either that the Fourth Amendment did not 
restrict such searches and seizures or that it provided a reduced level of protection. The 
Court has often justified its decision by arguing that in these cases the individual had no 
expectation of privacy, only a limited expectation of privacy, thereby requiring less Fourth 
Amendment protection.  
 
   This was the contemporary situation. Today the right to privacy clearly exists and has 
immediate application to all attempts at search and seizure in law enforcement. 
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First that a person has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, 
that the expectations be one that society is prepared to recognise as reasonable. Thus a 
man’s home is for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy, but objects, activities, 
or statements that he exposes to the plain view of outsiders is not protected. On the other 
hand, conversations in the open would not be protected against being overhead for the 
expectation of privacy under the circumstances would be unreasonable. 
 
In Bernstein27 this approach was accepted as “sensible” because it confines any 
claim to privacy, only to aspects in regard to which a legitimate expectation is 
held. Following this approach in Protea Technology Ltd v Wainer28 it was held 
that such a legitimate expectation requires a subjective expectation of privacy 
which society recognises as being objectively reasonable. 
 
Legitimate expectations of privacy have crystallised into three domains or 
spheres of privacy:29  
 
• those relating to the body of the person; 
•  those relating to a territorial or spatial aspect; and 
•  those occurring in the context of communication or information transfer.  
 
These domains coincide with the rights enumerated in section 14 of the 
Constitution relating to person, home, property and communications. Other 
areas of privacy requiring protection can also emerge. 
 
Should a formulation of a unifying purpose of the right to privacy be attempted, 
then, briefly put, it is to allow every individual sufficient space in which he or she 
can be himself or herself and relate to other persons.30 It is the space 
“necessary to have one’s own autonomous identity.”31 Protecting the space is a 
                                                 
27  Supra 84.  
28  1997 9 BCLR 1225 (W) 1239 H 388. 
29  R v Dyment supra 178; Bernstein v Bester supra 65; Protea Technolgy Ltd v Wainer supra 
     391. 
30  Steytler supra 51. 
31  Bernstein v Bester NO 1996 4 BCLR 449 (CC) 93. 
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central concern of the liberal democratic tradition.32 Within the confines of this 
liberal democratic tradition, Didcott J proclaimed:  
 
     What erotic material I may choose to keep within the privacy of my home and only for my 
personal use there, is nobody’s business but mine. It is certainly not the business of society 
or the State.33 
 
Such an unqualified viewpoint may not be endorsed at all times. It could be 
limited if appropriately justified because like all rights privacy is not absolute. 
Langa J stressed that the importance of privacy should also be seen against the 
backdrop of South Africa’s history where this right “in common with others was 
violated often with impunity by the legislature and the executive.”34 
 
The objective aspect of privacy is problematic.35 The Constitutional Court held 
that “privacy is acknowledged in the truly personal realm, but as a person 
moves into communal relations and activities such as business and social 
interaction, the scope of personal space shrinks accordingly.”36 Society tends to 
be more favourably disposed to respect privacy as reasonable in relation to an 
individual’s home, body and family life. “Privacy interests are in their greatest 
when they relate to personal aspects of a persons existence and are much 
narrower outside personal matters.”37 This will however depend upon the 
circumstances of the case, since the state may indeed be justified in intervening  
                                                 
32   Nowak UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary 1993 287. 
33  Case v Minister of Safety and Security; Curtis v Minister of Safety and Security 1996 5 BCLR 
     609 (CC) 100. The majority of the Constitutional Court may not support such an unqualified 
     view of privacy, see Madala J (103). See also Mokgoro J para 65:  
      ..as in England, a ‘South African’s home is his (or her) castle. But I would hesitate to  
     endorse the view that its walls are impregnable to the reach of governmental regulation  
     affecting expressive materials.   
34  Case v Minister of Safety and Security: Curtis supra 101. 
35  Devenish supra 80. 
36  Bernstein v Bester 1996 2 SA 751 (CC). 
37  Motala “The Constitutional Court’s approach to international law and its method of 
     interpretation in the ‘Amnesty Decision’: Intellectual honesty or political expediency?”  21 
     SAYIL 1996 29. 
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when a private sphere of activity is involved in order, for instance to combat 
social evils.38 
 
There is a substantial overlap between infringement of the right to privacy and 
the infringement of other rights. Privacy and human dignity, for example, are 
intertwined and the former has as its objective the preservation for each 
individual of “the choice of when and how much he or she will allow others to 
know about his or her personal affairs, or interfere with his or her mind, or body, 
or private affairs”.39 Thus, the right to privacy is also protected in other sections 
of the Bill of Rights, such as those dealing with freedom of association. It is 
therefore imperative to perceive that the manner in which rights operate is not 
compartmentalised, but that they operate holistically. 
 
A juristic person is entitled to the right to privacy “to the extent required by the 
nature of the right and “the nature of that juristic person”.40 There is little doubt 
that the nature of the right is capable of being extended to juristic persons,41 a 
principle recognised in comparative constitutional jurisprudence42 as well as in 
South African common law.43 With reference to the nature of a juristic person, 
public juristic persons exercising public authority would not be able to claim 
privacy protection against state conducted searches.44 The extent of the 
protection depends on the nature of the privacy interest sought to be 
protected.45 
 
In Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor 
Distributors (Pty) Ltd: In re: Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit46 the 
                                                 
38  Case v Minister of Safety and Security 1996 1 SACR 587 (CC) para 65. 
39  PH King The Guide to American Law 1984 288. 
40  Section 8(4) of the Constitution. 
41  Steytler supra 85. 
42  Dow Chemical Co v United States 476 US 227 (1986). 
43  Financial Mail (Pty) Ltd v Sage Holdings Ltd 1993 2 SA 451 (A). 
44  Rautenbach and Malherbe Constitutional Law 1996 225. 
45  Steytler supra 191. 
46  2000 10 BCLR 1079 (CC) 437; 2001 1 SA 545 (CC); 2000 2 SACR 349 (C) 349. 
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Constitutional Court maintained that although juristic persons are not the 
bearers of human dignity, they are entitled to the right to privacy although their 
privacy rights “can never be as intense as those of human beings”. Blanket 
exclusion of the right to privacy would lead to possible grave violations of 
privacy in our society, with serious implications for the conduct of affairs.47 For 
instance the state may have a free licence to search and seize material from 
any  non-profit organisation or corporate entity at will. This would undoubtedly 
lead to serious disruptions and undermine the essence of democracy. Therefore 
juristic persons do enjoy the right to privacy, although not to the extent enjoyed 
by natural persons.48 
 
2.1.2 The right to dignity  
 
Section 10 of the Constitution reads as follows: 
 
Everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and protected. 
 
Chaskalson P (as he then was) maintained that the right to dignity is the pre-
eminent of all fundamental rights.49 It is the cornerstone value of the Bill of 
Rights as a whole and all individual rights are founded on this value.50 The right 
to dignity has been accepted as a foundational value in the South African 
Constitution. In S v Makwanyane51 O’Reagan J maintained that: 
 
                                                                                                                                               
     See also Magajane v Chairperson, Northwest Gambling Board 2006 (2) SACR 447 para 42- 
     43:  
     ...the scope of a person’s privacy extends a fortiori only to those aspects in regard to  
     which a legitimate expectation of privacy can be harboured.....businesses have lower 
    expectations of privacy as to the disclosure of relevant information to the public and 
    authorities....  
47  Devenish supra 2005 86.  
48  Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd.  
    Supra 15. 
49  M. Chaskalson The Third Bram Fischer Memorial Lecture 2000 (16) SAJHR 193. 
50  Ibid 193. 
51  1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC). 
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     The importance of dignity as a founding value of our new Constitution cannot be over 
emphasised.....Respect for dignity of all human beings in South Africa is particularly 
important.....Recognising a right to dignity is an acknowledgement of the intrinsic worth of 
human beings: human beings are entitled to be treated as worthy of respect and concern. 
 
The right encompassed in section 10 is the right of an individual to have his or 
her dignity protected. The implication of section 10 is logical and self 
explanatory. Individuals have a right to claim protection from the state from 
interference with their dignity by others. Our courts have linked dignity to status, 
honour, reputation or what amounts to esteem in the eyes of others.52  
 
The right to respect one’s dignity interfaces with many rights and, indeed, 
implies respect for all of a person’s rights. The conduct which impairs a person’s 
dignity may simultaneously be the impairment of a person’s right to privacy. The 
right to dignity may accordingly be asserted as an additional ground in a 
challenge to some other law or practice which impairs a person’s rights. This 
implies for example that when a person challenges a search with or without a 
warrant, on the basis that it was an unreasonable infringement of his or her right 
to privacy, he or she might add the impairment of his or her right to dignity.    
 
2.1.3 Freedom and security of the person 
 
Section 12(1) of the Constitution reads: 
 
Everyone has the right to freedom and security of the person, which includes the right- 
 (a) not to be deprived of freedom arbitrarily or without just cause; 
 (b)............ 
 (c) to be free from all forms of violence from either public or private sources; 
 (d) not to be tortured in any way; and 
 (e) not to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way. 
 
There is no definition of the word freedom in Chapter 2 of the Constitution. The 
concept of freedom includes the freedoms guaranteed in Chapter 2, such as the 
                                                 
52  University of Pretoria v Tommy Meyer Films (Edms) Bpk1979 (1) SA 441 (A) 277. 
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right to privacy.53 The primary purpose of the right to freedom is to ensure that 
the physical integrity of every person is protected, for this is how a guarantee of 
freedom and of security of the person would ordinarily be understood.54 
 
As an aspect of the right to dignity, physical integrity forms an important part of 
a person’s well being.55 Within the South African context, the history of state 
perpetrated violence particularly by the police, is one of the hallmarks of the 
previous regime and gives the right to privacy an important platform in the Bill of 
Rights.56 The right to security of person, as expressed in the specific rights to be 
free from all forms of violence, torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, 
includes both physical and mental aspects57 and creates a comprehensive 
shield against the use of physical force by the state. 
 
2.2 Foreign law 
 
The 1996 Constitution permits a court, when interpreting the Bill of Rights, to 
“consider foreign law”.58 While the provision is “no injunction to do more than 
this”59 the jurisprudence of foreign jurisdictions is an important source because 
it provides a yardstick or guidance  to the practice of human rights in other 
democratic jurisdictions.60 However the courts have warned that the use of 
foreign precedent calls for circumspection and acknowledgment that transplants 
require careful management.61 Foreign law will not necessarily provide a safe 
guide or means “to interpretation of the Bill of Rights” unless the principles of 
                                                 
53  Cheadle...et al. supra 154. 
54  Ferreira v Levin NO and Others and Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others 1996 (1) 
     BCLR 1 (CC) 59. 
55  S v Huma (2) 1995 2 SACR 411 (W) 414h. 
56  Bernstein v Bester NO 1996 4 BCLR 449 (CC) 89. 
57  Minister of Justice v Hofmeyr 1993 3 SA 141 (A) 1451. 
58  Section 39(1)(c):  
             When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum- 
                                  ....(c) may consider foreign law.” 
59  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391. 
60  Steytler supra 1998 13. 
61  Sanderson v Attorney-General 1997 12 BCLR 1675 (CC). 
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comparative law are adhered to.62 First the text and the context of the 
comparative system ought to be examined. The comparison may be relevant or 
irrelevant depending on textual and structural differences. The value of foreign 
judicial decisions should be examined within the context of the particular legal 
system. Secondly the underlying rationale and purpose of a comparable 
concept or doctrine should be examined and identified.63 The transportability of 
principles, doctrines or concepts is not dependent on similarity of language in 
which they are expressed but rather it is the compatibility of underlying 
rationales or purposes which determine whether a foreign principle, doctrine or 
concept can be effectively used.64  In this dissertation reference is made to the 
jurisprudence of the United States and Canada, “jurisdictions most cited by 
South African courts.”65  The South African Bill of Rights is largely modelled on 
the Canadian Charter.66 
 
2.2.1 In the United States  
 
In the United States, the courts usually quote the following dictum of Brandeis J, 
to justify their recognition of a right to privacy: 
 
The makers of our Constitution……recognised the significance of man’s spiritual nature, of 
his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of pain, pleasure and satisfactions 
of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, 
their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the 
Government, the right to be left alone........ the most comprehensive of rights and the right 
most valued by civilised men.67 
                                                 
62   Bernstein v Bester supra 91. 
63  Ferreira v Levin NO 1996 1 BCLR 1 (CC) 342. 
64  Paciocco, Charter Principles and Proof in Criminal Cases 1987 82. 
65  Steytler supra 13. See also National Director of Public Prosecutions and Another v Mahomed  
     2008 (1) SACR 309 paragraph 23 Nugent JA referring to Farlam JA says: 
             He finds support for his view in two decisions from Canada.... 
66  S v Nortje 1996 2 SACR 308 (C) 319. See also Zuma v National Director of Public 
     Prosecutions supra para 12: 
            This applies with equal force to the precepts of our law..... 
67 Olmstead  v United States 277 US 438 478 (1928). The right of the people to be secure in 
    their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,   
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It has also been accepted that the general right to privacy includes a number of 
so called privacy rights. In determining whether a particular privacy right should 
be recognised the Supreme Court usually asks itself the question whether such 
a right is “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” in such a way that “neither 
liberty nor justice would exist” if it was sacrificed and whether it is “deeply rooted 
in this Nation’s history and tradition”.68 Compared to other jurisdictions, this 
inherent limitation of the scope of the right to privacy has resulted in a narrower 
understanding of it in the United States.69 Apart from the inherent limitations of 
the scope of protection of the right to privacy,70 it may justifiably be infringed if a 
compelling state interest so requires. An infringing statute must be shown to be 
necessary and not merely rationally related to the accomplishment of a 
permissible state policy.71 
 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides as follows: 
 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the place to be searched, the person or things to be seized. 
 
The Fourth Amendment, unlike section 14 of the Constitution, does not only 
deal with the seizure of possessions but with persons as well. Another important 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment is that searches must not be 
unreasonable and further that a warrant can only be issued upon probable 
                                                                                                                                               
    shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
    Oath and affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
    things to be seized. See Woody 2006 29 “Search and seizure: The Fourth Amendment for  
    Law Enforcement officers” which states: The first clause affirms reasonableness and the  
    second clause affirms the need for a warrant with details. 
68  Bowers v Hardwick 478 US 186. 
69  Ibid 186. 
70  Maditsi “The Right of Privacy in America: What does it mean?” 1992 De Rebus 659. 
71  Griswold v Connecticut supra 510. 
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cause. The United States Supreme Court has struggled to give meaning to 
many of these concepts.72 
 
In the United States the Supreme Court in interpreting and applying the right to 
personal liberty and the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment 
relied on a conception of these rights which was in turn founded on the respect 
for human dignity.73 In this way many aspects of the inherent dignity of citizens 
have come to be protected under these rights, including the right to privacy and 
the many component parts of the right to privacy.74  
 
2.2.2 In Canada 
 
The Supreme Court of Canada views the right to privacy as being “at the heart 
of liberty in a modern state.”75 Founded on the bedrock value of the inherent 
dignity of the individual and his or her moral autonomy, the right to privacy gives 
the state no superior claim to prescribe how the identity of the individual is to be 
shaped.  
 
Section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is simple. It 
stipulates that: 
 
Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure. 
 
Much of the framework for analysing section 8 can be derived from Hunter v 
Southam76 and R v Collins.77 The relevant principles formulated by these two 
cases are as follows: the purpose behind section 8 is to protect the privacy of 
individuals from unjustified state intrusions but this interest in privacy is however 
limited to a “reasonable expectation of privacy”. The primary aim of the Charter 
                                                 
72  Salzburg Introduction to American Criminal Procedure 1980 28. 
73  Furman v Georgia (1972) 408 US 238. 
74  Ibid 238. 
75  R v Dyment (1988) 45 CCC (3d) 244 (SCC) 459. 
76  (1984), 41 C.R. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.) 261. 
77  (1987), 56 C.R. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.) 338. 
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is to protect individual rights and freedoms from state action means that it must 
be interpreted to constrain government from infringing upon these rights, rather 
than to authorise governmental action. In these cases section 8 was interpreted 
as protecting more than property rights. The purpose behind section 8 is to 
protect the privacy of the people as well as to guard against trespass of 
property. As a consequence of this purpose, the court held that intrusion of 
privacy through searches and seizures could only take place where it was 
justifiable for the privacy interest of the public to yield to the state interest in law 
enforcement or other supportable goals.  
 
In Canada notwithstanding the absence of constitutional reference to dignity, 
the Supreme Court maintained that respect for the inherent dignity of every 
person is the bedrock of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.78 The 
Canadian Supreme Court also stressed that the idea of inherent dignity finds 
expression in almost every right and freedom by the Charter.79 
 
Despite there being significant differences between section 14 of the South 
African Constitution, the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
and section 8 of the Canadian Charter, a brief study of the jurisprudence which 
has emerged in the United States and Canada can be useful for us. The United 
States and Canadian courts have interpreted their respective privacy provisions 
to apply only to state action.80 Where the individual is merely a private party 
acting on his or her own initiative, the Fourth Amendment does not apply.81 
According to Beaudoin and Ratushny82  the Canadian courts may distinguish 
between gathering evidence by a private detective or security officer for a civil 
matter and in doing so for a criminal matter. Our Bill of Rights however applies 
                                                 
78  R v Oakes (1986) 19 CRR 308. 
79  Morgenthaler Smoling and Scott v R (1988) 31 CRR 1. 
80  Durdeau v McDowell (1921) 256 US 465 475. Hunter et al v Dolphin Delivery Ltd (1987) 33 
     DLR (4th) 174. 
81  United States v Pierce 893 F 2d 669 at 674 (5th Cir 1990). 
82  Beaudoin and Ratushny The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1989 29. 
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to state actions only under section 7(2)83 and not to the actions of private, 
natural or juristic persons. 
 
3. International law  
 
Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
provides as follows: 
 
(1) No one shall be subject to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, 
family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks upon his honour and 
reputation.  
(2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference. 
 
The United Nations Human Rights Committee indicated that article 17 should 
be given a broad interpretation to include “the place where a person resides or 
carries out his usual business.”84 Interferences ought to be both lawful and not 
arbitrary, that is, “in accordance with the provisions, aims and objectives of the 
Covenant and should be in any event, reasonable in the particular 
circumstances.”85 
 
Although formulated differently the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) safeguards the same 
privacy rights. Article 8 reads as follows: 
 
(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. 
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society 
in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the 
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health and 
morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
 
                                                 
83  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 
84  Case v Minister of Safety and Security 1996 1 SACR 587 (CC) para 68. 
85  UN Human Rights Committee General Comment 16/32 of 23 March 1988. 
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The European Court of Human Rights regards Article 8 as reflecting a general 
right to privacy, although it does not refer to the concept privacy specifically. 
“Private life” and “the home” have been given a broad interpretation. The Court 
in Niemitz v Germany86 held that the office of a lawyer fell within the protected 
sphere of privacy. It is not always possible to distinguish clearly which of an 
individual’s activities form part of his or her professional or business life.87 The 
inclusion of certain professional or business activities or premises would be 
consonant with the essential object and purpose of Article 8, namely to protect 
the individual against arbitrary interference by public authorities. 
 
The broadness of the right to privacy calls for specific focus on the limitation 
clause in Article 8 (2). The requirement that any limitation should be “in 
accordance with law” necessitates compliance with both national law and the 
rule of law criteria.88  
 
A legislative regime crafted with the required precision should be applied strictly 
by administrative agencies.89 In Niemitz v Germany90 the Court criticised a 
warrant as being too vague because it authorised the search of a lawyer’s office 
without being specific. 
 
The proportionality test is of critical importance. For an infringement to be 
“necessary in a democratic society, an interference must be founded on a 
pressing social need and, in particular, be proportionate to the legitimate aim 
pursued.”91 In weighing the alleged harm (seriousness of the crime) and the 
extent of state interference, the court warned in Klass v Germany92 that states 
may not, “in the name of the struggle against espionage and terrorism, adopt 
whatever measures they deem appropriate.” It stressed the dangers of police 
                                                 
86  16 December 1992 Series A No 251-B. 
87  Steytler supra 80. 
88  Malone v United Kingdom 2 August 1984 Series A No 82. 
89  Steytler supra 81. 
90  Supra 334. 
91  Schönenberger and Durmaz v Switzerland 20 June 1988 Series A No 137. 
92  Klass v Germany 6 September 1978 Series A no 28. 
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powers “undermining or even destroying democracy on the ground of defending 
it.”93 To ensure appropriate guarantees against abuse, the court assessed 
police powers in terms of “the nature, scope and duration of possible measures, 
the grounds required for ordering such measures, the authorities competent to 
permit, carry out and supervise such measures, and the kind of remedy 
provided by the national law.”94There should be judicial supervision of any 
interference because of the guarantee of independence and impartiality.95  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The right to privacy and the other affected rights discussed above are 
guaranteed expressly in our Constitution. In providing for the right to privacy the 
Constitution gives an indication of its scope by specifying the entitlements it 
entails. The purpose of the right to privacy is closely related to its scope. 
Steytler96 reflects the view that the purpose of the right is “to allow every 
individual sufficient space in which he or she can be himself or herself and 
relate to other persons. It is the space necessary to have one’s own identity.” 
 
In Powell and Others v Van der Merwe NO and Others97 the court stressed the 
importance of the right to privacy and associated rights. From this authority and 
others such as Zuma and Another v National Director of Public Prosecutions 
and Others98 it is clear that a person’s right to privacy and affected rights are 
jealously guarded by the Constitution. It is more than arguable that the various 
                                                 
93 Ibid 396. 
94 Ibid 396. 
95 Ibid 396. 
96 Supra 67. 
97 2005 (5) SA 62 (SCA) 151, in which the court stated that: Because of the great danger of 
misuse in the exercise of authority under search warrants, the courts examine their validity 
with a jealous regard for the liberty  of the subject and his or her rights to privacy and 
property. 
98 2006 (1) SACR 468 (D) 168. 
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search and seizure provisions, which permit warrantless searches and seizures 
are likely to present constitutional problems.99 
In South Africa the right to privacy and other affected rights can be limited in 
terms of the limitation clause,100 by law of general application if the limitation is 
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on freedom 
and equality, and does not negate the essential content of the right. 
 
The right to privacy and affected rights are also explicitly guaranteed in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights,101 the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights102 and the European Convention on Human Rights.103 
In South Africa the right to privacy and other affected rights can be limited in 
terms of the limitation clause,104 by law of general application if the limitation is 
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on freedom 
and equality, and does not negate the essential content of the right. 
 
In the United States the Fourth Amendment105 does not refer specifically to the 
concept of “privacy”, but it has been found to be implicitly guaranteed in various 
of its provisions. In the United States the general right to privacy includes a 
number of so called privacy rights. In determining whether a particular privacy 
right should be recognised the Supreme Court usually considers whether such 
a right is “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” in such a way that “neither 
liberty nor justice would exist” if it was sacrificed and whether it is “deeply rooted 
in this Nation’s history and tradition”.106 The inherent limitation of the scope of 
the right to privacy has resulted in a narrower understanding of it in the United 
                                                 
99 Beaudoin and Ratushny supra 401. 
100 Section 36(1) of the Constitution. 
101 Article 12. 
102 Article 17. 
103 Article 8. 
104 Section 36(1) of the Constitution. 
105 “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against  
      unreasonable searches and seizures.” 
106 Bowers v Hardwick 478 US 186. 
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States.107 The right to privacy may justifiably be infringed if a compelling state 
interest so requires. An infringing statute must be shown to be necessary and 
not merely rationally related to the accomplishment of a permissible state 
policy.108 
 
In Canada the right to privacy is regarded as being at the heart of liberty. The 
right to privacy does not give the state any superior claim to prescribe how the 
identity of the individual is to be shaped. The right to privacy and other 
fundamental rights such as, the right to freedom and security of the person and 
dignity are interrelated and should not be viewed compartmentally. Searches 
and seizures, which generally involve an invasion of privacy must comply with 
constitutional requirements. In both the United States and Canada, the 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” defines the scope of constitutional 
protection from government intrusion. 
 
It is clear that in South Africa, as well as in the United States and Canada, any 
“state” or government conduct that intrudes on a justified expectation of privacy 
is considered a search and seizure and ought to be legitimate to pass 
constitutional scrutiny. 
                                                 
107 Ibid 186. 
108 Griswold v Connecticut supra 510. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
SEARCH IN TERMS OF A SEARCH WARRANT 
 
1. Historical background 
 
An overview of the historical context is imperative if the principles enshrined in 
our Constitution are to be understood. A person’s right to be free from being 
searched  and having their goods confiscated has its origin in common law in 
the context of eighteenth century English society, where the notion of sanctity of 
the home and the property owners need to be free and secure from government 
intrusion were of cardinal importance.1The following eloquent remarks of 
William Pitt aptly illustrate the inviolability of a person’s home: 
 
 [T]he poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the force of the Crown. It may be frail; 
its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm may enter; the rain may enter; but 
the King of England may not enter; all his force dares (sic) not cross the threshold of the ruined 
tenement.2 
 
The earliest recognised common law power of search was that of a citizen to 
pursue a suspected cattle thief.3 The overriding philosophy of the time was the 
protection and preservation of private property. In Entick v Carrington4 the Court 
of Common Pleas rejected the pleas of government to recognise the legality of 
general warrants, that is warrants which did not name the person to be arrested 
or specify the exact place to be searched or things to be seized, and instead 
stressed the immunity from intrusion of the private dwelling of a subject, unless 
there was express lawful authority to justify such intrusion. An early exception to 
the common law rule that no man may enter the home of any other man without 
permission from the owner or the occupier, was the right of the King’s officer to 
enter a man’s premises without warrant or permission, for the limited purpose of 
                                                 
1  R v Dyment (1988) 2 SCR 417, 45 CCC (3d) 244.  
2  Cited in LaFave 1987 4. 
3   Pollock and Maitland The history of English law 1968 91. 
4   (1765), 95 E.R. 807 (Eng. K.B.) 564.  
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searching for stolen goods which he reasonably believed to be concealed there. 
This exception was the origin of the search warrant,5 which could be issued only 
on suspicion that stolen goods had been concealed on private premises. 
 
South Africa’s pre-1990 political and constitutional history is documented in 
Chapter 1. Suffice to say that the Constitution has eliminated the core notions 
and latter day practices of its predecessors, namely, parliamentary sovereignty, 
a dominant executive, indiscernible separation of powers, underdeveloped 
political accountability, no Bill of Rights, and finally a racist base. 
Our Constitution aims to effect a fundamental balance between the interests of 
society in bringing offenders to justice and the rights and liberties of persons 
suspected of crime. There was a perceived need for clear and certain rules 
within which police officials should operate. By prohibiting unreasonable 
searches and seizures, and through regulation of the warrant process our 
Constitution places important limits on the powers of police officials in the 
prevention and investigation of crime.   
 
2. The rationale for a search warrant 
 
The warrant is a document by which searches are judicially authorised and 
legitimated.6  As a due process safeguard, all searches by warrant are 
considered to be “good” and all searches without warrant are “bad”.7 This theory 
is also most evident in the rhetoric of the United States’ Supreme Court in cases 
such as Coolidge v New Hampshire,8 where it was expressed that, as a general 
proposition, warrantless searches were unreasonable. A similar doctrine is 
apparent in Canada where the seminal case of Hunter v Southam Inc.9 stated 
that the absence of a warrant makes a search prima facie unreasonable. 
Another theory and one to which English judges traditionally subscribe, is that 
                                                 
5  Stephens Commentaries on the law of England (21ed) (Wellington vol. 4) 1993 224. 
6  Sharpe Search and Surveillance: the movement from information to evidence 2000 47. 
7  Ibid 47. 
8  403 US 433 (1971) 118. 
9  (1985) 14 CCC (3rd) 641 SCC 724. 
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warrants are coercive instruments and they must therefore be limited to those 
situations that have been set out in statute, as a result of a democratic 
process.10 
 
Today in the United States it is well established in the views of the Supreme 
Court that searches and seizures conducted without a warrant are suspect.   
 
     Searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by a judge or  
      magistrate is per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment..... Subject only to a few  
      specifically established and well delineated exceptions.11  
 
The Supreme Court has deemed this “a cardinal principle” of Fourth  
Amendment Law.12 
 
Indiscriminate searches and seizures might be thought to be bad for either or 
both of two reasons: The first is that they expose people and their possessions 
to interference by government when there is no good reason to do so. The 
concern here is against unjustified searches and seizures: it rests upon the 
principle that every citizen is entitled to security of his person and property 
unless and until an adequate justification for that security is shown. The second 
is that indiscriminate searches and seizures are conducted at the discretion of 
executive officials who may act despotically and capriciously in the exercise of 
the power to search and seize. This latter concern runs against arbitrary 
searches and seizures: It condemns the “petty tyranny of unregulated 
rummages.”13 
 
In Johnson v United 14 Justice Jackson submitted that there are exceptional 
circumstances in which, on balancing the need for effective law enforcement 
                                                 
10  Sharpe supra 87. 
11  Katz v United States 389 US 347, 357 (1967). 
12  Mincey v Arizona 437 US 385 (1978) 547. 
13  Minn Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment 1974 349. 
14  333 U.S. 10 (1948) 479. 
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against the right of privacy, it may be contended that a warrant for search may 
be dispensed with. 
 
In Beheermaatschappij  Helling I NV v Magistrate, Cape Town15 the court noted 
with reference to Powell NO v Van der Merwe and Others:16 
 
     Our law has a long history of scrutinising search warrants with rigour and exactitude – 
indeed, with sometimes technical rigour and exactitude. The common law rights so protected 
are now enshrined, subject to reasonable limitation, in section 14 of the Constitution...  
 
The courts tend to jealously safeguard individual rights because of the 
pervasive nature of these powers of search and seizure in the hands of the 
state.17 
 
This chapter will address the warrant requirement to conduct search and 
seizure. Secondly, the extent to which warrants serve to safeguard legitimate 
expectations of privacy, and certain aspects of the warrant process will be 
addressed in detail. Thirdly, the protections the warrant procedure affords will 
be considered. Principles extracted from comparative law will be considered 
and applied where it is relevant. Finally, the conclusion will consider the impact 
and influence of comparative law on our law. 
 
3. Search warrants 
 
3.1 The issuing of general search warrants 
 
3.1.1 In South Africa 
 
Section 21 of the Criminal Procedure Act governs the procedure with regards to 
search warrants. Subsection (1) provides that subject to section 22, 24 and 
                                                 
15  2007 (1) SACR 99 (C) 112. 
16  Supra (SCA Case No 503/2002,1 April 2004) (unreported at that time). 
17  Cowling Search and seizure SACJ 2007 400. Powell NO v Van der Merwe and Others  
     supra 49. 
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25,18 an article referred to in section 20 shall be seized only by virtue of a 
search warrant issued – 
 
(1) by a magistrate or justice, if it appears to such magistrate or justice from information on 
oath that there are reasonable grounds for believing that any such article is in the 
possession or under the control of or upon any person or upon or at any premises 
within his area of jurisdiction; or 
(2) by a judge or judicial officer presiding at criminal proceedings, if it appears to such 
judge or judicial officer that any such article in the possession or under the control of 
any person or upon or at any premises is required in evidence at such proceedings. 
 
Section 21 makes provision for two instances where a warrant may be issued: 
before the trial and during the trial. If a police official needs to obtain a search 
warrant and a magistrate is not available, a justice of peace should be 
approached, instead of conducting a search without a warrant.19 “Justice” 
means a person who is a justice of the peace under the provisions of the 
Justices of the Peace and Commissioners of Oaths Act 16 of 1963.20 A 
commissioned21 police officer is a justice of the peace, (holders of the following 
offices are justices of the peace: commissioned officers in the South African 
Police Service, National Defence Force and Correctional Services, directors of 
public prosecutions, registrars and magistrates). Such a commissioned officer is 
empowered to issue a search warrant.  
 
Section 25(1)22 stipulates that: 
 
If it appears to a magistrate or justice from information on oath that there are reasonable 
grounds for believing- 
(a) that the internal security of the Republic or the maintenance of law and order is likely to  
     be endangered by or in consequence of any meeting which is being held or  
                                                 
18  Sections 22, 24 and 25 of the Criminal Procedure Act are discussed in chapter 2. 
19  S v Motloutsi 1996 (1) SA 548 (C) 258. 
20  Section 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
21  Section 1 of the South African Police Act defines a commissioned police officer as 
     a police official with the rank of Captain and above. “Police official” means a member of the 
     South African Police Service.  
22  Criminal Procedure Act. 
 63
     is to be held in or upon any premises within his area of jurisdiction; or 
(b) that an offence has been or is being or is likely to be committed or that  
     preparations or arrangements for the commission of any offence are being or  
     are likely to be made in or upon any premises within his area of jurisdiction, 
he may issue a warrant authorizing a police official to enter the premises in question at any 
reasonable time....   
 
Where the person issuing the warrant is part of the office of the executing officer 
then objectively speaking neutrality and impartiality are in doubt and obviously 
this does not augur well for the protection constitutional rights and values. 
Furthermore commissioned officers may lack legal training and knowledge, and 
could have a direct interest in the matter, which can hamper objectivity.    
 
3.1.2 In the United States  
 
In the United States, both the United States Constitution and the Constitutions 
of the various states describe the circumstances under which warrants may be 
issued.23 They generally provide that: 
 
(1) a warrant shall not be issued unless there is probable cause; 
(2) the warrant must be supported by oath or affirmation; and the place to be searched and 
the things to be seized must be particularly described.24 
 
The United States Supreme Court expressed strong preference for the use of 
warrants because it interposes an orderly procedure involving judicial 
impartiality whereby a neutral and detached magistrate can make informed and 
deliberate decisions.25 
 
 The Fourth Amendment states: 
 
     The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated and no Warrant shall issue, but 
                                                 
23  Klotter, Walker and Hemmens Legal Guide for Police: Constitutional Issues 2005 91. 
24  Ibid 91. 
25  Israel and LaFave Criminal Procedure: Constitutional Limitations 2001 78. 
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upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the person or things to be seized. 
 
It has been maintained that “probable cause” is the level of justification required 
to make an arrest or conduct a search. The evidence in most probable cause 
statements is usually that the crime was committed.26 
 
3.1.3 In Canada 
 
In Canada the general power to issue a search warrant is conferred upon a 
justice of the peace.27 Under section 2 of the Canadian Criminal Code (1985), a 
justice is defined as either a justice of the peace or a provincial court judge. The 
most common type of search warrant issued is that under section 487 of the 
Canadian Criminal Code. It is a general search warrant since it may be used in 
relation to any Code offence or an offence under any other federal Act, even if 
that Act contains its own search and seizure provisions.28  
Section 487 reads as follows: 
 
(1) A justice who is satisfied by information on oath that there are reasonable and probable 
grounds to believe that there is in a building, receptacle or place: 
(a) anything on or in respect of which any offence against this Act or any other Act 
of Parliament has been or is suspected to have been committed, 
(b) anything that there are reasonable grounds to believe will afford evidence with 
respect to the commission of an offence, or will reveal the whereabouts of a 
person who is believed to have committed an offence, against the Act or any 
other Act of Parliament, or 
(c) anything that there are reasonable grounds to believe is intended to be used for 
the purpose of committing any offence against the person for which a person 
may be arrested without a warrant, 
 
he may at any time issue a warrant under his hand authorising a person named 
therein or a peace officer 
                                                 
26  Woody Search and seizure: The Fourth Amendment for law enforcement officers 2006 38.  
27  Harr and Hess Constitutional Law and the Criminal Justice System 2001 174. 
28  Section 487(1)(a) and (b) as interpreted by R v Multiform Manufacturing Company (1990), 
     79 C.R. (3d) 390 (SCC). 
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                    (d)   to search the building, receptacle or place for any such thing and to seize it, 
                           and 
                    (e)  subject to any other Act of Parliament, to, as soon as practicable, bring the  
                           thing seized before, or make a report thereof to, the justice or some other 
                           justice for the same territorial division in accordance with section 489.1.  
 
3.2 The issuing of warrants to maintain internal security and law and order 
 
3.2.1 In South Africa 
 
Section 25(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that if it appears to a 
magistrate or justice from information on oath that there are reasonable grounds 
for believing: 
 
(a) that the internal security of the Republic or the maintenance of law and order is likely 
to be endangered by or in consequence of any meeting which is being held or is to be 
held in or upon any premises within his or her area of jurisdiction; or  
(b) that an offence has been or is likely to be committed or that preparations or 
arrangements for the commission of any offence are being or are likely to be made in 
or upon any premises within his area of jurisdiction 
he may issue a warrant authorising a policeman to enter the premises in question at any 
reasonable time for the purpose- 
        (i)  of carrying out such investigations and of taking such steps as such policeman may 
consider necessary for the preservation of the internal security of the Republic or for 
the maintenance of law and order or for the prevention of any offence, 
(ii) of searching the premises or any person in or upon the premises for any article 
referred to in section 20 and which such policeman on reasonable grounds suspects 
to be in or upon or at the premises or in the possession or under the control of such 
person; and 
 (iii) of seizing any such article. 
 
In Control Magistrate, Durban v AZAPO,29 warrants were issued in terms of 
section 25(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act, on the basis of confidential 
information supplied to the magistrate in affidavits. The magistrate failed to 
provide reasons for his belief that the circumstances mentioned in section 25(1) 
                                                 
29  1986 (3) 394 (A). 
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existed. On appeal the decision by the provincial division setting the warrants 
aside was reversed. 
 
Only information placed under oath before a magistrate or justice may be 
considered in coming to the decision to issue the warrant.30 
In Wolpe v Officer Commanding South African Police, Johannesburg31 police 
officials entered a hall where a conference was being held by the South African 
Congress of Democrats together with other organisations. The chairman 
requested the police to leave the meeting and indicated that it was a private 
meeting. The police refused to leave. The Congress of Democrats brought an 
urgent application to the court for an interdict to prohibit the police from 
attending the meeting. They argued that the police do not have greater powers 
than any other individual, except in so far as they are vested with wide powers 
by statute. The application was refused. The judge concluded that if there was a 
suspicion that as a result of the holding of the meeting a disturbance of public 
order would occur on the same day, the police were entitled to attend the 
meeting in order to prevent the disturbance of order, even though the meeting 
was private. According to the judge the liberty of the individual must in such 
circumstances give way to the interests of the state. He however suggested that 
the legislature should define the duties and powers of the police in connection 
with the combating of what the state from time to time considered dangerous. 
This led to the inclusion of section 25 in the Criminal Procedure Act. It is 
submitted that the fact that a police official who acts in terms of this section may 
take any steps that he considers necessary for the preservation of the internal 
security of the Republic or the prevention of any offence, which could well be a 
minor offence, brings a subjective standard to be applied. It is further submitted 
that the standard for the police official’s conduct is arbitrary, because it applies 
to what the police official considers necessary and not that which is necessarily 
objectively justifiable. This appears to be an inherent violation of the right to 
privacy enshrined in the Constitution. 
 
                                                 
30  Naidoo and Another v Minister of Law and Order and Another 1990 (2) SA 158 (W) 166. 
31  1955 (2) SA 87 (W) 244. 
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3.2.2 In the United States  
 
The United States of America PATRIOT Act32 is a statute enacted by the United 
States government in October 2001. The Act increases the ability of law 
enforcement agencies to search e-mail communications, telephone, medical, 
financial and other records and enhances the discretion of law enforcement 
agencies in detaining and deporting immigrants suspected of terrorism related 
acts. The PATRIOT Act has generated great controversy since its enactment. 
Opponents of the Act have been vociferous in asserting that it was passed 
opportunistically after the September 11 terrorist attacks, believing there to be 
little debate on critical issues pertaining to fundamental human rights.33 
 
3.2.3 In Canada 
 
Before a warrant may be issued, there must be compliance with the provisions 
of section 487 of the Canadian Criminal Code. Under the Canadian Criminal 
Code a justice may issue a warrant authorising the search of a building, 
receptacle or place and seizure of anything that there are reasonable grounds 
to believe will afford evidence of an offence against the Code or any other Act of 
Parliament.34 
 
3.3 Prerequisites for a valid search warrant 
 
Some of the requirements of a search warrant are stated in the Constitution 
itself, others have been added by the Criminal Procedure Act, legislation and 
court interpretation. For a search warrant to be valid the following requirements 
must be met: 
 
 
                                                 
32  36 of 2001. The contrived acronym stands for Uniting and Strengthening America by  
     Providing  Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism. 
33  “Congressional Record” US Government Printing Office. (visited on 10 March 2009) 
     http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getpage.cgi.2001_record&page. 
34  Section 487(c). 
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3.3.1 Prior judicial authorisation 
 
3.3.1.1 In South Africa 
 
As a general rule a search should be authorised by a judicial officer.35 This 
power is, however extended to justices of the peace.36 Where the person 
issuing the warrant is part of the office of the executing officer, then objectively, 
there is no neutral or detached officer.37 Some kind of prior authorisation by an 
independent authority is usually necessary before a search may be carried 
out.38  
  
In Zuma v National Director of Public Prosecutions39 the court referred to the 
decision in Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai 
Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd40 where Langa DP reasoned that the task of the 
independent authority issuing a search warrant as being, first to establish the 
level of suspicion to justify an invasion of privacy, and secondly whether there 
are reasonable grounds to suspect that evidence sought is on the specific 
premises.  This was confirmed in Zuma v National Director of Public 
Prosecutions41  where the court reiterated that the emphasis is on the existence 
of “reasonable grounds for believing”. In Powell and Others v Van der Merwe 
and Others42 the court held that a reasonable suspicion is an impression formed 
on the basis of diverse factors, including facts and pieces of information falling 
short of fact such as allegations and rumours.43 It is the total picture that is 
relevant. 
 
                                                 
35  Sections 21(1) and 25 of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
36  Section 21(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
     See 3.1.1 Chapter 4 for discussion on justices of peace. 
37  Steytler supra 91. 
38  Currie and De Waal The New Constitutional and Administrative Law 2001 2. 
39  2006 2 All SA 91 (D) 15. 
40  2000 BCLR  1079 (CC). 
41  Supra 46. 
42  Supra 75. 
43  Powell NO and Others v Van der Merwe and Others 2005 1 All SA 149 (SCA) 161 38. 
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It is also implicit that the judicial officer should have regard to the provisions of 
the Constitution in making the decision. In Parker Ross and Another v Director: 
Office for Serious Economic Offences44 a provision in the Investigation of 
Serious Economic Offences Act45 authorising searches to be carried out without 
the sanction of a judicial officer was declared unconstitutional by Tebbutt J who 
stated that: 
 
     It would, I feel, accord with the spirit and purport of the Constitution if it was provided that, 
before any search and seizure pursuant to section 6 of the Act, prior authorisation be 
obtained from a magistrate or from a Judge of the Supreme Court in Chambers for such 
search and seizure. Any application for such authorisation should set out, at the very least, 
under oath or affirmed declaration, information as to the nature of the inquiry….., the 
suspicion having given rise to that inquiry, and the need, in regard to that inquiry, for a 
search and seizure … 
 
The importance of a residual discretion by a judicial officer is acknowledged in 
South African law with regard to the issuing of a warrant for the interrogation of 
a witness.46 The court in S v Cornelissen; Cornelissen v Zeelie NO47 held that 
where jurisdictional facts exist, the magistrate has the discretion to refuse the 
issuing of a warrant where a person’s right to privacy outweighs the interests of 
justice.  
These decisions are best made by an independent authority, usually a judicial 
officer. The principle needs to be invoked clearly in our law.48 The decision-
maker must be a neutral and detached person who is capable of acting 
judicially. The aim is to prevent unreasonable searches. 
 
3.3.1.2 In the United States  
 
The Supreme Court in 1971 made it clear that neither prosecutors nor police 
officers can be asked to maintain the requisite neutrality when deciding whether 
                                                 
44  Supra 198. 
45  117 of 1991. 
46  Section 205 of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
47  1994 2 SACR 41 (W) 69i. 
48  See section 21 of the Criminal Procedure Act - this principle is not enshrined in section 21. 
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a search warrant should be issued.49 State courts have recited the rule in state 
decisions. For example, an Oklahoma court held that the purpose of the warrant 
is to allow a neutral judicial officer to assess whether the police have probable 
cause to make an arrest or conduct a search.50 A New Jersey court opined that 
searches and seizures may be lawfully undertaken in many circumstances, and 
one such circumstance is when the search warrant is obtained from a neutral 
magistrate.51 
 
In Coolidge v New Hampshire52 warrants relating to a murder investigation were 
issued by the State Attorney General, acting as a justice of the peace. Prior to 
issuing the warrants, the Attorney General had personally taken charge of all 
police activities relating to the investigation. He later served as chief prosecutor 
at the trial. The Supreme Court held that the search resulting from these 
warrants breached the Fourth Amendment. The Court relied upon some 
seminal dicta in the case of Johnson v United States:53 
 
     The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not 
that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men 
draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a 
neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often 
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. Any assumption that evidence sufficient to 
support a magistrate’s disinterested determination to issue a search warrant will justify an 
officer in making a search without a warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and 
leave the people’s homes and offices secure only in the discretion of officers. 
 
Where there is evidence of ostensible bias, as in Coolidge, the Supreme Court 
is likely to invalidate the warrant, even in the absence of proof of actual 
partiality. Thus in Connally v Georgia54 a justice issued a search warrant under 
a statutory scheme whereby he received no salary, but was paid a prescribed 
                                                 
49  Coolidge v New Hampshire 403 U.S. 433 (1971) 394. 
50  Mollet v State 939 P.2d 1 (Okla.1997) 743. 
51  State v Ravotto 755 A.2d 602 (N.J.2000) 229. 
52  Supra 434. 
53  333 US. 10 (1948) 55. 
54  429 US. 245 (1977) 174. 
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fee for the issuance of every warrant. No fee was payable where a warrant was 
denied. The justice had testified in pre-trial hearings that he was a justice 
primarily because he was “interested in a livelihood.” The issuance of the 
warrant was a breach of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
Partiality may also arise as an aspect of abdication of responsibility of a justice. 
In Lo-Ji Sales Inc. v New York55 the magistrate signed what was, in effect an 
open search warrant in respect of an adult bookstore. The warrant had been 
issued after the magistrate had viewed two sample films purchased from the 
bookstore by the investigator. The magistrate accompanied the police to the 
bookstore for the purpose of ascertaining whether any material found on the 
premises might be obscene. This action was not only an improper delegation of 
judicial power to the police, it demonstrated a clear lack of neutrality. The justice 
had allowed himself to become a member of the search party which was 
essentially a police operation and had acted as an adjunct law enforcement 
officer. 
 
3.3.1.3 In Canada 
 
In Hunter v Southam56 Dickson J insisted that prior authorisation be obtained 
from someone who is neutral and impartial. It is not necessary that the person 
should be a judge, but he or she should be capable of acting judicially. In the 
criminal law sphere, the authorising person is in fact a judge.57  Unlike in South 
Africa, in most Canadian provinces provincial court judges are clothed with the 
jurisdiction of justices as well, and therefore any warrant that may be issued by 
                                                 
55  442 US. 319 (1979). 
56  [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, 33 Admin. L.R. (2d) 193: 
The purpose of a requirement of prior authorisation is to provide an opportunity, before an 
event, for the conflicting interests of the state and the individual to be assessed, so that the 
individuals right to privacy will be breached only where the appropriate standard has been met, 
and the interests of the state are thus demonstrably superior. For such an authorisation 
procedure to be meaningful it is necessary for the person authorising the search to be able to 
assess the evidence as to whether that standard has been met, in an entirely neutral and 
impartial manner. 
57  Quigley Procedure in Canadian Criminal Law 1997 178. 
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a justice may also be issued by a provincial court judge.58 In R v Baylis59 a 
justice, who was also a commissioner at an airport issued a search warrant for 
the search of drugs. She was held not to be a neutral and impartial person for 
this purpose.  
 
3.3.1.4 Concluding remarks 
 
The requirement of prior authorisation in the form of a warrant is a consistent 
prerequisite for a valid search and seizure in South African law. Such a 
requirement places an onus on the state (which includes police officials) to 
demonstrate the superiority of its interests to that of the individual. It accords 
with the apparent intention of the Constitution to prefer, where feasible, the right 
of the individual to be free from state interference to the interests of the state in 
advancing its purposes through such interference. 
 
An important difference between the South African law, the Fourth Amendment 
of the American Bill of Rights and the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, is that South African law and the Fourth Amendment specifically 
requires a police official, before conducting a search to obtain a search warrant 
based on reasonable grounds and probable cause respectively, supported by 
oath or affirmation. The Canadian Charter does not specifically require a police 
official to obtain a search warrant before conducting a search. However in 
Hunter v Southam60 the Supreme Court of Canada said that there was now a 
presumption that a warrantless search was prima facie unreasonable. Police 
officials seeking to justify a warrantless search are required to establish that it 
was not feasible to obtain a search warrant. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
58  Ibid 179. 
59  1988 65 CR (3d) 209 (CCC) 549. 
60  Supra 97. 
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3.3.2 Objective grounds for the search 
 
3.3.2.1 In South Africa 
 
The safeguards against unjustified interference with the right to privacy include 
prior judicial authorisation and an objective standard, that is whether there are 
reasonable grounds to believe based on information under oath that an offence 
has been or is likely to be committed; that the articles sought or seized may 
provide evidence of the commission of the offence; and that the articles are 
likely to be on the premises to be searched.61  
 
It is insufficient merely to ask whether the articles are possibly concerned with 
an offence.62 The question arising is what criteria should be employed to 
determine the basis of such grounds. One may infer that for seizure of property 
on reasonable grounds to be justifiable there should exist an objective set of 
facts which cause the officer to have the required belief. In the absence of such 
facts, the reliance on reasonable grounds will be vague. 
 
The Constitutional Court in Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic  
Offence v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd63 had to consider and pronounce 
upon the constitutionality of the provisions contained in the National Prosecuting 
Authority Act64 (NPA Act) that authorise the issuing of warrants of search and 
                                                 
61 Cheadle, Davis and Haysom South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of 
    Rights 2002 193; See also Rajah and others v Chairperson: North West Gambling Board and 
    Others [2006] 3 All SA 172 (T) 394 the court held that for a search and seizure to be valid in 
    terms of section 21 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, “a warrant may only be issued   
    by a magistrate or judicial officer where it appears from information on oath that there are 
    reasonable grounds for believing that an article is in possession or under the control of or at a 
    premises within the area of jurisdiction of that particular officer…… The present court has a 
    wide discretion to interfere with the magistrate’s decision if he has not applied his or her mind 
    to the matter.” 
62  Mandela v Minister of Safety and Security 1995 2 SACR 397 (W) 401b. 
63  2000 10  BCLR 1079 (CC) 539. 
64  32 of 1998. The sections at issue are sections 29(5), 28(13) and 28(14) of the said Act. 
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seizure for purposes of a “preparatory investigation”.65 Langa DP held that 
section 29(5) of the NPA Act explicitly provides that prior to issuing a search 
warrant, a judicial officer must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that an object which is connected to the investigation is on the premises 
on which the official requests authorisation to search: 
 
     The warrant may only be issued where the judicial officer has concluded that there is a 
reasonable suspicion that an offence has been committed, that there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that objects connected with an investigation into that suspected offence 
may be found on the relevant premises, and in the exercise of his or her discretion, the 
judicial officer considers it appropriate to issue a search warrant. These are considerable 
safeguards protecting the right to privacy of individuals.66 
 
For the effective protection of the right to privacy, the information on which 
reasonable grounds are based, thus authorising a constitutional search, may 
not itself have been obtained in violation of section 14 of the Constitution. The 
information need not comply with the strict rules of evidence67 and hearsay 
evidence of informers and anonymous tips may be used,68 subject however to 
the cautionary rule.69 The test adopted in Van der Merwe v Minister of Justice70 
is that the threshold is too low when the police in applying for a warrant, only 
express in their affidavit that the tendered hearsay evidence is true or correct. 
While the identity of informers need not be disclosed, information should be 
                                                 
65  Section 28(13) makes provision for the investigating director to hold a preparatory 
     investigation if he or she is uncertain whether there are reasonable grounds to conduct an 
     inquiry. The standard for a preparatory investigation was lower than the standards  
     encapsulated in section 20 of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
66 Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) (Ltd) 
     and Others: In RE: Hyundai  Motors Distributors (Pty) Ltd and others v Smit NO and Others   
     2000 (10) BCLR 1079 (CC) 52. In Parker-Ross and Another v Director: Office for Serious 
     Economic Offences 1995 (2) BCLR 198 (C) 339, Tebutt J declared a provision of the 
Investigation of Serious Economic Offences Act 117 of 1991, authorising searches to be 
conducted without prior judicial authorisation unconstitutional. 
67  Kriegler Hiemstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses 5ed 1993 38. 
68  Van de Merwe v Minister of Justice 1995 2 SACR 471 (SCC) 29. 
69  Steytler supra 88. 
70  1995 2 SACR 471 (O) 89. 
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placed before an independent decision- maker in terms of which the reliability of 
such hearsay evidence can be assessed. The word of the police cannot be a 
substitute for the decision of the issuing authority.71 The essence of reasonable 
grounds is that they are objective72 and can be reviewed by a court.73  
 
3.3.2.2 In the United States  
 
In the United States government agents who have probable cause to believe 
evidence of crime is located at a specific place or that an individual is involved 
in crime must go before a magistrate (judge) and swear under oath who or what 
they are looking for.74 All warrants are to be based on probable cause.75 In 
determining whether probable cause for the warrant exists, the reviewing judge 
must consider the totality of the circumstances, in other words whether a 
reasonable person would believe what the officer claims. A key term in the 
United States Fourth Amendment is probable cause. “Probable cause exists 
when the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge and of which 
they had reasonable trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to 
warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offence has been or is 
being committed”.76 In Zurcher v Stanford Daily77 the majority said that “the 
critical element … is a reasonable cause to believe that the specific “things” to 
be searched for and seized are located in the property to which entry is sought.” 
When dealing with the hearsay evidence of informers and anonymous tips the 
United States Supreme Court has developed a totality of circumstances test: a 
                                                 
71  Ibid 89.  
72   Du Toit, de Jager, Paizes, Skeen and Van der Merwe Commentary on the 
     Criminal Procedure Act 1996 27-30. 
73  Highstead Entertainment (Pty) Ltd t/a ‘The Club v Minister of Law and Order 1994 1 SA 387 
    (C) 393A. 
74  Harr and Hess Constitutional Law and the Criminal Justice System  2001 179. 
75  Ibid 180. 
76  Brinegar v United States. 338 U.S. 160 (1949) 395. 
77  436 U.S. 547 (1978) 598. 
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decision maker must take into consideration the totality of evidence in 
determining whether there is a reliable foundation for the reasonable grounds.78 
In Draper v United States79 probable cause was defined as follows: 
 
Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within their [the officer’s] 
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in 
themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been 
 or is being committed. 
 
In discussing probable cause for a search warrant the United States Supreme 
Court made the following statement: 
 
If the apparent facts set out in the affidavit are such that a reasonably discreet and prudent 
man would be led to believe that there was a commission of the offense charged, there is 
probable cause justifying the issuance of a warrant.80 
 
In 1986 the United States Supreme Court explained probable cause as follows: 
 
     The term ‘probable cause’....... means less than evidence which would justify 
condemnation......It imports a seizure made under circumstances which warrant 
suspicion.....Finely tuned standards such as beyond a reasonable doubt or by the 
preponderance of evidence, useful in formal trials, have no place in the magistrate’s 
decision. 
 
                                                 
78  In Spinelli v United States 393  US 410 (1969) 378, the U.S. Supreme Court at first  
  developed a two pronged test. At first the magistrate issuing the warrant had to establish  
  the basis of the knowledge of the informer and second the veracity of the information. The 
latter  question had two prongs: i. The credibility of the informant, and ii. The reliability of the 
information. If one of the prongs was missing the hearsay evidence was insufficient without 
further corroboration. In Illinois v Gates 462 US 213 1983 the court rejected the two pronged 
test established in Spinelli. It adopted a common sense approach which became known as 
“totality of circumstances” test. Once a magistrate has determined that he has information 
before him that he can reasonably say has been obtained in a reasonable way by a credible 
person, he has ample room to use his common sense and to apply a practical, non technical 
conception of probable cause. 
79  358 US 307 (1959) 358. 
80  Dumbra v United States 268 US 435 (1925) 683. 
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In its closing comment the court reiterated that: 
 
     Probable cause requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an 
actual showing of such activity. 
 
In defining the probable cause standard the court in 2000 commented that: 
 
      Probable cause to issue a search warrant need not be tantamount to proof beyond 
reasonable doubt; probability is the touchstone. The probable cause standard for issuing 
search warrants does not require a showing that an officer’s belief that evidence will be 
found in the searched premises is correct or more likely true than false; rather probable 
cause to search a home exists as long as the underlying affidavit contained information 
showing a fair probability that evidence of crime would be found there.81 
 
3.3.2.3 In Canada 
 
The Supreme Court of Canada in Hunter v Southam82 held that the Anglo-
Canadian legal and political traditions require reasonable and probable grounds 
for the belief, firstly, that an offence has been committed and, secondly, that 
something which may afford evidence in respect of the offence may be 
recovered from the place or person to be searched. Canadian Courts have 
indicated that the standard of proof to be met in order to establish reasonable 
grounds for a search is “reasonable probability.”83 The courts have repeatedly 
stated and restated that, a search warrant should not be granted lightly by the 
justice of the peace. Before issuing a warrant, the justice must be satisfied that 
there are reasonable grounds for the belief of the informant. It is not for him 
simply to accept the assurances of the informant that the procedure is proper. 
There should be before him sufficient information to enable him to decide 
judicially whether or not the warrant should be issued.84 In instances where a 
police official has received confidential information from a source, which does 
not want to be revealed or which the official does want to reveal, there is no 
                                                 
81  United States v Grant 218 F.3d 72 (1st Circuit 2000) 449. 
82  1984 11 DLR (4th) 641 (SCC) 658. 
83  Regina v Debot (1986) 26 C.R.R 275, 285. 
84  Moran v Canada 1988 36 CCC (93d) 225. 
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necessity for him to do so unless the justice concludes that he should do so.85 
Under section 487 (1) (b)86 the words of the section read: “anything that there is 
reasonable ground to believe will afford evidence …. ” In Worall v Canada87 an 
application was brought to quash a search warrant because the information had 
failed to allege that the “articles will afford evidence.” The Ontario Court of 
Appeal held that it was not necessary to do so, since there was no provision as 
to the informant’s belief that they will afford evidence, the words were 
superfluous and did not need to be included. 
 
3.3.2.4 Concluding remarks 
 
The two main grounds to ensure the reasonableness of a search are the 
requirements of objective grounds for the search and prior judicial authorisation. 
These safeguards are in South African law and they are likewise found in the 
jurisprudence of the United States and Canada. The purpose of objective 
grounds is to enable the judicial officer to decide whether the case based upon 
the facts brought before him is a proper one upon which to exercise his 
discretion and to issue a warrant to search. A search warrant should not be 
granted lightly by a judicial officer. The judicial officer must be satisfied that 
there are reasonable grounds for the belief. The United States Constitution 
describes the circumstances under which a warrant must be issued. It provides 
that a warrant shall not be issued unless there is probable cause. In the United 
States it is the function of a judicial officer to issue a search warrant. The US 
Supreme Court made it clear that neither prosecutors nor police officers can be 
asked to maintain the requisite neutrality when deciding whether a search 
warrant should be issued.88 This principle is not fully adhered to in South African 
law. In South Africa as a general rule a search should also be authorised by a 
judicial officer.89 However this power is also extended to justices of the peace.90 
                                                 
85  Swarts v Canada 1916 27 CCC 90. 
86  Criminal Code of Canada supra 142. 
87  1965 2 C.C.C. 1. 
88  Coolidge v New Hampshire supra 443. 
89  Section 21(1) and section 25 of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
90  Section 21(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
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Objectively, it is questionable whether the person who issues the search 
warrant as part of the office of the executing officer can be regarded as neutral 
or detached. 
 
3.3.3 Particular description of things to be seized  
 
3.3.3.1 In South Africa 
 
The warrant must clearly define the purpose of the search and the articles that 
must be seized. In Smith, Tabata and Van Heerden v Minister of Law and 
Order91 it was held that the court will find that the judicial officer had not applied 
his mind properly to the question whether there has been sufficient reason to 
interfere with the liberty of the person, if the search warrant only specifies the 
articles that were supposed to be seized, in broad and general terms. The 
defect is not cured by an instruction that such a police official must search for 
documents, which “may” afford evidence of the commission of the crime.92 
 
In Ferucci and Others v Commissioner, South African Revenue Services 93 the 
court held that: 
 
     [T]he items required to be searched for and seized may not be able to be identified with 
precision, it could not be expected that a warrant should always individually itemise each of 
the documents sought. The description of the documents in the warrant would be adequate if 
the person charged with executing the warrant could, by referring to the warrant itself, 
ascertain with reasonable accuracy what was to be searched. The person against whom the 
warrant was executed similarly had to be able to ascertain from the warrant itself what he 
was obliged to surrender. 
 
It has long been accepted that the Court’s will refuse to recognise as valid a 
warrant, the terms of which are too general.94  In Divisional Commissioner of SA 
                                                 
91  1989 (3) SA 627 (E) 249. 
92  Minister of Justice v Desai 1948 (3) SA 395 (A) 361. 
93  2002 (6) SA 219 (C) 231 B-E. 
94  Pullen NO and Others v Waja 1929 TPD 838. See also Minister of Justice and Others v  
     Desai NO 1948 (3) SA 395 (A) 134.  
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Police, Witwatersrand Area and others v SA Associated Newspapers Ltd and 
Another,95 part of the warrant authorised seizure of “all other documents 
including statements of whatsoever nature concerning reports in connection 
with the conditions in gaol and experience of prisoners in gaols throughout the 
Republic of South Africa.” The court held that this part of the warrant was too 
general. It was couched in such wide terms as to justify the interference that the 
justice of the peace who had issued it had not properly applied his mind to it. In 
Cine Films (Pty) Ltd and others v Commissioner of Police and Others96 the 
warrant stipulated a statutory copyright offence. However, what followed 
authorised the seizure not only of specified infringing films plus correspondence 
or circulars referring to such films, but “all stock books, stock sheets, invoices, 
invoice books, consignment notes, all correspondence, film catalogues”. 
The latter formulation was challenged. The court held that the warrant had been 
drawn too widely. The documents to be seized had to be identified with the 
statutory offence at issue. The challenged portion was set aside. In National 
Director of Public Prosecutions and Others v  Zuma and Another97 it was held 
that the warrants were unduly vague on basis that it constituted authority to 
search an accused person’s premises to find anything that would help the 
appellants in the prosecution. 
 
In Zuma v National Director of Public Prosecutions98 the court held that it is 
authoritatively established now, that for validity, a warrant must convey 
intelligibly to both the searcher and the searched the ambit of the search it 
authorises. It is not a cure for a warrant which is excessively worded “to say that 
the subject of the search knew or ought to have known what was being looked 
for:  the warrant must specify its object, and must do so intelligibly and narrowly 
within the bounds of the empowering statute.”99  
                                                 
95  1966 (2) SA 503 (A) 276. 
96  1972 (2) SA 254 (A) 98. 
97  2008 1 All SA 197 (SCA) 442. 
98  2006 2 All SA 91 (D). Confirmed in National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others v  
      Zuma and Another  2008 1 All SA 197 (SCA).  See also Powell NO and others v Van der  
      Merwe and Others 2005 1 All 149 (SCA) 664. 
99  Powell NO and others v Van der Merwe and Others 2005 1 All 149 (SCA) 169. 
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In Toich v The Magistrate, Riversdale and Others100 the Court held with 
reference to Pullen NO and Others v Waja101, Zuma and Another v National 
Director of Public Prosecution and Others102 that a warrant authorising the 
arrest of an unspecified person, or the search of unspecified premises, or for 
unspecified articles, will as a rule be invalid. 
Search warrants must be couched in clear and specific terms and police officers 
executing such warrants must operate within these terms.103 Further a warrant 
can only be issued for the purpose of securing articles that are reasonably 
believed to be concerned in the commission of an offence and are to be used in 
subsequent criminal proceedings in order to prove such offence.104 In 
Community Repeater Services CC v Minister of Justice105 a number of warrants 
issued by magistrates in Port Elizabeth failed on both the above grounds. 
 
In Beheermaatschappij Helling I NV v Magistrate Cape Town106 the Court 
addressed the ambit of the terms of the warrant. It held that the terms of a 
search warrant will always be construed with reasonable strictness which 
means that if it is too general or if its terms go beyond those that the authorising 
statute permits it will be set aside. In this respect it was held that because the 
search warrants placed no limit on the number or nature of documents liable to 
be seized, nor did they provide any indication how far back in time the searches 
could extend, the terms of the warrants went beyond what was considered 
reasonable in the circumstances. The court also found that the warrants only 
authorised a search and seizure for “documentation”. In keeping with the 
principle of strictness, the search for and seizure of computers and other 
equipment for storing electronic information was not covered by the warrant. 
The Court held that the terms of the warrant were unlawful which implies that 
                                                 
100  2007 4 All SA 1064 (C). 
101  Supra 32. 
102  Supra 121. 
103  Divisional Commissioner SAP Wits v Saan 1996 (2) SA 503 (A) 342. 
104  Cine Films v Commissioner of Police supra 574. 
105  2000 (2) SACR 592 (SEC) 349. 
106  2007 (1) SACR 99 (CC) 117. 
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they were invalid, irrespective of how the search and seizure operations were 
carried out. 
 
3.3.3.2 In the United States  
 
A leading case in this area is Marron v United States.107 Marron required that 
any item seized should be particularly described in the warrant. However in 
Coolidge v New Hampshire,108 this concept was broadened to allow officers to 
seize evidence that was not described in the warrant if: (i) it was in plain view 
and (ii) it was of an incriminating nature. Although Coolidge does not allow 
officers to go on a fishing expedition searching for evidence, if they are 
conducting a search of a premises and during the search observe other items 
that are incriminating, they may lawfully seize those items. A court held that 
items discovered during the execution of a search pursuant to a valid warrant 
may be seized if:  
 
(i) they are observed in plain view while the officer is in a place where he or 
she has a right to be, 
(ii) the discovery is inadvertent, and 
(iii) it is apparent to the officer that he or she is viewing evidence.109 
 
The Fourth Amendment provides that no search warrants shall issue except 
those “particularly describing the … things to be seized.” The degree of 
particularity required varies depending upon the nature of the materials to be 
seized. More leeway is permitted in describing contraband that is unlawfully 
possessed (property, the possession of which is a crime), and thus for example 
a description merely of “cases of whiskey” would suffice.110 Comparatively 
innocuous property must be described more specifically so that executing 
                                                 
107  235 U.S. 192 (1927). 
108  Supra 433 (1971). 
109  State v Mitchell, 20 S.W. 3d 546 (2000). 
 110 LaFave and Israel Criminal Procedure: Constitutional Limitations in a Nutshell 2001  
      83. See Steel v U.S. 267 U.S. 498. 
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officers will not be confused between items sought and other property of a 
similar nature, which might well be found on the premises.111 
 
The things to be seized must be described with reasonable accuracy and 
certainty. This was expressed in People v Bradford112 as follows: 
 
 The purpose of the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment is to avoid general 
       and exploratory searches by requiring particular description of items to be seized. 
 
If the description of things to be seized is too broad or sweeping, it is not 
“particular” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. For example, a 
description that described property sought as “books, records, pamphlets, 
cards, receipts, lists,… and other recordings concerning the Communist Party” 
was held to be too broad.113 Conversely, where the description is specific as to 
certain items, adding the phrase, “together with other fruits, instrumentalities, 
and evidence of crime” does not render the warrant invalid if this follows the 
detailed specific list of items.114 
 
3.3.3.3 In Canada 
 
The Canadian Criminal Code requires that articles to be searched for be stated 
in the warrant.115 The articles to be seized should be identified with reasonable 
particularity in the warrant so that the officers to whom it is directed will know 
exactly what to look for and to prevent wanton ransacking.116 The person 
executing the warrant is however, not limited to seizing only those articles 
described in the warrant.117 He may also seize anything that “on reasonable 
                                                 
111  Ibid 117. 
112  65 Cal. Reptr. 2d 145 (1997) 176. See also U.S. v Abell, 963 F.  Supp.1178 (1997). For a  
     search warrant to be sufficiently particular, the searcher must be able to reasonably 
ascertain and identify the things authorised to be seized. 
113  Stanford v Texas 379 U.S. 476 (1985) 439. 
114  Andresen v Maryland 427 U.S. 463 (1976) 549. 
115  Salhany Canadian Criminal Procedure 1989 74. 
116  Morgentaler v Fauteux, Church of Scientology (No 6) 21 C.C.C. 1985. 
117  Sahany supra 74. 
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grounds he believes has been obtained by or has been used in the commission 
of an offence”.118 
 
In many cases especially those involving extensive documentation, it is 
impossible to precisely identify the items sought in a search. It is sufficient in 
those cases if the warrant sets out the class of things to be seized.119 The test is 
whether a reviewing court can ascertain from the warrant whether the goods 
actually seized fall within the description120 and whether there is a sufficient 
nexus between the items and offence being investigated.121  
 
In R v Harris122 alleged obscene material seized from a business premises 
under a warrant were found to be insufficient due to insufficient particularity. 
The court held that the nature and content of the films sought in the search 
should be set out in the warrant. 
 
Section 487 of the Canadian Criminal Code grants authority to both search 
places and seize things found there. In addition section 489 grants a power to 
seize items other than those sought by the warrant if they are reasonably 
believed to be related to an offence other than that for which the warrant was 
obtained. In effect this is similar to the American plain view doctrine, which 
holds that a police officer engaged in lawful activity may seize evidence in plain 
view, except that the additional items seized need not have been in plain view 
but may be located in the course of the search. 
 
 
 
                                                 
118  Section 489 Canadian Criminal Code. See also Welch v Gilmour and Blackstock 111 C.C.C.  
      221 (B.C.S.C.) 1955: Money found on the prisoner was returned where there was no ground  
      for believing it was connected with the offence charged. 
119  Quigley supra 1997 181. 
120  R v Church of Scientology 31 C.C.C. 382 1987. 
121  R v Turcotte 2 W.W.R. 97 (Sask. C.A) 1988. 
122  57 C.R. (3d) 356 (Ont. C.A.) 1987. 
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3.3.3.4 Concluding remarks  
 
The warrant must clearly define the purpose of the search and the articles that 
must be seized. In South Africa it is authoritatively established now, that for 
validity, a warrant must convey intelligibly to both the searcher and the 
searched the ambit of the search it authorises. Search warrants must be 
couched in clear and specific terms and police officers executing such warrants 
must operate within these terms. In the United States the Fourth Amendment 
provides that, “no search warrants shall issue except those “particularly 
describing the … things to be seized.” The degree of particularity required 
varies depending upon the nature of the materials to be seized. The things to be 
seized must be described with reasonable accuracy and certainty. The 
Canadian Criminal Code also requires that articles to be searched for be stated 
in the warrant.123 The articles to be seized should be identified with reasonable 
particularity in the warrant so that the officers to whom it is directed will know 
exactly what to look for and to prevent wanton ransacking. 
 
3.3.4 Particular description of the place or person to be searched 
 
3.3.4.1 In South Africa 
 
Section 21(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that a search warrant 
issued under section 21(1) shall require a police official to seize the article in 
question (article referred to in section 20) and shall to that end authorise the 
police official to search any person identified in the warrant, or to enter and 
search any premises identified in the warrant and to search any person found 
on or at such premises. 
 
In National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others v Zuma and Another124 
the court indicated that: 
 
                                                 
123  Salhany Canadian Criminal Procedure 1989 74. 
124  2008 1 All SA 197 (SCA) 263. 
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… there are two criteria for validity that will apply to all warrants for search and seizure 
on account of their nature alone. A warrant is no more that a written authority to perform 
an act that would otherwise be unlawful. Like any other written authority it must 
obviously be intelligible (“capable of being understood”) … for it must be possible to 
determine with certainty the scope of its authority. A warrant must also authorise no 
more than is permitted by its authorising statute. If it purports to authorise what it is not 
permitted to authorise the warrant will be invalid at least to the extent of the excess. 
 
The protection which prior judicial authorisation affords will be meaningful if the 
issuing authority indicates clearly the scope of the intrusion with regard to the 
place to be searched.125 In Toich v The Magistrate, Riversdale and Others126 a 
warrant was held to be invalid in so far as it authorised the search of a farm and 
not the search of the accused’s house. The court maintained that the search of 
her house conducted under the purported authority of the warrant was 
unauthorised and unlawful and so was the seizure of property. Also, hardly any 
of the property seized under the warrant was specified in the warrant. 
 
3.3.4.2 In the United States  
 
Similarly in the United States the Fourth Amendment provides that no warrants 
shall be issued except those “particularly describing the place to be searched.”  
In a Supreme Court decision in 1987, some allowance was made for mistake by 
the police in describing the place to be searched.127 The Fourth Amendment 
                                                 
125  Steytler supra 93. 
126  2007 4 All SA 1064 (C) 491. The third respondent together with other police officials in the  
      course of their duties with the second respondent, conducted a search and seizure 
operation on the applicant’s property. Seven articles were seized during the operation. The 
police officials claimed to have acted in terms of a search warrant. The warrant authorised 
the third respondent and any other members of the SAPS who could assist in conducting the 
search and seizure to search “the identified person” and to enter and search “the identified 
     premises”. Only one person and one property were described in the warrant. Neither the 
     applicant nor her premises where the items were seized, were described in the warrant. 
127 Maryland v Garrison 480 U.S. 79 1987 659. Police officers in seeking a warrant to search  
     for controlled substances and related paraphernalia, believed that there was only one    
apartment in the third floor of the building. It was later discovered that the third floor was 
divided into two apartments. Prior to becoming aware that they were in the wrong apartment, 
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only requires that the premises be defined with practical accuracy. The 
description must be such that the officer executing the warrant can with 
reasonable effort and certainty, identify the exact place to the exclusion of all 
others.128 In describing the premises to be searched, greater care is generally 
required in urban areas than in rural areas.129 For instance farm property may 
merely be described in a general way and identified by section, township and 
range number. In a city however a building should be identified by street and 
number or by an equally specific description.130 
 
A valid warrant for the search of a certain person must indicate the person’s 
name, if known.131 Where the person’s name in unknown facts such as the 
individual’s aliases, approximate age, height and weight, race and clothing is 
adequate.132 In G6-Bart Important Co v United States the court held that 
application for a warrant must set forth facts showing the existence of probable 
cause, and contain a description of the place to be searched, persons to be 
searched and property to be seized.133 
 
3.3.4.3 In Canada 
 
The position in Canada is somewhat similar. This is aptly illustrated in the Time 
Square Book Store,134 where authority is provided for the proposition that a 
warrant should set out with reasonable specificity the location in the premises to 
                                                                                                                                               
the officers discovered contraband that provided evidence for conviction under Maryland’s 
Controlled Substance Act. Reiterating that the warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment 
prohibits the issuance of a warrant except when it “particularly describes the place to be 
searched and things to be seized,’ the Court nevertheless acknowledged that it must judge 
the constitutionality of the officer’s conduct in the light of the information available to them at 
the time they acted. 
128   Commonwealth v Rodriguez 732 N.E. 2d 906 Mass. 2000 632. 
129   Israel and LaFave supra 81. 
130  Ibid 82. See Steel  v U.S. 267 U.S. 498 1925. 
131  Ibid 83. 
132  Ibid 83. 
133  282 U.S. 344 1987. 
134  Times Square Book Store and R., Re 48 C.R. (3d) 132 (Ont. C.A.) 1985 374. 
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be searched where the items are thought to be. The usual position has been to 
restrict the ambit of the search to the premises named in the warrant and the 
immediate land surrounding it. If the police wish to search other buildings, they 
should provide the grounds and seek their express inclusion in the warrant.135  
Some inroads have been made on this position. For example, in R v Benz136 the 
Ontario Court of Appeal suggested that a warrant to search a home also 
granted authority to search vehicles, at least if they were in a garage or 
driveway on the same land and perhaps even on the street out front. 
 
3.3.4.4 Concluding remarks 
 
In South Africa it is authoritatively established in terms of section 21(2) of the 
Criminal Procedure Act that a search warrant issued under section 21(1) shall 
require a police official to seize an article in question (article referred to in 
section 20 of the Criminal Procedure Act) and shall to that end authorise the 
police official to search any person identified in the warrant, or to enter and 
search any premises identified in the warrant and to search any person found 
on or at such premises. Similarly in the U.S. the Fourth Amendment provides 
that no warrants shall be issued except those “particularly describing the place 
to be searched.”  In Canada the position is somewhat similar. This is aptly 
illustrated in the Time Square Book Store,137 where authority is provided for the 
proposition that a warrant should set out with reasonable specificity the location 
in the premises to be searched where the items are thought to be.  
 
3.3.5 Information under oath  
 
3.3.5.1 In South Africa 
 
According to section 21(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act information on oath 
must be provided to a magistrate or justice before a search warrant may be 
                                                 
135  R v LaPlante 40 C.C.C. (3d) 63 (Sask. C.A.) 1987 671. 
136  51 C.R. (3d) 363 (Ont. C.A.) 1986 437. 
137  Times Square Book Store and R., Re 48 C.R. (3d) 132 (Ont. C.A.) 1985 375. 
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issued. The information may be given verbally or in writing. Information in 
writing is however preferable. It is important to note that hearsay evidence may 
be regarded as “information” for the purposes of section 21(1). A police official 
may submit an affidavit in which hearsay evidence is used, for example, 
information from an informer, if the police official is of the opinion that the 
hearsay evidence is true and/or correct.138 
 
The information on oath must indicate that there are reasonable grounds for 
believing that an article referred to in section 20 of the Criminal Procedure Act is 
in the possession of or under the control of any person or upon or at any 
premises within the area of jurisdiction of the person that is approached with the 
application. If the oath or affirmation is not administered as required by the 
Criminal Procedure Act, the warrant will be invalid. In Toich v The Magistrate, 
Riversdale and Others139 from the record of proceedings before the magistrate, 
the only document relied upon by the police officer in her application for the 
warrant was her own undated and unattested “affidavit”. By virtue of the fact 
that there was no viva voce evidence and that the “affidavit” was not attested, 
there was no evidence of any kind placed before the magistrate on oath. Based 
on that reason alone it was held that the magistrate had no power under section 
21(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act to authorise the issue of a warrant and it 
was accordingly invalid. 
 
3.3.5.2 In the United States  
 
Comparatively the American Constitution also requires that a warrant be 
supported by an oath or affirmation.140 If the oath or affirmation is not 
administered as required by the American Constitution, the evidence obtained 
                                                 
138  Van der Merwe v Minister of Justice 1995 (2) SACR 471 (0) 398. 
139  2007 (2) SACR 235. “… the validity of a search warrant was to be examined with a jealous 
      regard for the subject’s right to privacy and property. … the magistrate or justice of the  
      peace authorising the warrant must be satisfied by information on oath not only that the    
articles to be searched for and seized was under the control or in the possession of a 
specified person or specified premises within his or her jurisdiction.” 
140  Harr and Hess supra 191. 
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under the warrant will be inadmissible. There is a presumption that the warrant 
is supported by oath or affirmation; however, this is a rebuttable presumption, 
and the defence may introduce evidence, including statements from the officer, 
indicating that no oath was in fact administered.141 If the defence can show that 
the affiant, such as a police officer, made a false statement or recklessly 
disregarded the truth, the search warrant will be declared invalid and all 
evidence obtained by virtue of the search warrant will be inadmissible.142 
 
3.3.5.3 In Canada 
 
In Canada the requirement of evidence on oath means that the justice must 
actually assess information provided by the police in order to decide whether 
the requisite grounds have been established.143 It is not enough for the police 
merely to assert that they have reasonable and probable grounds, rather the 
basis for that belief must be made clear to the justice.144 This means that the 
(officer swearing the affidavit) must indicate the sources of information and any 
indicators of reliability.  
 
3.3.5.4 Concluding remarks 
 
The essence of the oath is duly recognised in South African, Canadian and 
American law. It is an important safeguard against unjustified intrusion into the 
rights of an individual. The purpose of the oath was intended to govern not only 
the existence of reasonable grounds for suspecting that a certain article is to be 
found at a certain place, but also that there are reasonable grounds for 
believing that the article in question will afford evidence as to the commission of 
an offence. The information may be given verbally or in writing. 
 
 
 
                                                 
141  Lee v State, 2 P.3d 517 (Wyo. 2000) 553. 
142  Harr and Hess supra 193. 
143  Quigley supra 179. 
144  Kourtessis v Minister of National Revenue (1993), 20 C.R. (4th) 104 (S.C.C.) 526. 
 91
4. Execution of warrants 
 
4.1 In South Africa 
 
The search warrant requires a police official to seize the article in question and 
authorises such official to search any person identified in the warrant or to enter 
and search any premises identified in the warrant and search any person found 
on or at the premises.145 
 
In terms of section 21of the Criminal Procedure Act a search warrant must be 
executed by day unless the police official is specifically authorised therein to 
execute it by night. Conversely section 25 of the Criminal Procedure Act does 
not make provision for the time of execution of a warrant. The reasonableness 
of the time when a warrant is executed is significant in terms of the Constitution, 
since it has an important effect on the extent to which the dignity and privacy of 
the person concerned is affected. A police official executing a warrant under 
section 21 of the Criminal Procedure Act, shall upon demand of any person 
whose rights have been affected by the search or seizure under the warrant, 
hand to him or her a copy of the warrant.146 
 
A search warrant should be interpreted strictly.147 “Once issued by a competent 
judicial officer no person executing the warrant can widen its scope, even if the 
statute authorises wider powers than those included in the warrant.”148 While 
section 21(3) (a) of the Criminal Procedure Act intends to ensure that privacy of 
people’s homes is not invaded at unreasonable hours, this does not mean that 
a search which commenced during the day becomes unlawful at sunset.149 
                                                 
145  Section  21(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
146  Section  21(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
147  Bennet and Others v Minister of Safety and Security and Others 2006 (1) SACR 523 (T)  
      143. 
148  Naidoo and Another v Minister of Law and Order and Another 1990 (2) SA 158 (W) 289. 
149  Young and Another v Minister of Safety and Security and others 2005 (2) SACR 437. “Fact    
       … that had interrupted his search in order to fetch certain equipment, returning after     
nightfall, not constituting …, unauthorised search.” 
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4.2 In the United States  
 
Once the warrant has been properly issued by the issuing official, the police 
official is charged with executing the warrant and, in the absence of statutory 
authority, cannot refuse to do so.150 A police officer may not automatically 
assume that a search warrant is valid because a reviewing magistrate has 
issued it.151 The officer must read the warrant carefully and must be objectively 
persuaded that the warrant is sufficient. If the warrant is issued to a class of 
officers, any officer within that legal class may execute it. If it is to a named 
officer, only that officer or those present with him or her may execute the 
warrant.152 A warrant may be executed at night only upon a special showing of 
a need to do so, as provided by law in several jurisdictions, because of the 
“Fourth Amendment doctrine that increasingly severe standards of probable 
cause are necessary to justify increasingly intrusive searches.” 153 On the other 
hand a federal court has held that a search initiated during the day under a 
search warrant may continue into the night for so long as is reasonably 
necessary for its completion.154 
The final step for the officer in carrying out the orders of the court is to return the 
warrant, with the results of its execution, to the court or a designated agency.155 
The return should list the items particularly described in the search warrant, and 
indicate where and when these items were seized. Generally, a copy of the 
inventory is forwarded to the person from whose premises the instruments, 
articles or things were taken and to the warrant applicant. The latter is not a 
constitutional requirement however.156 
 
 
 
                                                 
150  Klotter et al supra 100. 
151  People v Randolph, 4 P.3d 477 (Colo. 2000) 476. 
152  United States v Abell, 963 F. Supp 1178 (S.D. Fla. 1997) 615. 
153  Gooding v United States, 316 U.S. 129, 62 S. Ct. (1942) 155. 
154  United States v Joseph, 278 F. 2d 504 (3d Cir. 1960). 
155  City of West Covina v Perkins 525 U.S. 234 (1999) 249. 
156  Ibid 276. 
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4.3 In Canada 
 
Only the person to whom the warrant is directed is authorised to conduct the 
search and seize the named articles.157 There does not however, appear to be 
any prohibition against others such as experts, who are more qualified in 
identifying the articles, from accompanying him.158 It is submitted that this 
practice might in some instances be desirable where the purpose would be to 
assist the police officer to pick out those articles named in the warrant. When 
the officer goes to conduct a search, it is his duty to carry the warrant and 
produce it if he or she is requested to do so.159 A search warrant may only be 
executed in the territorial division in which the justice who issued it has 
jurisdiction.160 Once the warrant has been endorsed, it may then be executed by 
not only the officer to whom it was originally directed, but by all peace officers in 
that jurisdiction.161 A warrant must be executed during the daytime unless the 
justice who issues it authorises otherwise.162 As a general rule the courts are 
reluctant to permit night searches unless there are substantial reasons 
therefore.163 Section 29 of the Canadian Criminal Code requires that the police 
must have the warrant with them and, where feasible, produce it if requested. 
The purpose of this is to provide proper authority and announcement to the 
occupiers of the premises and thus to minimise the possibility of violent 
resistance to the search.164 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
157  Canadian Criminal Code (1985). 
158  Worall v Canada, [1965] 2 C.C.C. 1 (Ont. C.A.) 297. 
159  Section 29(1) of the Canadian Criminal Code (1985) 549. 
160  Unless the justice by his appointment has province wide jurisdiction: Haley v Canada   
      (1986), 27 C.C.C. (3d) 454 (Ont. C.A.) 278. 
161  Section 487 (4) of the Canadian Criminal Code (1985). 
162  Section 488 of the Canadian Criminal Code (1985). See also Plummer v Canada (1929), 52  
      C.C.C.288 (Man. C.A.) 321. 
163  Posternak v Canada (1929), 51 C.C.C. 426 (Alta. S.C. App. Div.). 
164  Eccles v Bourque (1974), 19 C.C.C. (2d) 129 (S.C.C.). 
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5. Conclusion 
 
Searches and seizures should, wherever possible, be conducted only in terms 
of a search warrant issued by a judicial officer,165 such as a magistrate or a 
judge. The Criminal Procedure Act confers powers to search only where the 
object of the search is to find a person or to seize an article, which falls into one 
of three classes of articles, which may be seized by the state in terms of the 
provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act.  
 
According to section 21 of the Criminal Procedure Act the general rule is that 
articles referred to in section 20 should be seized with a search warrant. The 
only exceptions to this are authorisation in terms of section 22, 24 and 25(3) of 
the Criminal Procedure Act. The reason for this requirement of prior 
authorisation is to ensure that before the search and seizure takes place, the 
“conflicting interests of the state and the individual”166 are assessed by an 
“impartial arbiter”167 to ensure that there are no unwarranted intrusions on the 
right to privacy and associated fundamental rights such as the right to dignity 
and the right to freedom and security of the person. The aim is to prevent 
unreasonable searches rather than to remedy unconstitutional breaches of 
privacy after the intrusion.168 A person other than the official who intends to 
intrude upon an individual’s privacy, is required to make two judgement calls: 
first, that there are reasonable grounds for the intrusion, and secondly, even if 
such grounds exist, is the intrusion justified under the circumstances? Therefore 
an independent, detached, responsible officer,169 is required to make such an 
assessment. This principle is not fully complied with in South African law. The 
general rule is that a search should be authorised by a judicial officer.170 This 
power is however extended to justices of peace who include de facto justices of 
                                                 
165  See also section 21 of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
166  Hunter v Southam Inc supra 97. 
167  Parker Ross and Another v Director: Office for Serious Economic Offences supra 148. 
168  Ibid 160. 
169  SA Police v SA Associated Newspapers supra 503. See also Zuma  and Another v National 
      Director of Public Prosecutions and Others 2006 2 [ALL] supra 198. 
170  Section 25(1) and section 25 Criminal Procedure Act. 
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the peace. It appears to be constitutionally questionable that members of the 
executive are granted this power.  
 
Section 21 (3) (b) provides for a search warrant to be issued on any day, thus 
including weekends and public holidays. The search warrant will remain 
effective until it is executed, or cancelled by the person who issued it or if that 
person is nor available, by a person with like authority. 
 
In terms of section 21 (4), after executing a warrant, a police official must hand 
a copy of the warrant to any person whose rights were affected by the search 
and seizure, if the person concerned requests that a copy be handed to him or 
her. It appears questionable that only upon demand of a person whose rights 
are affected by a warrant, that a copy of the warrant is handed to such a 
person. 
 
A search warrant may also be issued in terms of section 25 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act. Unlike section 21, where the application is based on the 
suspected presence of an article mentioned in section 20, the reason for 
obtaining a warrant in terms of section 25 is connected either to state security or 
to the commission of an offence. In terms of section 25(b)(i) a police official may 
carry out such investigations and take such steps as such police official may 
“consider necessary” for the preservation of the internal security of the Republic 
or for the maintenance of law and order or for the prevention of any offence. 
The fact that the police official may take such steps as he “considers necessary” 
brings a subjective standard into the equation, for the attainment of objectives 
that could well prove to be legally irrelevant or of little importance. The standard 
for the police official’s conduct appears to be arbitrary, because it applies to that 
which the police official considers necessary and not that which is necessarily 
objectively and legally justifiable. 
 
The position in United States is somewhat similar to our law. The Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no warrant shall 
issue except on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be 
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seized. The preferred means of making a search is with a search warrant. For a 
search warrant to be valid, the following requirements must be met: a proper 
official must issue the warrant; the warrant must be issued for particular objects; 
the warrant must be issued on probable cause; the warrant must be supported 
by oath or by affirmation and the place to be searched and the things to be 
seized must be particularly described. It is the function of a judicial officer in the 
United States to issue a search warrant. This function is not delegated to 
prosecutors nor to the police because it is doubtful whether they are in a 
position  to maintain the appropriate neutrality when deciding whether a search 
warrant should be issued.171 In South Africa the latter principle is not fully 
adhered to. In South African law as a general rule a search should also be 
authorised by a judicial officer.172  This power is however also provided to 
justices of the peace.173 If cognisance is taken of the high premium the 
Constitution places on privacy and associated rights, it is constitutionally 
questionable whether the person who is issuing the search warrant (which 
essentially impacts on the mentioned rights) is part of the office of the executing 
officer can be regarded as neutral or detached. 
 
It is legally accepted that in order to be valid, a warrant must convey intelligibly 
to both searcher and searched the ambit of the search it authorises.174If the 
search is to be legal and the evidence admissible, the officer must follow certain 
rules when executing the warrant. These include: the warrant must be executed 
by the officer or officers so commanded or be within the class designated; the 
warrant must be executed within certain time limitations, only property 
described in the warrant may be seized under the warrant. The information in 
support of a warrant and the warrant must specify the items to be searched for, 
their location in the place being searched, and the offence to which the items 
relate with reasonable particularity. 
  
                                                 
171  Coolidge v New Hampshire supra 443. 
172  Section 21(1) and section 25 Criminal Procedure Act. 
173  Section 21(a) Criminal Procedure Act. 
174  Powell NO and Others v Van der Merwe NO and Others 2005 (5) SA 62 (SCA) 334. 
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Similar to section 14 of the South African Constitution, section 8 of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees that, everyone has the 
right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure. In Hunter v 
Southam175 the Supreme Court of Canada pointed out that section 8 of the 
Charter guarantees a broad and general right to be secure from unreasonable 
search and seizure, which is not necessarily restricted to protection of property. 
It embodies an entitlement to a reasonable expectation of privacy and indicates 
that an assessment must be made as to whether, in a particular situation, the 
public’s interest in being left alone by government must give way to the 
government’s interest in intruding on the individual’s privacy in order to advance 
its goals, particularly those of law enforcement. 
                                                 
175  Supra 122. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Although it is preferable, that searches should only be conducted on the 
authority of a search warrant issued by a judicial officer, it is quite conceivable 
that circumstances may arise where the delay in obtaining such a warrant 
would defeat the object of the search.  
 
Sections  22, 23, 25(3) and 27 of the Criminal Procedure Act deal with 
warrantless searches.  
 
Section 22 of the Criminal Procedure Act, which provides for search without a 
warrant, can basically be divided into two parts: a search conducted with the 
consent of the person concerned, and a search undertaken on the reasonable 
belief that a warrant will be issued to the police official and that a further delay 
will defeat the object of the search. A search conducted with the consent of 
the person concerned places a police official in a much better position than a 
search without consent. It eliminates the procedural burden of proving the 
existence of reasonable grounds to the search. 
 
Working out the appropriate balancing of interests in warrantless search and 
seizure cases is not always easy, especially since the stakes for both 
individuals and the state tend to be high. As a result warrantless search and 
seizure law is both intriguing and challenging. 
 
In Canada, two major principles articulated in Hunter v Southam1 were the 
requirements of prior authorisation by an impartial judicial officer and for 
reasonable and probable grounds as a constitutional standard for overriding 
individual privacy interests. Nevertheless, the court also indicated that some 
                                                 
1 [1984] 2 S.C.R 145. 
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contexts might permit lower standards. In spite of the suggestion in R v 
Simmons2 that permissible departures from Hunter v Southam would be 
“exceedingly rare”, this has certainly proved to be the case. There are two 
different instances in which departure from Hunter v Southam may occur. 
Firstly, there are some situations, usually involving “exigent circumstances”, 
where a warrantless search or seizure may take place. Secondly, there are 
some situations where a search or seizure may take place on less than 
reasonable and probable grounds for believing that an offence has been 
committed and that evidence may be located at the site of the search or 
seizure.3 
 
The development of warrantless search and seizure powers in the United 
States has been constrained by the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment. Viewed essentially as “exceptions” to the normative warrant 
procedure4 such searches are validated by three distinct lines of argument:  
• The first is that the urgency of the situation necessitates an immediate 
search, despite the absence of judicial authorisation; 
•  The second is that there is a minimal level of intrusion caused by the 
search and therefore minimal violation of privacy;  
• This argument may be linked to the third justification, which is that 
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances 
existing at the time. 
 
This chapter will address the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act 
pertaining to warrantless search and seizure. Provisions of the South African 
Police Service Act relating to warrantless search and seizure will also be 
visited. Then the critical principles relating to consent, exigent circumstances, 
search and seizure incidental to arrest, extracted from the mentioned Acts will 
be addressed. This chapter will further evaluate whether such warrantless 
searches and seizures conform to the democratic legal order prescribed by 
                                                 
2 [1988] 66 C.R. (3d) 297 (S.C.C.) 146. 
3 Quigley Procedure in Canadian Criminal Law 1997 200. 
4 Coolidge v New Hampshire 403 U.S. (1971) 433. 
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our Constitution or whether they are in conflict therewith. Principles extracted 
from American, Canadian and foreign jurisdictions will be considered and 
applied where relevant. Finally the conclusion will consider the impact and 
influence of warrantless searches and seizures on our Constitution. 
 
2. Provisions for warrantless searches and seizures in the Criminal 
      Procedure Act  
 
2.1 General Provisions 
 
In terms of section 20 of the Criminal Procedure Act, the state may, subject to 
Chapter 2 of the Criminal Procedure Act, seize anything that: 
 
(a) is concerned or on reasonable grounds believed to be concerned in the commission 
or suspected commission of an offence within the Republic or elsewhere; 
(b) may afford evidence of the commission or suspected commission of an offence in the 
Republic or elsewhere; or 
(c) is intended to be used or on reasonable grounds is believed to be intended to be 
used in the commission of an offence. 
 
The power to seize is limited to articles and items which, are either involved 
in, used during or may provide proof of an offence in the Republic or 
elsewhere, or provide proof of the fact that the commission of an offence was 
planned. Contrary to earlier decisions, articles such as documents which are 
covered by legal professional privilege cannot be attached or seized in terms 
of these provisions.5 Evidence obtained in conflict with the provisions of 
section 20 of the Criminal Procedure Act, or in conflict with the Constitution, 
may still be allowed to be produced in evidence, provided that the trial is not 
rendered unfair as a result thereof and the admission of such evidence does 
not cause the administration of justice to come into disrepute.6 
                                                 
5 Cheadle, Thompson and Haysom and Others v Minister of Law and Order and Others 1986 
  (2) SA 279 (W) 176; Sasol (Edms) Bpk v Minister van Wet en Orde 1991 (3) SA 766 (7) 339;  
  S v Safatsa and Others 1988 (1) SA 868 (A) 276. 
6 Bantjies, Bertelsmann, Meyer, Nell and Walker Criminal Procedure in the Magistrates Court: 
  A Practical Guide 2007 3-6. 
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Section 22 of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that a police official may 
without a search warrant search any person or container or premises for the 
purpose of seizing any article referred to in section 20: 
 
(a) if the person concerned consents to this search for and seizure of the article in 
question; or 
(b) if the police official on reasonable grounds believes that a search warrant will be 
issued to him under section 21 of the Criminal Procedure Act (supra) and that the 
delay in obtaining such warrant would defeat the object of the search.7 
 
In interpreting section 20 and section 22 of the Criminal Procedure Act it is 
clear that the onus is on the police to prove, when objectively viewed, the 
existence of reasonable suspicion upon which the police base the reasonable 
belief, which facts must exist at the time when the police acted without a 
warrant, and not only at a later stage.8 
 
In terms of section 25(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act, a police official may 
also act without a warrant if he on reasonable grounds believes that a warrant 
would be issued to him if he applied for it and that the delay in obtaining such 
warrant would defeat the object thereof. 
 
Section 26 of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that if a police official,  who 
is investigating an offence or alleged offence reasonably suspects that a 
person who may furnish information with reference to such offence is on any 
premises, such police official may enter such premises without a warrant for 
the purpose of interrogating such person and obtaining a statement from him 
or her, provided that such a police official shall not enter any private dwelling 
without the consent of the occupier thereof.9 A person so interrogated is 
entitled to exercise his or her right to silence.10 
                                                 
7 See also Ntoyakhe v Minister of Safety and Security and Others 2000 (1) SA 257 (ECD) 
  126; Dyani v Minister of Safety and Security and Others 2001 (1) SACR 634. 
8 Mnyungula v Minister of Safety and Security and Others 2004 (1) SACR 219. 
9 See also Minister van Polisie en ŉ Ander v Gamble en ŉ Ander 1979 (4) SA 759 (A). 
10 Bantjies.... et al. supra 3-9. 
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Further in terms of section 27 of the Criminal Procedure Act, a police official 
who may lawfully search any person or premises or may enter such premises 
under section 26, he or she may use such force as may reasonably be 
necessary to overcome any resistance against such search or entry of such 
premises, including the breaking of any door or window of such premises, 
provided that such police official must first audibly demand admission to the 
premises and notify the occupier and others on the premises of the purpose 
for which he or she seeks to enter such premises. The proviso of a previous 
warning shall not apply where the police official concerned reasonably 
believes that any article which is the subject of the search may be destroyed 
or disposed of if entry to the premises is demanded. This is the so-called the 
“no knock clause”.11 Swanepoel maintains that an element of subjectivity 
attaches to the word “opinion” in section 27(2) of the Criminal Procedure 
Act.12 
 
2.2 Consent searches  
 
2.2.1 In South Africa 
 
Section 22(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act makes provision for the consent 
search of a person, container or premises in the absence of a warrant.13 
Consent by the subject of a search and seizure operation can serve to 
validate such an operation where it is conducted without a search warrant. In 
this regard the following should be noted: 
 
                                                 
11 Joubert Criminal Procedure Handbook 2007 136.  
12 Swanepoel, “Warrantless search and seizure in criminal procedure: A constitutional  
    challenge” 1997 CILSA 334. 
13 Section 22(a) reads: “A police official may without a search warrant search any person or 
container or premises for the purpose of seizing any article referred to in section 20-  
   (a) if the person concerned consents to such search for and seizure of the article in 
question, or if the person who may consent to the search of the container or premises 
consents to such search and seizure of the article in question.” 
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 (a) The consent must be valid 
 
 For a valid consent, the police official should inform the person of the 
purpose of the search.14 A blanket request of “May I search you?” would 
therefore be invalid. Where a container or premises is to be searched, the 
consent must be given by a person “who may consent to the search”, that is a 
person who has some authority or control over the container or premises.15 In 
both instances the onus will be on the state, affecting the search, to show that 
a valid consent was given.16 In S v Motloutsi17 a person who was leasing 
property (lessee) sublet a room to the accused. The court held that the 
consent from the lessee did not amount to a valid consent in terms of section 
22(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act because the lessee did not have the 
accused’s property in his custody or under his control and he did not have the 
right to pry into the accused’s private possessions. The only person who could 
have consented was the accused. Therefore the search and seizure was 
unlawful. 
 
(b) The consent must be given voluntarily 
 
Where a person consents to the invasion of his or her privacy, the 
requirements of “reasonable grounds and prior authorisation”18 do not apply. 
Waiver of rights is however never lightly inferred.19 The question of paramount 
importance then, is whether the consent was validly, that is voluntarily given. 
The voluntariness of the consent is to be determined from the totality of the 
                                                 
14 Steytler supra 96. 
15 Ibid 97. 
16 S v Hammer 1994 2 SACR 496 (C) 498 b. 
17 1996 2 BCLR 220 (C) 229 A-B. 
18 See section 21 of Criminal Procedure Act. 
19 Powell NO and Others v Van Der Merwe and Others 2005 1 All 49 (SCA) 49 
   Powell was confronted at his home, where the warrants and annexures were read to him.  
   The search then proceeded. The next day Powell’s attorney objected that the warrants were  
   void because they were vague and that the search was unlawful. The attorney was present  
   during most of the search. The Court found that initially and for most parts thereafter Powell  
   indicated that he was willing to co-operate with the investigation and had nothing to hide.  
   There was no question that Powell consented to an unlawful search.  
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circumstances.20 Other indicators of the absence of voluntariness are explicit 
or implicit threats or shows of force.21 For a successful reliance on consent 
the courts have indicated that the following criminal law standards are 
relevant: the consent must have been given voluntarily;22 expressly or 
tacitly;23 before the otherwise unlawful act is committed;24 by a person 
capable of forming a will;25 while aware of the true and material facts 
regarding the act consented to;26 by the person who is going to be harmed.27 
 
(c) Consent cannot validate an irregular search warrant 
 
Section 22(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act stipulates that consent by the 
subject of a search and seizure operation can serve to validate such an 
operation where it is conducted without a search warrant. However, what of 
those situations where police officials are purportedly acting in terms of an 
invalid warrant? Can it be argued that the consent of the person concerned 
would have the effect of validating the warrant or validating a warrantless 
search? This issue was dealt with in Beheermaatschappij Helling I NV v 
Magistrate, Cape Town28 where a search and seizure was conducted under 
the authority of a warrant that was subsequently found by the court to be 
invalid. In this case the South African Police Service contended that the 
subject of the search and seizure had acquiesced by reaching an agreement 
                                                 
20 Ndlovu v Minister of Police, Transkei 1993 2 SACR 233 where the accused handed over 
his vehicle to the police under protest in order to co-operate with them but shortly thereafter 
instructed his attorneys to recover the vehicle. The Court held that there was no valid 
consent. 
21 S v Madiba 1998 1 BCLR 38 (D) 167. 
22 Ibid 167. 
23 R v Handcock 1925 OPD 149. 
24 Ndlovu v Minister of Police Transkei supra 133. 
25 R v C 1952 (4) SA 117 (0) 439. 
26 Ibid 437. 
27 R v Williams (1923) KB 340; S v Mayekiso en Andere 1996 (2) SACR 298 (C), accused 1 
and 3 shared a home. The police obtained consent from accused 1 to enter the shared 
home and conducted a search. A bag with a pistol that belonged to accused 3 was seized. 
The court held that accused 1 had no authority from accused 3 to permit a search of his 
property in the house. Therefore there was no valid authority to search and seize accused 
3’s bag, since consent in terms of section 22(a) was not obtained from accused 3. 
28 Supra 2007 (1) SACR 99 (C) 147. 
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for the early return of the electronic equipment. The court maintained that it 
was “trite” law that, if the relevant search warrants were invalid because they 
had been invalidly issued, no amount of consent or agreement by the subjects 
of the search could have the effect of rendering them valid or lawful. 
Generally, this reflects the realities of any search and seizure operation, since 
the average citizen when confronted with a search warrant produced by a 
police official, would tend to defer to the latter and acquiesce in the conduct of 
the search.29 If this was to have the effect of legitimising an invalid warrant it 
would drastically undermine the safeguards inherent in the primary 
requirement of a search warrant. 
 
2.2.2 Consent searches in foreign law 
 
2.2.2.1 In the United States  
 
A favourite tool of police officers is the “consent search.”30 Where effective 
consent is given, a search may be conducted without a warrant and without 
probable cause.31 In accordance with the general principle that allows a 
person to waive other constitutional rights, rights protected under the Fourth 
Amendment may be waived.32 This and other constitutional rights are 
considered waived only after careful evaluation and only after compliance with 
certain requirements. The burden of showing that the rights have been waived 
is on the prosecution.33 
 
To determine whether rights have been waived, certain principles, have been 
established by the courts: 
 
 
                                                 
29 Cowling “Search and seizure” 2007 (3) SACJ 400. 
30 Klotter, Walker and Hemmens Legal Guide for Police: Constitutional Issues  
    2005 122. 
31 LaFave and Israel supra 141. 
32 Schneckloth v Bustamonte 412 US 218 (1973) 268. 
33 Ibid 268.  
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(a) The consent must be given voluntarily 
 
The United States Supreme Court, in upholding the consent search, included 
this comment: 
 
     We hold only that when the subject is not in custody and the state attempts to justify a 
search on the basis of his consent, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require that it 
demonstrate that the consent was in fact voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or 
coercion, express or implied. Voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from all 
of the circumstances, and while the subject’s knowledge of the rights to refuse is a factor 
to be taken into account, the prosecution is not required to demonstrate such knowledge 
as a prerequisite to establishing voluntary consent.34 
 
In United States v Medenhall,35 police officers told the suspect that she had a 
right to decline the search if she desired and she responded, “go ahead”. The 
Court held that this was consent under the circumstances. Mere 
acquiescence is not consent. The state’s burden of proving consent to a 
warrantless search cannot be satisfied by showing nothing more than 
acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority.36 
 
(b) The extent of the search is limited to the exact words or meaning of 
      consent.  
 
The consent to search must be such that it is clear that the person intends to 
give consent and the consent should be in specific terms.37 Consent to search 
one portion of the premises is not consent to search the other portions.38 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34 Schneckloth v Bustamonte supra 173. 
35 446 US 544 (1980) 155. 
36 Turner v State 745A.2d 1074 (Md.Ct.App. 2000) 448. 
37 Florida v Jimeno 499 US 934 (1991) 270. 
38 Ibid 270.  
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(c) Consent may be withdrawn 
 
One danger of conducting a search under the consent rule is that the consent 
may be withdrawn at any time. If the person giving consent withdraws consent 
during the search, the officer must honour this and stop the search 
immediately.39 In this situation, the officer may use any evidence obtained up 
to this point, or may seize other evidence within view if the circumstances 
justify it.40 
 
(d) The person giving consent must have the capacity to do so 
 
The general rule, as established by the United States Supreme Court, is that: 
 
....[t]he consent of one who possesses common authority over the premises or effects 
 is valid against the absent non-consenting person with whom the authority is shared.41 
 
Under this rule, valid consent to search may be given by a person who has 
the immediate and present right to possess those premises. Another issue 
that police officials may face is where the person giving consent appears to 
have the legal authority to do so, but it is later discovered that the person did 
not have the authority.42 The Supreme Court held that warrantless entry into a 
private home by the police is valid if based on consent from a person who the 
police may reasonably believe to have authority to grant consent, even if it is 
later determined that the person did not have such authority. 
 
 
 
                                                 
39 State v Samarghandi 680 N.E. 2d 738 (Ohio 1997) 516. 
40 Ibid 369. 
41 Coolidge v New Hampshire 403 US 443 (1971) 85. See also US v Sculco 82 F. Supp. 2d  
    410 (2000) 382. 
42 See Illinois v Rodriguez supra 172. A woman told the police that she had been beaten by  
    Rodriguez .She referred to Rodriguez’s apartment as “our apartment” and produced a key. 
    After the police entered the apartment without a warrant and found drugs in plain view,  
    Rodriguez was arrested and charged. At the trial, he moved to suppress all evidence  
    seized at the time of the arrest, claiming that the woman who had given the consent had no  
    authority to do so, as she had moved out of the apartment several weeks ago. 
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2.2.2.2 In Canada 
 
The position in Canada is similar to South Africa. Where a person grants 
consent to the invasion of his or her privacy, the requirements of reasonable 
grounds and prior authorisation fall away.43 The critical question then is 
whether the consent was given voluntarily. The requirement of voluntariness 
is determined from the totality of the circumstances. While it may not be 
necessary to inform an individual that he or she has a right to refuse, the 
failure to do so may be a consideration in assessing the voluntariness of the 
consent.44 
 
2.3 Reasonable grounds, and exceptions to the reasonable grounds 
      rule and exigent circumstances      
  
2.3.1 In South Africa 
 
Section 22 (b) of the Criminal Procedure Act reads: 
 
 A police official may without a search warrant search any person or container or premises 
  for the purpose of seizing any article referred to in section 20— 
(a) …….. 
(b) if he on reasonable grounds believes— 
(i) that a search warrant will be issued to him under paragraph (a) of section   21(1) if  
     he applies for such warrant; and 
 (ii) that the delay in obtaining such warrant would defeat the object of the  
      search.45 
 
Section 22 of the Criminal Procedure Act provides for search and seizure of 
certain articles that are linked to criminal activity without a search warrant. 
However, in order to justify such search and seizure it is imperative for the 
                                                 
43 Rv Borden (1994) 119 DLR (4th) 74 (SCC) 87 where the accused consented to the taking of  
a blood sample on the understanding that the police were investigating only one offence.  
The purpose of obtaining the blood sample was however for another unrelated offence. The 
consent was thus invalid as the accused was not apprised of the true reason for the taking 
of the blood sample.   
44 Ibid 87. 
45 See also section 20 (Chapter 2) where reference is made to reasonable grounds. 
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police official to show that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the 
articles to be seized is concerned in the commission or suspected 
commission of an offence or which may afford evidence of the commission or 
suspected commission of an offence.46  
 
It is also necessary to establish that reasonable grounds existed for the belief 
that a search warrant would have been issued if an application had been 
made therefore, and that the delay in obtaining the warrant would defeat the 
object of the search.47 
 
In Mnyungula v Minister of Safety and Security48 a police official seized a 
vehicle on the basis of a reasonable belief that the vehicle was stolen. In fact, 
his belief was incorrect and the applicant had purchased the vehicle lawfully. 
The seizure was purportedly effected in terms of sections 20 and 22 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act. The court emphasised that in interpreting sections 20 
and 22 of the Criminal Procedure Act, the onus was on the police to prove, 
when objectively viewed, the existence of reasonable grounds upon which the 
police based their reasonable belief. The court referred to Ndabeni v Minister 
of Law and Order49 where Didcott J cited Watson v Commissioner of Customs 
and Excise:50 
 
There can only be reasonable cause to believe …… where, considered objectively, 
there are reasonable grounds for the belief ….. [I]t cannot be said that an officer has 
reasonable cause to believe ….. merely because he has reasonable cause to believe. 
 
The court further held, that the existence of such “reasonable belief” could be 
rebutted by the person whose article had been seized by showing that the 
facts or grounds relied upon by the policeman, in forming his reasonable 
                                                 
46 Section 20 Criminal Procedure Act. 
47 Section 22 (b) (i) and (ii) of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
48 2004 (1) SACR 219 (TK) 195. 
49 1984 (3) SA 500 (D) 164. 
50 1960 (3) SA 212 (N) 273. 
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belief, had not existed or had been false. In terms of its inherent power the 
court could then set aside the seizure in the interests of justice. 
 
          Is it the law of this land that once a policeman has on incorrect “facts” formed a  bona 
fide reasonable belief that there are sufficient grounds to seize a vehicle, that seizure is 
‘forever’ or can the ‘reasonable belief’ later be rebutted by the true facts being shown, 
causing the seizure to lapse?51 
 
Criminal law is increasingly being used to enforce social legislation. In order to 
protect the public, the state seeks to regulate and control the activities of 
persons, both natural and legal, when they engage in public intercourse.52 For 
the protection of the rights of the general public the state intervenes through 
preventative measures before actual damage is done. In many cases there 
are no immediate victims or complainants. The commission of offences is 
prevented through routine inspections of factories and restaurants and tests of 
motorist “sobriety”.53 On a social policy perspective it is no longer acceptable 
to prosecute drunken drivers only once they have caused an accident. The 
safety and protection of the general public dictates that the state takes 
preventative measures before death and destruction occur on the roads. In 
these situations, reasonable grounds as well as prior authorisation are 
dispensed with. The South African Police Service Act contains a number of 
provisions where reasonable grounds prior to a search are not necessary, for 
example, border searches.54 Any police official may search any premises, 
person, vehicle, vessel or aircraft without reasonable grounds or a warrant 
“where it is reasonably necessary for the purposes of control over illegal 
movement of people or goods across the borders of the Republic.”55 
 
Where exigent circumstances are present it is accepted in many countries 
that the interests of law enforcement trump the need for judicious 
                                                 
51 Ibid 275. 
52 Steytler 1998 90. 
53 Ibid 90. 
54 See also 3. (section 13 (7) and road blocks (section 13(8) ) in discussion 
    below.  
55 Section 13(6) South African Police Services Act 68 of 1995. 
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consideration of privacy rights.56 Exigent circumstances include the imminent 
danger of the loss, removal, destruction or disappearance of evidence should 
the search be delayed to obtain prior authorisation.57 This principle is also the 
general rule in the Criminal Procedure Act. The police may dispense with a 
warrant where the obtaining of authorisation would destroy the object of the 
search.58 Such a search will be lawful and in consequence constitutional if the 
police official can demonstrate objectively reasonable grounds for the belief 
that a warrant would have been issued had it been applied for, and the delay 
caused by the application would have destroyed the objective of the search.59 
Section 22(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that in order to seize any 
article referred to in section 20, a police official may search any person or 
container or premises without a search warrant if he or she believes on 
reasonable grounds that: a search warrant will be issued to him or her under 
section 21(1)(a) if he or she were to apply for a warrant, implying that if there 
was time and a warrant was applied for it would have been issued. The police 
official must therefore at least have information under oath or be prepared to 
provide information under oath himself or herself; and the delay in obtaining 
the warrant would defeat the object of the search. The object of the search will 
be defeated if the articles which form the object of the search can be 
destroyed, disposed of or removed. 
 
                                                 
56 S v Madiba 1 BCLR 38 (D) 45. 
57 R v Grant (1993) 84 CCC (3d) 173 (SCC) 538. 
58 Sections 22(b) and 25(3) of  the Criminal Procedure Act. 
 See R v Beghin 1933 EDL 24, when a suspect attempts to swallow evidence for example 
money, this will constitute reasonable grounds for believing that the delay in obtaining the 
warrant would defeat the object of the search. See also Nel v Deputy Commissioner of 
Police, Grahamstown 1953 (1) SA 487 (E), in a case of illegal gambling, where the police 
official believed, as a result of experience, that gambling machines could easily be changed 
to amusement machines, a search in terms of section 22(b) was justified. 
See S v Motloutsi supra, if a magistrate is not available to issue a warrant in terms of 
section 21, a justice of peace must be approached. The unavailability of a magistrate does 
not render action in terms of section 22(b) lawful. 
59 S v Mayekiso 1996 2 SACR 298 (C) 293. 
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Search and seizure in terms of section 22(b) does not authorise a police 
official to close down the business of a suspect. Authorisation to that effect 
must be obtained.60 
 
If a magistrate is not available to issue a warrant in terms of section 21, a 
justice of the peace must be approached. The only factor of unavailability of a 
magistrate does not render action in terms of section 22(b) lawful.61 
In the case of Hako v Minister of Safety and Security and Another62 the 
search was held to be unlawful for the following reasons: no reasons were 
given to the court as to why a search warrant was not obtained, the delay in 
obtaining a warrant would not have defeated the object of the search as the 
suspect had been in undisturbed possession of the article (in this case a 
motor vehicle) for approximately two years and the vehicle was being used on 
a daily basis by the suspect’s wife, the police arrived at the suspect’s home 
without prior notification and there was no reason to believe that the suspect 
was about to dispose of the vehicle. Section 22(b) does not mention when the 
search and seizure must be executed, which implies that it may be executed 
during the night.63 This may be considered to be undesirable in the light of 
right to privacy and affected fundamental rights. 
 
Section 25(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act contains provisions that are 
similar to section 22(b), in instances where state security or the maintenance 
of law and order is threatened. A police official may act without a warrant if he 
or she on reasonable grounds believes that a warrant will be issued to him or 
her under section 25(1) if he or she applies for a warrant; and the delay in 
obtaining the warrant would defeat the object of the search. 
The fact that a police official who acts in terms of section 25 may take any 
steps that ‘he considers necessary’ for the preservation of the internal security 
of the state or the prevention of any offence, which could well be a trivial 
offence, causes a subjective standard to be applied in order to attain 
                                                 
60 Goncalves v Minister of Law and Order 1993 (1) SA 161 (W) 473. 
61 S v Motloutsi supra 259. 
62 1996 (2) SA 891 (Tk) 183. 
63 Hiemstra Introduction to the Law of Criminal Procedure 1985 8. 
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objectives that may well be of little importance.64 The standard for the police 
official’s conduct is arbitrary. It applies to that which he considers to be 
necessary and not that which is objectively justifiable.65  
 
2.3.2 In the United States  
 
It is a basic principle of Fourth Amendment law that searches and seizures 
inside a home without a warrant are per se unreasonable in the absence of 
one of a number of well-defined exigent circumstances.66 Accordingly, the 
Supreme Court has emphasised that exceptions to the warrant requirement 
are “few in number and carefully delineated” and that the police bear a heavy 
burden when endeavouring to demonstrate an urgent need to justify a 
warrantless search.67 The courts have recognised that sometimes situations 
will arise that reasonably require immediate action or evidence may be 
destroyed. Police officers who have established probable cause that evidence 
is likely to be at a certain place and who do not have time to get a search 
warrant, may conduct a warrantless search.68  But there must be demanding 
(exigent) circumstances. Crawford69 notes: 
 
     Virtually every crime will constitute an emergency that justifies law enforcement’s 
warrantless entry to the scene. Traditionally courts have identified three different types of 
emergencies: threats to life or safety, destruction or removal of evidence, and escape. It is 
difficult to imagine a crime scene that would not automatically present officers with the 
requisite belief that at least one of these exigent circumstances exists to justify, at the very 
least, a warrantless entry to assess the situation. Problems arise, however, when officers 
exceed the scope of the particular emergency that justified the initial entry. 
 
                                                 
64 Swanepoel supra 353. 
65 Ibid 353. 
66 Coolidge v New Hampshire supra 433. 
67 Welsh v Wisconsin 466 US 740 (1984) 219. 
68 Crawford and Kimberly Crime Scene Searches: The need for Fourth Amendment  
    compliance  1999 28-31. 
69 Ibid. 
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In United States v Johnson70 the court upheld the warrantless search of a 
suitcase because there was probable cause to believe it contained a sawn-off 
shotgun. While a warrant is preferred because of the judicial decree that 
probable cause exists, if a genuinely exigent circumstances exists, such a 
search is reasonable. 
 
The courts have generally been consistent in holding that officers may enter a 
home if a delay in procuring a warrant would gravely endanger the life of the 
officer or others. For example, exigent circumstances existed to justify police 
officers’ warrantless search of the defendant’s apartment to search for 
individuals who had shot at the officers as well as for weapons involved in the 
shooting, because the police did not know the whereabouts of the armed 
individual who had just shot at officers from the immediate vicinity of the 
defendant’s apartment, and there was a risk of bodily harm or death to both 
police officers and civilians.71 
 
Just as a warrant may be challenged, warrantless searches may also be 
challenged. The most frequent challenge is that the police official did not 
establish probable cause or that there was sufficient time to obtain a 
warrant.72 
 
2.3.2.1 Stop and frisk searches 
 
The question that poses itself in relation to search and seizure is the extent to 
which a police official may seize weapons or evidence from a suspect when 
there is no probable cause to make an arrest, and there is no justifiable 
search incident to the arrest. This relates to what has become known in the 
United States as “stop and frisk”.73 In Terry v Ohio74 there was considerable 
doubt as to whether a police official could stop suspicious persons on the 
                                                 
70 Supra 335.  
71 Robinson v State 730 N.E 2d 185 (Ind.2000) 518. 
72 Illinois v McArthur 531 US 326 2001 159. 
73 Terry v Ohio 392 US 1 (1968) 394. 
74 Ibid. 
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street, ask them questions and then frisk them for weapons. In this case a 
police officer stopped a suspect on a street after he had observed the suspect 
and two other men “casing” a jewellery store. Without putting the suspects 
under arrest, the police officer patted down their outside clothing for weapons 
and later removed a pistol from Terry’s overcoat pocket. Admitting that there 
was no probable cause to make an arrest, the Supreme Court was confronted 
with two questions. Firstly, did the officer have the authority to detain and 
secondly, did the officer have the authority to frisk the detained suspect for 
weapons? The court was cautious to distinguish this “stop and frisk” from a 
search incident to a lawful arrest, explaining: 
 
       The sole justification for the search in the present situation is the protection of the police 
officer and others nearby, and must therefore be confined in scope to an intrusion 
reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the 
assault of the police officer. 
 
Two issues are important in this case. Firstly, officers do not need probable 
cause to make a “Terry” stop and frisk. All that is needed is reasonable 
suspicion.75 Secondly, the frisk authorised in this detention situation is only for 
the protection of the officer and is limited to patting down, rather than a full 
scale search. The Court explained that, while there is a self-protective search 
for weapons, the officer must be able to point to particular facts from which he 
or she reasonably inferred that the individual was armed and dangerous. 
 
2.3.2.2 Plain view searches  
 
The Fourth Amendment and provisions of state constitutions protects 
individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures. In Minnesota v 
Dickerson76 the Supreme Court maintained that the rationale for the plain view 
doctrine is that if contraband is left in the open and is observed by a police 
officer from a lawful vantage point, there is no invasion of a legitimate 
expectation of privacy and thus no “search” within the meaning of the Fourth 
                                                 
75 Alabama v White 496 US 325 (1990) 274. 
76 508 US 366 (1993) 581. 
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Amendment. In other words, if an officer is in a place where he or she has a 
right to be and recognises instrumentalities of crime or other evidence, he or 
she may seize the evidence that is in plain view. The Supreme Court 
explained that the police are not required to close their eyes and need not 
walk out and leave the article where they saw it. Any other principle might 
lead to an absurd result and at times probably defeat the ends of justice.77 
There are two legal conditions that must be met before this doctrine will apply: 
the officer must be lawfully present when he or she views the object, and the 
officer must recognise the article as contraband, illegally possessed, stolen 
property, or otherwise subject to seizure.78 
 
2.3.3 In Canada 
 
In R v Collins79 it was maintained that the accused bears the onus of 
persuading the Court, on a balance of probabilities, that Charter rights or 
freedoms have been violated. Once the accused has demonstrated that the 
search is warrantless, the burden of persuasion is shifted to the Crown to 
show, on a balance of probabilities that the search was reasonable. A search 
will be reasonable if it is authorised by law, if the law itself is reasonable, and 
if the manner in which it was carried out was reasonable.80 The appropriate 
standard of proof that must be met in order to establish reasonable grounds 
for a search is one of reasonable probability rather than proof beyond 
reasonable doubt or a prima facie case. The phrase “reasonable belief” 
approximates the required standard. 
 
In Hunter v Southam81 it was held that in addition to prior authorisation, a 
reasonable search or seizure requires that there be reasonable and probable 
grounds in two respects: first, that an offence has been committed and 
                                                 
77 Washington v Chrisman 455 US 1 (1982) 209. 
78 United States v Blair 214 F. 3d 690 (6th Cir. 2000) 415. 
79 [1987] 1 S.C.R. (3d)  33 C.C.C. 1. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Supra 184. 
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second, that evidence related to that offence will be discovered in the place to 
be searched. When is a departure from this standard permissible? 
 
Exigent circumstances 
 
In general, in the criminal/quasi-criminal arena, where a warrantless search or 
seizure power is justified as reasonable by the Crown, it is because it still 
requires reasonable and probable grounds for its exercise.82 The sources of 
reasonable and probable grounds are essentially the same as for obtaining a 
warrant.83 Thus for example, the warrantless search power in section 10 of 
the Narcotic Control Act and its counterparts in the Food and Drugs Act and  
the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act84 all require the police official 
conducting the search to have reasonable grounds for believing that an illegal 
drug or substance will be located on the premises to be searched. 
There are however, some situations where less than reasonable and probable 
grounds have been considered reasonable. The administrative or regulatory 
field is one such broad situation. In Comité paritaire de L’ industrie de la 
chemise v Potash85 the Supreme Court accepted that inspections or the 
seizure of documents might occur below the standards set out in Hunter v 
Southam (supra). As with the absence of a warrant, the rationale is that there 
is a much reduced expectation of privacy involved in administrative or 
regulatory searches and seizures. 
 
In the criminal, as opposed to the regulatory sphere, the Supreme Court has 
been insistent that prior authorisation be required unless exigent 
circumstances exist. In R v Grant86 the police conducted perimeter searches 
of a house used by the accused. They relied upon the authority of section 10 
of the Narcotic Control Act, which permits a warrantless search of a premises 
other than a dwelling if a peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe it 
                                                 
82 Sharpe supra 205. 
83 R v Grant 1993 24 C.R. (4th) 1 (SCC) 107. 
84 Food and Drugs Act, section 42(1); Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, section 11(7). 
85 1994 168 N.R. 241 (SCC). 
86 Supra 441. 
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contains narcotics. However, the Supreme Court held that the provision can 
only operate in a constitutional manner in exigent circumstances. These were 
defined to exist where there is: 
 
…… an imminent danger of the loss, removal, destruction or disappearance of the evidence 
sought in a narcotics investigation if the search or seizure is delayed in order to obtain a 
warrant.87 
 
As a consequence, the court read down section 10 to apply only where it is 
urgent to obtain a warrant. Parliament has now responded to the Grant case 
by passing the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act. Section 11 of the Act 
sets out search and seizure powers, but in subsection (7) specifically limits 
warrantless searches and seizures to exigent circumstances. In the light of 
this case, other statutory provisions for warrantless searches must similarly be 
read down to apply only in exigent circumstances and one would therefore 
expect future legislative amendments of those provisions to comply.88 The 
Grant position should apply to any warrantless search and seizure provisions 
in the criminal or quasi-criminal sphere. 
 
2.4 Search incident to a lawful arrest  
 
2.4.1 In South Africa 
 
In South African law a peace officer may also without a warrant or a 
reasonable belief search an arrested person and seize any article referred to 
in section 20 of the Criminal Procedure Act which is found in the arrestee’s 
possession, custody or control which may afford evidence of the commission 
of an offence.89 Where the peace officer is not a police official he ought to 
forthwith deliver such article to a police official.90 Where the person making 
the arrest is not a peace officer he may seize any article referred to in section 
                                                 
87 Supra 158. 
88 Quigley supra 201. 
89 Section 23(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
90 Ibid. 
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20 which is in the possession, custody or control of the arrestee and he must 
deliver any such article to a police official91 (such person has no power to 
search). 
 
While the reasonableness of such search is not constitutionality suspect, the 
following principles should be observed when applying section 23 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act.92 The search should firstly, pursue an object not 
inconsistent with the proper administration of criminal justice. Secondly, it may 
be constitutionally accepted to search the environment in which the accused 
is arrested. Thirdly, the seizure (without searching) of section 20 articles in the 
possession, custody or control of the arrestee is permissible provided that 
they are in the immediate vicinity where the arrest was effected: 
 
“In the custody or under control” does not only refer to items on the person, 
but would also include articles found in a motor vehicle, flat or premises that 
the arrested person is in or on.93 Possession, custody and seizure should be 
given a restrictive interpretation.94 
 
The search incident to a lawful arrest was one of the earliest recognised 
exceptions to the rule that a search must be made with a search warrant.95 It 
is obvious that the authority to search, incident to a lawful arrest is necessary, 
because it is senseless to obtain warrants in all instances. A search incident 
to a lawful arrest is permitted for two reasons: to protect the arresting officer 
and to avoid destruction of evidence by the arrested person.96 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
91 Section 23(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
92 Steytler supra 99. 
93 S v Nader 1963 (1) SA 843 (0) 271. 
94 Kriegler Hiemstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses 1993 39. 
95 Klotter...et al. supra 112. 
96 Ibid. 
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2.4.2 In the United States 
 
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the 
person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to 
use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape, and to, seize any evidence 
on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction.97 
Explaining the rationale for the exception “search incident to a lawful arrest”, a 
Virginia Court held that an arresting officer may search the person arrested to 
remove any weapons that the latter may attempt to use to resist arrest or 
effect his escape; in addition it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search 
for and seize any evidence on the arrested person to prevent its concealment 
or destruction.98 In United States v Robinson99 the United States Supreme 
Court condoned a general search incident on arrest despite the fact that there 
was no suspected danger to the arrestor and no further evidence could be 
discovered to prove the crime for which the accused was arrested. The court 
concluded that a search incident upon a lawful arrest required no further 
justification.100 Upon arrest it is also reasonable to search the area within the 
arrestee’s immediate control, that is, “the area from within which he might gain 
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.”101 This power does not 
include a general search of the premises or even the room in which the 
search was conducted.102 
 
Before a search incident to a lawful arrest can be made, the following 
requirements must be met: 
 
                                                 
97 395 US 752, 89 S. Ct. 2034 (1969) 439. 
98 Cason v Commonwealth 530 S.E. 2d 920 (Va. Ct. App. 2000) 492. 
99 414 US 218 (1973). 
100 Cited Steytler supra 98, at a police station a further search of the arrestee may be  
     conducted without warrant and probable cause as part of a routine inventory search  
     incident on him or her being booked into custody (Illinois v Lafayette 462 US 640 (1983) 
     which by its nature, is broader in scope than a search incident on arrest (Dressler 1991  
     175).  
101 Ibid. (Chimel v California 395 US 752 762-763 (1969) supra) 167. 
102 Ibid. 
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(a) The arrest must be lawful 
 
If the arrest is not lawful, all that follows, including the search, is unlawful, and 
evidence obtained thereby is inadmissible except in “rare cases”.103 In Agnello 
v United States104 the Supreme Court, whilst recognising a right to search 
both a person “lawfully arrested” and the “place where the arrest is made”, 
stressed that this right is “an incident of the arrest”. 
 
(b) The search must be made contemporaneously with the arrest 
 
The rationale for authorising a search incident to a lawful arrest is that it is 
necessary to protect the police official and avoid destruction of evidence.105 It 
follows then that the search should be made contemporaneously with the 
arrest. In determining what is contemporaneous, the courts will consider the 
place of arrest, the time of arrest, the circumstances surrounding the arrest, 
and the degree of custodial control.106 
 
(c) The arrest must be in good faith 
 
If the court finds that an arrest was a hoax or a subterfuge to make the 
search, the use of evidence obtained as a result of the search will generally 
be inadmissible.107 
 
2.4.3 In Canada 
 
In the Charter era, three cases illustrate the options available. In R v 
Morrison,108 the Ontario Court of Appeal held that a police officer has a right 
to search as an incident of lawful arrest and may take from the person any 
                                                 
103 State v Pallone 613 N.W. 2d 568 (Wis 2000) 271. 
104 (1925) US 20. 
105 Dixon v State 327 A. 2d 516 (Md. Ct. App. 1974) 183. 
106 United States v McKibben 928F. Supp. 1479 (D.S.D. 1996) 239. 
107 State v Sullivan 16 S.W. 3d 551 (Ark 2000) 125. 
108 (1987) 58 C.R. (3d) 63 (Ont. CA) 472. 
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property reasonably believed to be connected with the offence charged. 
Further it was held, property that may be used as evidence against the person 
or any weapon or instrument found may be seized even if there were no 
reasonable grounds to believe that either the evidence or the weapons would 
be found. This case is interpreted as permitting an automatic search upon 
arrest. 
 
A different approach was followed in R v Lerke109 which dealt with a search 
following an arrest by a private citizen. In this case the court indicated a need 
for reasonable grounds both for believing that items related to the offence 
would be found in the search and to seize them once found. The court also 
stated in obiter that the right to search incident upon arrest must be 
reasonable in order to comply with section 8 of the Charter. It is not an 
automatic right to search. 
 
Between the above two extremes is a non-Charter case, albeit decided since 
the Charter came into effect, namely, Cloutier v Langlois.110 This was a case 
of private prosecution for common assault by a lawyer against two Montreal 
police officers who had arrested him after noticing him commit a traffic 
offence. The actual reason for the arrest was an outstanding warrant for 
unpaid traffic offences. After the arrest, the police had conducted a frisk 
search on the street, then took Cloutier  to a police station. He subsequently 
launched a private prosecution for assault, arguing amongst other issues, that 
the officers had no legal right to search him. The Supreme Court held that 
reasonable and probable grounds are not required to justify a search of the 
person following a lawful arrest. Nevertheless, the power is not without certain 
limitations: 
 
1. This power does not impose a duty. The police have some discretion in conducting the 
search. Where they are satisfied that the law can be effectively and safely applied without 
a search, the police may see fit not to conduct a search. They must be in a position to 
                                                 
109 (1986) 49 C.R. (3d) 324 (Alta. C.A.) 218. 
110 (1990) 74 C.R. (3d) 316 (S.C.C.) 152. 
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assess the circumstances of each case so as to determine whether a search meets the 
underlying objectives. 
2. The search must be for a valid objective in pursuit of the ends of criminal justice, such 
as the discovery of an object that may be a threat to the safety of the police, the accused 
or the public, or that may facilitate escape or act as evidence against the accused. 
      3. The search must not be conducted in an abusive fashion.111 
 
This approach suggests that the right to search is automatic upon arrest. 
 
A better way of striking a balance between the constitutionally protected 
interests of privacy and the concerns of law enforcement “in particular, the 
protection of the police” would be to permit a search upon arrest on either of 
two grounds: (1) in order to protect the safety of the police or other persons 
where there is some basis “perhaps a reasonable suspicion” for believing that 
safety is threatened; or (2) where reasonable grounds exist, in order to 
prevent destruction of evidence.112 
 
2.5 Concluding remarks 
 
Although there are a number of laws, which authorise searches and seizures 
without a warrant, the most important is the Criminal Procedure Act.113 These 
laws violate the right to privacy and must be justified under the limitation 
clause.114 Although it is preferable that searches should only be conducted on 
the authority of a search warrant issued by a judicial officer, it is quite 
conceivable that circumstances may arise where the delay in obtaining such 
warrant would defeat the object of the search. 
 
Section 22 of the Criminal Procedure Act makes provision for a police official 
to search without a warrant any person, container or premises for the purpose 
of seizing any article referred to in section 20, if the person consents to the 
                                                 
111 Ibid. 
112 Quigley supra 208. 
113 See section 22. 
114 Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors supra   
    214. 
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search for and seizure of the article in question, or if the police official has 
“reasonable grounds” to believe that a search warrant will be issued to him 
under section 21 and that the delay in obtaining such warrant would defeat 
the object of the search.115 Where a search warrant could have been obtained 
in the absence of exigent circumstances, a warrantless search is a violation of 
the constitutional right to privacy.116 
 
Further in terms of section 23 of the Criminal Procedure Act a peace officer 
may also without a warrant or a reasonable belief search an arrested person 
and seize any article found in the arrestee’s possession, custody or control 
which may afford evidence of the commission of an offence. The peace officer 
may also place in custody any object found in the person of the arrestee, 
which may be used to cause bodily harm to himself or herself or others. 
 
Section 25 also empowers a police official to enter any premises for purposes 
of preservation of law and order, or the prevention of any offence, without a 
warrant if the police official on reasonable grounds believes that a warrant 
would be issued to him or her if he or she applied for it and that the delay in 
obtaining such warrant would defeat the object thereof. In terms of section 25 
the police official may take such steps as he or she “considers necessary” for 
the preservation of the internal security of the Republic or maintenance of law 
and order or the prevention of any offence. The words “consider necessary”117  
appears to have a subjective connotation. It tends to armour a police official 
with carte blanche authority to act in terms of his or her own subjective 
discretion. Further the use of the words “preservation of the internal security 
of the Republic or for the maintenance of law and order or for the prevention 
of any offence”118 are not definitive. The domains encapsulated by these 
words are very wide. They can be interpreted to cover a very wide spectrum 
of acts or offences, which could well conflict with the right to privacy and other 
fundamental rights enshrined in our Constitution. 
                                                 
115 See also Ntoyakhe v Minister of Safety and Security and Others supra 149. 
116 S v Moloutsi supra 115. 
117 Section 25 (1)(b)(i). 
118 Ibid. 
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Section 26 of the Criminal Procedure Act empowers a police official who is 
investigating an offence or alleged offence, who reasonably suspects the 
person in possession of information concerning that offence or alleged 
offence, is on any premises, such police official may enter such premises 
without a warrant for the purposes of interrogating such person and obtaining 
a statement from him or her provided that such police official shall not enter 
any private dwelling without the consent of the occupier thereof.119 
Section 27(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act permits a police official to use 
force as may be reasonably necessary to enter a premises for purposes 
mentioned above in section 26, provided that such police official first audibly 
demand admission to the premises and notify the purpose for which he or she 
seeks to enter the premises. Considering how strongly our Constitution values 
fundamental human rights, what is the position with regard to persons who 
are hard of hearing or deaf? No provision is made in this section for such 
persons. 
 
3.   Provisions for warrantless searches and seizures relating to  
      roadblocks  
 
3.1 In South Africa 
 
According to section 13(6) of the South African Police Service Act (SAPS Act) 
a police official may search without a warrant, any person, premises, other 
place, vehicle, vessel or aircraft or any receptacle, and seize any article that is 
found and may lawfully be seized. The aim of such a search is to exercise 
control over illegal movement of people or goods within the borders of South 
Africa. The search may be conducted:  
 
• at any place in South Africa within 10 kilometres, or any reasonable 
distance from any border between South Africa and any foreign state; 
                                                 
119 See also Minister van Polisie en ŉ Ander v Gamble en ŉ Ander 1979 (4) SA 759 (A) 
     527. 
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• in the territorial waters of South Africa; 
• inside South Africa within 10 kilometres or any reasonable distance 
from such territorial waters; or 
• at any airport or within any reasonable distance from such airport.120  
 
Section 13(7) of the SAPS Act provides for searches in an area cordoned off 
for purposes of public order or safety. The National or a Provincial 
Commissioner may, “where it is reasonable in the circumstances to restore 
public order or to ensure the safety of the public in a particular area”, 
authorise in writing that a particular area be cordoned off, specifying the 
period (which may not exceed 24 hours), the area and the object of the 
cordoning off. On the strength of this authorisation, a police official may, 
“where it is reasonably necessary” to achieve the objective of the 
authorisation, conduct a search without a warrant (and, presumably without 
reasonable grounds) of any person, premises, vehicle or receptacle or “any 
object of whatever nature” and seize any article that may afford evidence of 
the commission of an offence. Given the broad purpose of the search, there 
may be insufficient safeguards to achieve the necessary balance between the 
rights of citizens and law enforcement concerns.121 The requirement of 
reasonable grounds for the search of individual premises may be abandoned, 
but the cordoning off of a particular area should be based on reasonable 
grounds.122 
 
                                                 
120 See South African Police Service Amendment Act, 1997 (Act 41 of 1997). 
121 Steytler supra 95. 
122 Ibid.  
     “.. the length, objective and intrusiveness of the search should also be reasonably 
justifiable. It is submitted that there are not sufficient reasons to abandon the principle that 
an independent and impartial person should be the final arbiter before such drastic 
measure is taken. The National or a Provincial Commissioner, although of the highest rank 
in the Police Service, does not stand detached from the search which makes it difficult to 
bring an independent discretion to bear on the matter. In view of the serious inroads on the 
right to privacy, it is submitted that a judicial officer would be a more suitable person to 
make the decision whether the public order or safety has been disturbed or threatened 
and whether the search to be conducted will assist in remedying the situation.” 
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Where it is reasonable in the circumstances in order to exercise a power or 
perform a function referred to in the Constitution,123 section 13(8)(a) of the 
SAPS Act provides that the National or Provincial Commissioner may 
authorise a police official in writing to set up: 
 
• a roadblock(s) on any public road in a particular area; or 
• a checkpoint(s) at any public place in a particular area. 
 
Section 13(8)(c) empowers a police official who is so authorised, to set up 
such a roadblock or checkpoint, as the case may be. 
In terms of section 13(8)(g)(i) a police official who sets up such a roadblock or 
checkpoint may: 
 
• search without a warrant any person or vehicle that is stopped or any 
receptacle or object of whatever nature that is in the possession or in, 
on or attached to such a vehicle, and 
• seize any article referred to in section 20 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 
that is found in the possession of the person or in, on or attached to the 
receptacle  or vehicle. 
 
In Sithonga v Minister of Safety and Security and Others124 the court 
maintained that it is common cause that section 13(8) restricted the setting up 
of checkpoints to public places. However the Act did not define what a public 
place was. It was further held that an authorisation in terms of the Act must 
describe the place where the checkpoint was to be set up with sufficient 
particularity. 
 
Section 13(8)(d) of the SAPS Act, provides that a police official may set up a 
roadblock for the purposes of seizing certain articles without written 
authorisation from the National or a Provincial Commissioner, if such a police 
official reasonably believes that: 
                                                 
123 See objects of the police in section 205(3) of the Constitution. 
124 2008 (1) SACR 376 (T).  
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• there is an object which is concerned in, or may afford evidence of, or 
is intended to be used in the commission of an offence listed in 
Schedule 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act, and  
• such object is present in or is about to be transported in a motor 
vehicle in a particular area, and 
• a search warrant will be issued to him or her under section 21(1)(a) of 
the of the Criminal Procedure Act if he or she has reason to believe 
that the object will be transported in a specific vehicle and he or she 
has applied for a search warrant, and 
• the delay that will be caused by obtaining the authorisation in terms of 
section 13(8)(a) (from the National or Provincial Commissioner) will 
defeat the purpose of the roadblock. 
 
In these circumstances a roadblock may be set up by such a police official on 
any public road or roads in that area, in order to determine whether a vehicle 
is in fact carrying such an object. 
 
The requirement that a Commissioner may exercise this power only where it 
is “reasonable in the circumstances” imposes an objective test.125 The 
purpose of the roadblock ought to be reasonable. A specified objective for the 
roadblock should be formulated, the objective of which can be assessed. A 
general crime prevention roadblock grants police officers unstructured search 
powers which are open to abuse and arbitrary action, while a limited objective, 
such as the search for weapons, would focus and confine police actions.126 
 
3.2 In the United States  
 
Most often roadblocks are used as a means of enforcing regulations 
concerning the use of vehicles on public highways,127 whereas a checkpoint is 
                                                 
125 Steytler supra 102. 
126 Ibid. 
127 LaFave supra 210. See also Delaware v Prouse 440 US. 648 (1979) 288.  
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maintained in order to check drivers’ licences and vehicle registrations. As a 
means of detecting crime the Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure128 
provides that: 
 
    A law enforcement officer may, if 
(a) he has reasonable cause to believe that a felony has been committed; and 
(b) stopping all or most automobiles, trucks, buses or other such motor vehicles moving 
in a particular direction or directions is reasonably necessary to permit a search for 
the perpetrators or victim of such felony in view of the seriousness and special 
circumstances of such felony, order the drivers of such vehicles to stop, and may 
search such vehicles to the extent necessary to accomplish such purpose. Such 
action shall be accomplished as promptly as possible under the circumstances. 
 
Although the Model Code encompasses any type of felony, this is not 
objectionable given the fact that in addition it must appear that a roadblock is 
“reasonably necessary”. However, a general roadblock may not be 
established on the chance of finding someone who has committed a serious 
crime.129 It is not permissible for the police to blockade a high crime area and 
search all cars leaving that area,130 or to establish roadblocks to curb juvenile 
problems.131 Such tactics such as these pose the most serious threat to the 
interest of privacy.132 On the contrary Whren v United States133 which 
addressed the issue of the “pretext stop” that is stopping a vehicle to search 
for evidence of a crime under the guise of a traffic stop, plain clothes officers 
saw a truck wait at a stop unusually long, turn suddenly without signalling and 
                                                                                                                                            
     ….. except in those situations in which there is at least clear articulable, reasonable 
suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered, or that either 
the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for violation of law, stopping an 
automobile  and detaining the driver in order to check his driver’s licence and the 
registration of the automobile is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 
 
128 Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure 110.2(2) (1975) US. 
129 Carrol v United States 267 US 132 45 S.Ct. (1925) 377. 
      It would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition agent were authorised to stop 
      every automobile on the chance of finding … and thus subject all persons lawfully using  
      the highways to inconvenience and indignity of such search. 
 
130 Wiring v Horall 85 Cal. App. 497 (1948) 172. 
131 People v Gale 46 Cal. 2d 253 (1956) 229. 
132 State v Hillesheim 291 N.W.2d 314 (Iowa 1980) 381. 
133 517 US 806 (1996) 279. 
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then speed away. The officers stopped the vehicles and as they approached 
it, they saw the defendant holding bags of crack cocaine. The defendant 
argued that the police used the traffic stop as a pretext to uncover the drugs. 
The Court held that as long as probable cause existed to believe a traffic 
violation occurred, stopping the motorist was reasonable:  Subjective 
intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment 
analysis. 
 
While the police have a reason for conducting roadblocks, they check 
everyone rather than a particular individual.134 Checkpoints at or near borders 
need no justification to stop all vehicles to check for illegal entrants into the 
United States.135 The Supreme Court has held that the government’s 
compelling interest in protecting the nation’s borders alone justifies stopping 
any vehicle or individual, but may not be done based on ethnicity, religion or 
the like. 
 
3.3 In Canada 
 
Similarly in Canada warrantless searches of vehicles that are not connected 
to driving are permissible if the reasonable expectation of privacy is 
diminished. Where the search is part of a routine regulatory search 
concerning motor vehicles’ roadworthiness, reasonable grounds are not 
required, but the search should be confined to that purpose.136 In R v 
Mellenthin137 it was held as follows: 
 
The primary aim of the program [of random roadblocks] is thus to check for sobriety, 
licences, ownership, insurance and the mechanical fitness of cars. The police use of 
checkpoints should not be extended beyond these aims. Random stop programs must 
not be turned into a means of conducting either an unfounded general inquisition or an 
unreasonable search. 
                                                 
134 United States v Martinez-Fuerte 428 US 543 (1976) 159. 
135 Ibid. 
136 R v Mellenthin (1992) 76 CCC (3d) 481 (SCC) 487. Cited Steytler supra 101. 
137 Ibid. 
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Automobiles and other means of transport often create exigent circumstances 
because of the likelihood of movement before a warrant could be acquired.138 
In R v D. (I.D.)139 the Court of Appeal rejected a blanket exception from prior 
authorisation for vehicle searches, something that is accepted in American 
jurisprudence. Where it is feasible to obtain one, a warrant is necessary 
before searching a vehicle. 
 
Intrusive searches of the driver or the vehicle would probably be subject to 
challenge as an infringement of section 8.140 
 
 In R v Debot141 the trial court held that a stop and search of a vehicle and its 
occupants based on an instruction received from another member of a 
surveillance team was unreasonable because the officers “did not exercise 
any direct independent mind of their own to determine whether or not what 
they were doing was arbitrary.” The search was based on “suspicion and 
hope”. However the presentation appeal was allowed on the basis that 
reasonable grounds for belief existed in the mind of the searching officers. 
It was said to be: 
 
          unrealistic and incompatible with effective law enforcement and crime prevention when 
a police officer is requested by a superior or fellow officer to arrest or search a person 
suspected of the commission of crime and to be fleeing from the scene, to require that 
police officer to obtain from his or her superior or fellow officer sufficient information 
about the underlying facts to enable him or her to form an independent judgement upon 
which to arrest or search the suspect. 
 
3.4 Concluding remarks  
 
The South African Police Service Act makes provision for a wide array of 
searches. The National or a Provincial Commissioner may in circumstances 
                                                 
138 R v D. (I.D.) (1987) 61 C.R. (3d) 292 (Sask. C.A) 638.  
139 Ibid. 
140 R v Ladouceur (1990) 77 CR (3d) 110 (SCC) 412. 
141 (1986) 30 CCC (3d) 207. 
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“where it is reasonable in the circumstances to restore public order or to 
ensure the safety of the public in a particular area” authorise in writing that the 
area be cordoned off, specifying the period which may not exceed 24 hours, 
the area and the object of the cordoning off. A police official may on the 
strength of this authorisation, conduct a search without a warrant (and 
probably without reasonable grounds) of any person, premises, vehicle or 
receptacle or “any object of whatever nature” and seize any article that may 
afford evidence of the commission of an offence. 
 
 The power granted to police officials here is very wide, almost without limits. 
There appears to be inadequate safeguards to ensure the necessary 
constitutional balance between the rights of citizens and law enforcement 
prerogatives. The cordoning off of a particular area should be based on 
reasonable grounds.142 Importantly, the length, objective and intrusiveness of 
the search need also be reasonably justifiable. There are insufficient grounds 
to depart from the principle that a neutral and independent arbiter should 
decide, before such a “fundamental rights” restricting measure is taken. The 
National or Provincial Commissioner does not stand detached from the 
search, which can impede impartiality in the matter. The decision to cordon off 
is not made instantaneously hence the objectives of the search would not be 
defeated by obtaining prior judicial authority. 
 Similarly section 13(8) of the South African Police Service Act allows the 
setting up of roadblocks and checkpoints without prior authorisation for 
searches of vehicles and persons and seizures. 
 
Section 13(8)(d) stipulates that any member of the Police Service, under 
reasonable suspicion may set up a roadblock without prior authorisation, 
where the delay in obtaining prior authorisation to set up the roadblock will 
defeat the object. Reasonable suspicion relating to crimes incidental to 
making an arrest, is constitutionally acceptable. Such searches incidental to 
arrest are constitutionally justifiable in the interests of law enforcement. 
Section 13 of the Police Act nowhere makes provision for a person who is 
                                                 
142 Steytler supra 95. 
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confronted with a roadblock or checkpoint, to be informed in advance of 
reasons for the roadblock or checkpoint. This appears to be in conflict with the 
Constitution.143 The Police Act stipulates that unless a person expressly 
requests reasons for setting up of a roadblock, there is no legal duty on the 
police to inform such person thereof. The argument submitted above applies 
mutatis mutandis to roadblocks and checkpoints.  
 
General crime prevention roadblocks give police officers subjective, 
discriminatory, unstructured powers which are open to abuse and arbitrary 
action, while a limited objective such as the search for stolen vehicles or 
weapons, would focus and restrict police actions. 
 
In the United States the Fourth Amendment prefers a warrant because it 
necessitates judicial review of government action.144 “The presumption exists 
that a warrantless search is unreasonable, thus unlawful and therefore 
invoking the exclusionary rule with the resulting evidence not permitted in 
court. But, reasonableness itself dictates that government action may become 
necessary before getting a warrant signed by a judge. Such practical 
measures as time, emergency circumstances or probable destruction of 
evidence or escape of a criminal have resulted in legitimate exceptions being 
made to the general requirement of a warrant.”145 Through the development of 
case law, the Supreme Court has defined the following searches without a 
warrant to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment: consent search, 
frisks, plain view, incident to arrest, exigent circumstances. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Exceptions to the general rule that prior authority should be obtained before 
conducting a search are accepted in a number of contexts. Firstly, where 
exigent circumstances are present it is accepted that the maintenance of law 
                                                 
143 See section 12(1) of the Constitution. 
144 Harr and Hess supra 226. 
145 Ibid. 
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and order overrides the need for judicious consideration of privacy rights. 
Secondly, where no reasonable suspicion is required, then as a general rule 
no judicial supervision is required.  Further where a person consents to the 
invasion of his or her privacy, the requirement of reasonable grounds and 
prior authorisation fall away. 
 
The position regarding warrantless search and seizure in the United States is 
similar in many respects to our law. Similarly the position in Canada is also 
enlightening and bears some resemblance to our law. Section 8 of the 
Canadian Charter protects the privacy of persons. Intrusions on privacy 
through searches and seizures can only take place where it is justifiable for 
the privacy interest of the public to yield to the state interest in law 
enforcement or other supportable goals. In both American and Canadian 
jurisdictions, government conduct that intrudes on a justified expectation of 
privacy is considered a search or a seizure and must be reasonable to pass 
constitutional scrutiny. 
 
Warrantless searches and seizures are rather unpredictable and by their very 
essence unreasonable when viewed from a constitutional perspective, 
primarily because they violate constitutional rights and impose an 
unreasonable burden on those who endeavour to defend their individual 
privacy rights enshrined in the Constitution, against such arbitrary intrusions 
founded on subjective discretionary powers. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The birth of the Constitution with an entrenched Bill of Rights can be viewed as the 
most important event in South African legal history. The right to privacy, the right to 
freedom and security of the person and associated fundamental rights places an 
onerous duty on the courts as guardians of the Constitution, to prevent manipulation 
of the criminal justice system by law enforcement agents of the state. The inherent 
function of the Bill of Rights is to safeguard the fundamental rights of individuals 
when they came into contact with the organs of the state. The Bill of Rights places a 
positive duty on the state to safeguard the fundamental rights of the inhabitants of 
South Africa. Everyone has the right to be free from all forms of violence, whether 
from private or public sources.1 The state must respect, protect, promote and fulfil 
the rights in the Bill of Rights,2 a task which ought to be performed diligently and 
without delay,3 in order to improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the 
potential of each person.4 
 
[I]f men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither 
external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to 
be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the 
government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.5  
                                                            
1  Section 12(1)(c) of the Constitution. 
2  Section 7(2) of the Constitution. 
3  Section 237 of the Constitution. 
4  Preamble to the Constitution. 
5 Cheadle, Davis and Haysom South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights  
   2002 3 (cited by Laurence H Tribe and MC Dorf On reading the Constitution 21 Cambridge  
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In the absence of a Bill of Rights, the right to privacy and other affected fundamental 
rights, have often in South Africa been violated by the legislature and the executive 
through for instance, laws conferring wide powers of search and seizure on the 
police.6 
 
With regard to international law section 39(1) of the Constitution provides that a court 
or tribunal in interpreting the Bill of Rights must consider international law. With 
regards to foreign law the Constitution allows a court, when interpreting the Bill of 
Rights to consider foreign law. 
 
The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general 
application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open 
and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom taking into 
account all relevant factors.7 
 
The most significant constitutional remedy for the infringement of a constitutional 
right is the exclusion of evidence in terms of section 35(5) of the Constitution. The 
dominant rationale for the exclusionary rule is that it is a preventive measure against 
illegal police action. By denying them the products of unlawful actions, the police are 
disciplined and discouraged from acting unlawfully. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
  Havard Press 1991 6). 
6  See for example section 25 of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
   In terms of section 25(1)(b) a police official may without a warrant enter a premises and search  
   the premises or any person on that premises for any article under section 20 of the Criminal  
   Procedure Act for the maintenance of law and order or the internal security of the Republic. The  
   police official who acts in terms of this section may take such steps as “he considers necessary”.  
   The police official is therefore permitted a subjective discretion. 
7  Section 36(1) of the Constitution. 
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2. The essence of laws governing search and seizure 
 
Our Constitution is considered the cornerstone of South African freedom. The 
Constitution is unique because it speaks not only to the desire for freedom, but also 
to the need therefore. The essence of being a South African to many means the right 
to be left alone by the state, the right to be safe in their persons, houses and 
property. While many of us take it for granted, one of the most significant advantages 
of living in South Africa is to be able to live unimpeded by the state.  
 
Constitutional control ensures that people can enjoy security of home, property and 
person without fearing intrusion by the state seizing property and assets just 
because they desire to do so under the umbrella of law enforcement. On the 
contrary, this security does not mean that the state is barred from carrying out its 
responsibilities. Limited state power is imperative for the laws of our country to be 
enforced and for the business of the state to be performed. But a balance is required 
for a democracy such as ours to prevail, a balance between the power of the state 
and the freedom of its people; and that is what the law of search and seizure is all 
about. The introductory chapters addressed the importance of the Constitution to law 
enforcement and the criminal justice system. 
  
3. Search and seizure 
 
Crime investigation entails obtaining evidence through the searches and seizures of 
persons, places and things respectively. South African law acknowledges that state 
authorities should not be permitted untrammelled access to search and seizure. It is 
a necessary incident of constitutionalism that citizens must be protected from 
unjustified invasion of their privacy and property by agents of the state. If the latter is 
not realised arbitrary state actions could severely hamper and prejudice the 
individual’s personal freedom and associated rights that are intended to be a 
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predominant feature of constitutionalism. Historically the police have required legal 
authority for conducting searches and seizures. The Criminal Procedure Act has long 
provided the only legal basis for obtaining warrants to search for and to seize or for 
performing such actions without a warrant in some circumstances. 
 
The basic human right to privacy is entrenched in section 14 of the Constitution 
which includes the right not to have one’s person, home or property searched or 
possessions seized. Other constitutional rights that are affected by searches and 
seizures are the rights to human dignity,8 freedom and security of the person9 and 
the right not to be deprived of property.10 These rights must always be respected, 
protected and promoted by the state. It is accepted that crime cannot always be 
effectively combated or investigated unless police officials are adequately 
empowered to do so. There are two conflicting schools of thought: on the one hand 
the interest of society in safeguarding human rights, which is of critical importance in 
a democracy, and on the other hand, the concern of society in combating crime. The 
two interests ought to be balanced. This is to be achieved by limiting the powers of 
police relating to search and seizure, as well as related powers, because unlimited or 
absolute powers will negate the essence of the fundamental rights entrenched in the 
Constitution. On the other hand these rights can be limited by requiring citizens to 
sometimes submit themselves to lawful searches and seizures of their persons 
and/or property. 
 
Since the enactment of the Constitution, there have been additional constraints on 
search and seizure powers. This has come through the guarantee in section 14 not 
to have one’s person or home or property searched and not to have one’s property 
seized. The most important legislative provisions that prima facie infringe these 
                                                            
8  Section 10 of the Constitution. 
9  Section 12(1) of the Constitution. 
10 Section 25 of the Constitution. 
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rights are to be found in the Criminal Procedure Act.11 The effect of the Constitution 
has been to greatly change the law relating to search and seizure, perhaps as much 
as it has provided greater protection against self incrimination. In many cases the 
failure of the police to abide by otherwise constitutional search and seizure powers 
has been held to breach section 14.  
 
The discussion of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of United States12 and 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms reveals similarities between our law 
pertaining to search and seizures and the law of those countries.13 Nevertheless 
there are some enlightening and conspicuous differences and lessons to be learnt. 
In the United States, the language of the Fourth Amendment first ascribes the right 
to the people, not to any person as under our Constitution.14 Secondly the framers 
choice of language might be important in properly interpreting the Amendment. It 
tends to regulate or control the conduct of the state and federal government so that 
Fourth Amendment violations do not occur rather than on fashioning remedies for 
                                                            
11  Cheadle......et al. supra 191. 
12   Stanford v Texas 379 U.S. 476, 85 S. Ct. 506 (1965). “… The Fourth Amendment provides that 
“no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, … and particularly describing … things to be 
        seized.” (emphasis added).  These words are precise and clear. They reflect the determination of  
those who wrote the Bill of Rights that the people of this new Nation should forever “be secure in  
their persons, houses, papers, and effects” from intrusion and seizure by officers acting under the   
        unbridled authority of a general warrant. Vivid in the memory of the newly independent Americans  
were those general warrants known as writs of assistance under which officers of the Crown had 
so  bedevilled the colonists. The hated writs of assistance had given customs officials blanket 
authority to search where they pleased for goods imported in violation of British tax laws. They 
were denounced … as the “worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English 
liberty, and the fundamental principles of law, that ever was found in an English law book” because 
they placed “the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer.” 
13  Refer to the discussion on United States and Canada in Chapters 2-3. 
14  It also concluded in US v Verdugo-Urquidez110 S.Ct.1056 (1990) 51 that the word “people” in the  
    Fourth Amendment covers only members of the national community and not non-resident aliens. 
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only those individuals who have suffered a personal Fourth Amendment wrong. 
Thirdly, the Fourth Amendment covers searches and seizures of “persons, houses, 
papers and effects,” and draws no distinct line between seizure of persons and 
objects. That no distinction was intended finds a certain amount of support in the 
closing six words of the Fourth Amendment.15 Fourthly, the Fourth Amendment has 
two parts. The first part deals with unreasonable searches and the second part with 
warrants. Since the term unreasonable is used first, it might be perceived to 
predominate so that all searches and seizures must satisfy its command, while the 
warrant clause would come into operation only when a warrant is sought to justify 
government action. Similar to our Constitution, the Fourth Amendment plainly 
recognises a right, but does not indicate against whom it applies. It can be argued 
that the people have a right to be free from all searches and seizures that are 
unreasonable, even if conducted by private persons. However our Constitution and 
the Fourth Amendment have generally been interpreted as providing protection only 
against the state or federal government and those acting on behalf of it. Further 
nothing in the language of our Constitution or the Fourth Amendment limits their 
applicability solely to criminal investigations or to the police. 
 
In Canadian law which is similar to our law, it is a fundamental right of every citizen 
to be secure against unreasonable and arbitrary searches by the police and the 
seizure of property for utilisation as evidence. In the renowned case of Entick v 
Carrington16, Lord Camden stressed that [i]:  
                                                            
15 “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, 
the person or things to be seized.” 
16 Supra 275. 
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It is very certain that the law obligeth no man to accuse himself; because the necessary 
means of compelling self accusation, falling upon the innocent as well as the guilty, would 
be cruel and unjust; and it would seem, that the search for evidence is disallowed upon 
the same principle. 
 
The right to search a man’s home or premises is regarded as an extraordinary 
remedy that may be exercised only where there is a clear and unambiguous 
statutory provision permitting it. Unless the police are in possession of a warrant or 
other specific authority, they have no right to enter private premises and remain 
there. The crucial word in section 8 of the Canadian Charter is “unreasonable.” It 
simply means to reach a conclusion based on suspicion instead of “credibly based 
probability.”17 It is not enough to be merely suspicious. A police officer must have 
reasonable cause to search a place or person. An officer only has reasonable cause 
to believe when he or she is able to indicate some information in his or her 
possession that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that his or her belief is 
probably true. A similar meaning is attached to the reasonable grounds in South 
African law. 
 
4. Search and seizure in terms of a search warrant18 and warrantless search  
     and seizure19 
 
4.1 Search with a warrant 
 
Section 21 of the Criminal Procedure Act makes provisions for searches in terms of 
a search warrant. If a magistrate or justice of the peace believes that there are 
reasonable grounds for believing that an article referred to in section 20 is in the 
                                                            
17 Hunter v Southam supra 97. 
18 Please refer to discussion in chapter 4. 
19 Please refer to discussion in chapter 5. 
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possession or under the control of any person or upon any premises, and such 
information is provided to him or her under oath a warrant may be issued. For a 
search to be lawful the premises to be searched must be clearly defined in the 
warrant.20 Contrary to section 21 of the Criminal Procedure Act section 14 of the 
Constitution protects the right not to have one’s person or property searched. The 
Criminal Procedure Act therefore prima facie infringes this right. However in the 
context of criminal justice a search for and seizure of articles can be considered 
legitimate for the following purposes: may afford evidence of the commission or 
suspected commission of an offence;21 to be confiscated because their possession is 
unlawful;22 to return them to their rightful owner;23 and to be forfeited to the state if 
they were used in the commission of a crime.24 
 
 The two main grounds to ensure the reasonableness of a search are the 
requirements of objective grounds for the search and prior judicial authorisation. 
These safeguards are inherent in South African law and are also profound in the 
jurisprudence of the United States and Canada. 
 
A judge or judicial officer may issue a search warrant if it appears to such judge or 
judicial officer once a criminal trial has started that an article in question is required 
as evidence before him or her. The search warrant authorises a police official to 
seize the article in question and to search any person identified in the warrant or to 
enter and search any premises identified in the warrant and to search any person 
found on or at the premises. A search warrant must be executed by day unless a 
police official is specifically authorised to execute it at night. A search warrant must 
                                                            
20 Toich v The Magistrate, Riversdale and Others supra 235. 
21  Section 20(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
22  Section 31 of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
23  Section 30(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
24  Section 35 of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
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be interpreted strictly and cannot authorise the seizure of articles not strictly related 
to the investigation concerned.25  
 
In the United States, the Fourth Amendment is debatably similar to our Constitution 
as it also protects a person’s right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures. The preferred way to conduct a search, and one that is universally 
recognised, is in terms of a valid search warrant. In the United States it is the 
function of a judicial officer to issue a search warrant. The United States Supreme 
Court made it clear that neither prosecutors nor police officers can be asked to 
maintain the requisite neutrality when deciding whether a search warrant should be 
issued.26 This principle is not fully adhered to in South African law. In South Africa as 
a general rule a search should also be authorised by a judicial officer.27 However this 
power is also extended to justices,28 who include commissioned officers in the South 
African Police Services, National Defence Force, Correctional Services, director of 
public prosecution and state prosecutors. It is objectively questionable whether the 
person who is issuing the search warrant, as part of the office of the executing officer 
can be regarded as neutral or detached. 
 
The United States Constitution requires that a warrant must be supported by oath or 
affirmation. This is similar to South African law. Section 8 of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms is also similar to South African constitutional provisions.  In 
Toich v The Magistrate, Riversdale and Others29 the court maintained that: 
     … the validity of a search warrant was to be examined with a jealous regard for the subject’s right 
to privacy and property. … the magistrate or justice of the peace authorising the warrant must be 
                                                            
25  Bennet and Others v Minister of Safety and Security and Others 2006 (1) SACR 523 (T) par 
     24 
26  Coolidge v New Hampshire supra 443. 
27  Section 21(1) and section 25 Criminal Procedure Act. 
28  Section 21(a) Criminal Procedure Act. 
29  2007 (2) SACR 235.  
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satisfied by information on oath not only that the articles to  be searched for and seized was under 
the control or in the possession of a specified person  or specified premises within his or her 
jurisdiction.... 
 
An important difference between the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the 
South African Constitution when compared to the Fourth Amendment is that the 
Fourth Amendment  specifically requires a police official, before conducting a search 
to obtain a search warrant based upon probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or 
things to be seized. In discussing probable cause for the issuance of a search 
warrant, the United States Supreme Court made the following assertion: 
 
     If the apparent facts set out in the affidavit are such that a reasonably discreet and prudent man 
would be led to believe that there was a commission of the offence charged, there is probable 
cause justifying the issuance of a warrant.30  
 
In the United States there is no requirement that proof beyond reasonable doubt 
(which is a South African legal standard) be furnished, but he or she must show 
more than a mere suspicion (reasonable grounds). The United States Supreme 
Court explained the probable cause standard as follows: 
 
     The term “probable cause” means less than evidence which would justify condemnation ... . It 
imports a seizure made under circumstances which warrant suspicion ... finely tuned standards 
such as beyond a reasonable doubt or by the preponderance of evidence, useful in formal trials, 
have no place in the magistrate’s decision.31 
The Court reiterated that “probable cause” requires only a probability or substantial 
chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity. 
 
                                                            
30  Dumbra v United States 268 US 435 (1925). 
31  New York v P.J. Video, Inc. 475 US 868 (1986). 
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In Canadian law three important principles pertaining to search and seizure are:  
 
• where feasible prior authorisation is required;  
•  prior authorisation must be granted by someone who is neutral and 
impartial and capable of acting judicially (in South Africa the capacity to act 
judicially is not a prerequisite); and  
• the person granting authorisation must be satisfied on oath that there are 
              reasonable and probable grounds for believing both that an offence has 
              been committed and that a search of the place for which the warrant is  
              sought will  find evidence related to that offence.32  
 
These principles are in essence similar to South African law. 
 
4.2 Search without a warrant 
 
Section 22 of the Criminal Procedure Act provides for search and seizure without a 
warrant. Section 22 can be divided into two parts:  
 
• firstly a search conducted with the consent of the person concerned, and 
• secondly a search conducted on the reasonable belief that a warrant will be 
issued to a police official and that a delay in obtaining a warrant will defeat the 
object of the search.  
 
Where a search is conducted with the consent of the person concerned it places the 
police official in a much more advantageous position than a search without consent. 
It eliminates the procedural burden on the police official to prove the existence of 
reasonable grounds to search. Therefore the police official should where it is 
                                                            
32  Hunter v Southam supra 157. 
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reasonably practical to do so, make it clear that he or she seeks the voluntary co-
operation of the person concerned, and should request for consent to search for a 
section 20 article.33 Although reasonable ground becomes irrelevant where consent 
is granted, an onerous duty still rests on the police official to conduct the search with 
due regard to the individual’s fundamental rights to be treated in humane and 
dignified manner, as encapsulated in the Constitution.  
 
The Criminal Procedure Act makes provisions for a number of instances, depending 
on the objective thereof where a search of premises may be conducted without a 
warrant. Each of these instances describes the specific circumstances where a 
search may be undertaken, based solely on the subjective opinion of the police 
official conducting the search. These instances include: 
 
• where a police official wishes to enter a private premises for the purpose of a 
search for and seizure of an article mentioned in section 20 he is generally 
required have a search warrant. He or she is not compelled to, as it is not an 
absolute requirement. It should also be noted that the Criminal Procedure Act 
does not differentiate between search of a private dwelling and other 
premises. 
• Where a police official is of a reasonable “opinion” that an article which is the 
object of a search “may be destroyed” if he or she demands entry and states 
his purpose, he or she may with or without the use of force enter the premises 
without prior notice.34 The word opinion obviously has a subjective 
connotation. 
• Where a police official in the investigation of an offence or alleged offence, 
reasonably suspects that a person is in possession of information concerning 
                                                            
33  See also S v Motloutsi supra 112. 
34  Section 27 Criminal Procedure Act. 
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an offence or alleged offence, is on any premises including a private 
premises, he or she may enter such premises without a warrant for the 
purpose of interrogating and obtaining a statement from such person.35 Where 
the premises is a private dwelling the consent of the occupier has to be 
obtained. No provision is made in the Criminal Procedure Act if the premises 
is not a private dwelling. It can be assumed that no consent is required. 
Should the police official meet any resistance and he or she is compelled to 
enter the premises by force, he or she may enter the premises, provided he or 
she audibly demands entry and states his or her purpose.36 No provision is 
made for persons who are hearing impaired (“audibly demand admission”).         
• A police official may also without a warrant enter any premises and search the 
premises or any person on the premises for any article mentioned in section 
20 for the maintenance of law and order, or the internal security of the 
Republic, which is likely to be threatened by a meeting or in consequence 
thereof.37 A police official who acts in terms hereof may take “such steps as 
such police official may consider necessary,” for the preservation of the 
internal security of the Republic or prevention of crime (which can be a crime 
of a trivial nature). The latter creates a subjective standard. This section 
violates fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution. 
 
By comparison, there are no provisions in the United States' Fourth Amendment that 
authorise a search without a warrant. Despite this it was not the intent of the framers 
of the American Constitution to condemn all warrantless searches.  
• Firstly, similar to South African law, search without a warrant is authorised 
when it is made incident to a lawful arrest. In order for the search to be lawful 
                                                            
35  Section 26 Criminal Procedure Act. 
36  Section 27 Criminal Procedure Act. 
37  Section 25 Criminal Procedure Act. 
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the arrest ought to be lawful and the search must be made 
contemporaneously with the arrest. 
•  Secondly, similar to South African law a person may waive the rights 
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment voluntarily and freely, to allow a so-
called “consent search”.  
• Thirdly, as in South African law, warrantless searches of movable objects and 
vehicles are authorised, provided that there is probable cause that would have 
justified the issuance of a search warrant and the vehicle or article is moving 
or about to be moved. 
• Because the American Constitution only protects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, a seizure of articles does not violate the Constitution 
where there is no search. For the plain view exception to apply, the police 
official must be lawfully present on the premises when he or she views the 
object and must have probable cause to believe that the article is illegally 
possessed or subject to seizure. Unlike our Constitution the Fourth 
Amendment relates only to persons, houses, papers and effects.  
• In the United States there is also the concept of “stop and frisk”, where the 
police stop suspicious persons on the street or other public places for 
purposes of questioning them or conducting some investigation. This 
technique is ordinarily employed when there are no grounds to arrest the 
suspect and to search him incident to the arrest. Stop and frisk is justifiable in 
the United States.38  
 
Similarly, in Canada the Charter of Rights and Freedoms requires prior authorisation 
and reasonable and probable grounds as a standard for overriding individual privacy 
interests. There are two ways in which departure from these standards may occur. 
Firstly, in situations involving exigent circumstances, where a warrantless search or 
                                                            
38  Terry v Ohio supra 1868. 
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seizure may be justified. Secondly, in situations a search and seizure may take place 
on less than reasonable and probable grounds for believing that an offence has been 
committed and that evidence will be located at the place of the search or seizure. 
 
4.3 Roadblocks 
 
The South African Police Service Act also provides for various searches without a 
warrant. Roadblocks and checkpoints may be set up without prior authorisation for 
purposes of searching vehicles and persons, and for seizures.39 A police official 
acting under reasonable suspicion may set up a roadblock or checkpoint without 
prior authorisation if the delay in obtaining prior authorisation will defeat the object of 
the search.40  Section 13(8) of the South African Police Service Act does not make 
provision for a person who is the subject of a roadblock or checkpoint to be informed 
of the reasons therefore. This is constitutionally questionable. Furthermore the South 
African Police Service  Act provides that where it is reasonable in the circumstances 
in order to restore public order or to ensure the safety of the public in a particular 
area, the National or a Provincial Commissioner may in writing authorise that the 
particular area or a part of it to be cordoned off.41 In this provision there appears to 
be insufficient safeguards to protect and achieve the necessary balance between the 
fundamental rights of individuals and law enforcement prerogatives. Provision should 
also be made for the objective and duration of the search to be reasonably 
justifiable. The National Commissioner and Provincial Commissioner are of the 
highest rank in the SAPS, but as they are still part of the office of the executing 
officials, their independence and neutrality comes into question.  
In the United States the following warrantless searches are constitutionally 
reasonable and justifiable: 
                                                            
39  Section 13(8) South African Police Service Act. 
40  Section 13(8)(d) South African Police Service Act. 
41  Section 13(7) South African Police Service Act. 
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• Warrantless vehicle searches where the vehicle contains evidence of crime. 
• The investigatory stop and frisk procedure outlined in Terry v Ohio.42  
• Searches incidental to a lawful arrest. 
 
In Canada warrantless searches of vehicles that are not connected to driving are 
reasonable where the expectation of privacy is diminished or non-existent. Vehicles 
are less valued as private domains. Random stops of motor vehicles for routine 
inspections for purposes of public safety are considered to constitute minimal 
infringement of the expectation of privacy and do not constitute searches within the 
meaning of section 8 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
 
In conclusion the laws pertaining to search and seizure are complicated and 
sometimes difficult to interpret. This area of police work is susceptible to abuse and 
litigation. It is a fundamental right of every South African to be secure against 
arbitrary and unreasonable searches by the state and seizure of property. Attempts 
to abrogate this right have been strongly and consistently restricted by our courts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
42  Supra 1868. 
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5. Recommendations 
 
5.1 Knowing the law  
 
     Our laws on search and seizure are largely in line with international trends. The law 
relating to search and seizure is complex but not impossible to understand. Probably 
more evidence is inadmissible in criminal cases because of the failure of police 
officials to follow the legal provisions relating to search and seizure than for any 
other reasons. If the state's police officials are to carry out their responsibilities 
diligently, it is a necessity that they are knowledgeable about the laws relating to 
search and seizure. This implies that police officials must determine prior to the 
search, whether it is conducted with or without a warrant, the grounds on which they 
can justify their search before a judicial proceeding. Searches are generally valid 
because they are made: (1) with a warrant; (2) incident to a lawful arrest; or (3) with 
consent. If a police official is cognisant of all the legal requirements by which a 
search and seizure may be validated, he or she can make the determination at the 
time of the search and seizure and not after it has commenced. On the other hand, if 
a police official cannot base his or her search on a legal justification, it is better not to 
conduct the search at all. Once evidence has been contaminated by an illegal search 
it will not be admissible in court. The failure of the police to adhere to the mandates 
of our Constitution results not only in the case being dismissed or lost, but also in 
possible liability on the part of the police official, as well as the state. Failure on the 
part of the state to properly train and supervise police officials, as well as to enact 
and enforce constitutional requisites will often result in civil action. 
 
Our Constitution is the guiding light of the criminal justice system. The police need to 
embrace constitutional development. According to the Constitution, police officials 
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are responsible for upholding and enforcing the law.43 All policing powers and duties 
are prescribed by law. All South African police officials must know, understand and 
be able to apply the law in order to perform their duties diligently, effectively and to 
lawfully exercise their powers. South Africa is a very young democracy and because 
the majority of police officials served in the previous dispensation, it is important to 
understand and appreciate the role played by the law in a democracy. The conduct 
of the police official is at the core of search and seizure and the conduct of the police 
official should always demonstrate great deference to an individual’s fundamental 
rights. In the name of constitutionalism the police official should implement search 
and seizure in a manner that is just and legal, with no potential intrusion into the 
individual’s personal legal rights. Modern constitutional law enforcement supports 
doing the right thing, and decries unbridled or ill-tempered actions in search and 
seizure. 
 
Indeed, the police face a dilemma when confronted with serious forms of crime. On 
the one hand, they are responsible for the protection of society and its citizens, and 
on the other hand, they must respect the constitutional rights of all individuals. When 
the level of crime is perceived to threaten the safety of society, the police often feel 
pressurised to take repressive measures at the expense of fundamental human 
rights. This is when vigilance is required because there is a risk of abusing individual 
rights on a grander scale in these extraordinary circumstances than in normal 
situations. The difficult task of the police is to ensure that a proper balance is 
achieved between the means necessary to protect democracy and the maintenance 
of the protection of individual rights. Therefore, police officials should be trained to 
balance the competing demands imposed upon them by the legal system and 
become objective, yet vigilant, law enforcers. Objectivity does not imply that police 
officials cannot be sympathetic and empathetic to the concerns and plight of those 
                                                            
43  Section 205(3) Constitution. 
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who have been unjustly harmed, just as vigilance does not imply that police officials 
cannot be fair to those who have harmed and transgressed. 
 
5.2 The Criminal Procedure Act 
 
The following aspects of the Criminal Procedure Act pertaining to search and seizure 
are questionable from a constitutional perspective:  
 
• Section 20 provides for what kind of articles may be seized by the state. The 
term “anything” in section 20 is very wide. It refers to any article. Equally the 
term “concerned” in section 20 is very wide. In the light of fundamental human 
rights it should be interpreted restrictively and an element of necessity to 
prove an offence should be attached to the provision. 
• Section 21 provides for a warrant to be issued by a justice. In the light of the 
definition of “justice” in the Criminal Procedure Act, it is submitted that too 
many officials are empowered to issue warrants, and this practise could lead 
to warrants being issued without circumspection. With due regard to neutrality 
and objectivity, the power to issue warrants should be conferred on judicial 
officials.  
• Section 21 also only makes provision for “information on oath”. Provision 
should also be made for “information on affirmation” in the light of 
fundamental human rights. Furthermore section 21 provides for a warrant to 
be handed to a person whose rights have been affected thereby “upon 
demand” of the person. The police are thus legally empowered to intrude on 
individual rights. In the light of the Constitution it is submitted that this 
provision should rather state that the police must provide a copy of the 
warrant to the person whose rights have been encroached upon, prior to the 
execution of the warrant.  
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• Section 22 empowers a police official who on reasonable grounds believes 
that a search warrant will be issued to him if he applies for a warrant and that 
the delay of obtaining a warrant would defeat the object of the search, he may 
search any person, container or premises without a warrant for any article 
mentioned in section 20. It is submitted that section 22 empowers the police 
official to seize even articles of a trivial nature on unidentified offences which 
may constitute evidence of little importance. This could lead to abuse of 
constitutional rights and these provisions should therefore be more specific 
and have a narrower ambit.  
• In terms of section 25 a police official may take such steps as he “considers 
necessary” for the maintenance of law and order or the preservation of the 
internal security of the Republic or the prevention of crime. The offence here 
can be interpreted to be even a trivial offence. That which the police official 
considers necessary, permits a subjective discretion to be applied. This 
section tacitly permits violation of fundamental human rights and does not 
meet the proportionality test and will not survive constitutional muster. It ought 
to be revised. 
• In terms of section 26 a police official must enter a private dwelling with the 
consent of the occupier, for purpose of interrogation and obtaining a 
statement in the investigation of an offence. No provision is made for 
premises which are not private dwellings, which again enables a police official 
to encroach upon constitutional rights where the premises is not a private 
dwelling. It is submitted that these provisions be revised to accommodate for 
such premises in order to prevent constitutional abuse.  
• In terms of section 27 a police official must first “audibly” demand admission 
into a premises. This provision is discriminatory when one takes cognisance 
of the emphasis our Constitution places on fundamental rights. No provision is 
made for persons who are hearing impaired or have similar traits. Such 
persons should be communicated with in a manner in which they fully 
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understand the purpose of the police action. Section 27 also provides for the 
“opinion” of a police official. Again a subjective element attaches hereto. 
 
5.3 The South African Police Service Act 
 
The South African Police Service Act also makes provision for searches without a 
warrant. Section 13 (6) of the South African Police Service Act provides that a police 
official may search without a warrant or reasonable grounds, any person, premises, 
other place, vehicle, vessel or aircraft or any receptacle, and seize any article that is 
found and may be lawfully seized, where it is reasonably necessary for the purposes 
of control over the illegal movement of people or goods across the borders of the 
Republic. This power is granted in respect of searches within a corridor of 10 
kilometres or any reasonable distance from any border with a foreign state, or in 
South African territorial waters, or inside the Republic within 10 kilometres or any 
reasonable distance from such territorial waters. I submit that in view of the 
substantial state interest involved, searches without reasonable grounds in places 
adjacent to foreign borders would be a reasonable limitation on the right to privacy. 
Such searches are aimed at exercising control over the illegal movement of people 
or goods across the borders of South Africa. In view of South Africa’s geography the 
ten kilometre corridor would mostly be applicable in sparsely populated areas, where 
it would be ‘reasonably necessary’ to conduct routine roadblocks and searches in 
order to determine the legality of persons and goods. The ten kilometre areas along 
the coastline, which include major towns and cities, searches would be ‘reasonably 
necessary’ only when they are preceded by reasonable suspicion relating to the 
illegal movement of persons or goods.  
 
Section 13(7)(a) of the South African Police Service Act provides that the National 
Commissioner or a Provincial Commissioner may, “where it is reasonable in the 
circumstances to restore public order or to ensure the safety of the public in a 
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particular area,” authorise in writing that a particular area be cordoned off, specifying 
the period, which may not exceed 24 hours, the area and the object of the cordoning 
off. This authorisation empowers a police official ‘where it is reasonably necessary’ 
to achieve the objective of the authorisation, to conduct a search without a warrant of 
any person, premises, vehicle or receptacle or any object of whatever nature and 
seize any article that may afford evidence of the commission of an offence. The 
cordoning off of a particular area should be based on reasonable grounds. There are 
insufficient reasons to depart from the principle that an independent and impartial 
person should be the final arbiter before such a drastic measure is taken. Although 
the National Commissioner or a Provincial Commissioner occupy the most senior 
positions in the police service, this does not detach or separate them from the 
search, which unfortunately makes the independence of the discretion they exercise 
very questionable. In view of the serious infringement of the right to privacy, it is 
recommended that a judicial officer is in a better position to decide whether the 
public order or safety has been threatened or disturbed, and whether the search to 
be conducted will help remedy the situation. The objectives and purpose of the 
search will not be defeated by obtaining prior judicial authorisation, since the 
decision to cordon off an area is rarely made instantaneously. 
 
Section 13(8)(a) of the South African Police Service Act provides that the National 
Commissioner or Provincial Commissioner may authorise a police official in writing to 
set up: 
 
• a roadblock or roadblocks on any public road in a particular area; or 
• a checkpoint or checkpoints at any place in a particular area. 
 
157 
 
In Sithonga v Minister of Safety and Security44 it was held that the SAPS Act did not 
define what a ‘public place’ was. The court indicated that the place where the 
checkpoint was to be set up should be clearly described in the authorisation. 
It is recommend that ‘specific legitimate goals’ should be provided in the 
authorisation. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
                                                            
44 2008 (1) SACR 376. In this case  in terms of section 13(8) a police captain obtained authorisation to 
 set up a  checkpoint, but instead on the strength of such authorisation, searched private premises 
and seized vehicles found there. The authorisation did not constitute a search warrant. Because of  
   the serious inroads on individual right to privacy the court held that section 13(8) should be 
interpreted restrictively. The search and seizure of vehicles was accordingly held to be unlawful. 
158 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Books 
 
B Bantjies, E Bertelsmann, L Meyer, G Nell and C Walker Criminal Procedure 
in the Magistrates Court: A Practical Guide 2007 Durban Lexis Nexis 
 
GA Beaudoin and E Ratushny The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
1989 Toronto Carswell 
 
MH Cheadle, DM Davis and NRL Haysom South African Constitutional Law: The Bill 
of Rights 2002 Cape Town Juta 
 
I Currie and De Waal The New Constitutional and Administrative Law 2001 Cape 
Town Juta 
 
D Davis, H Cheadle and N Haysom  Fundamental Rights in the Constitution 1997 
Cape Town Juta 
 
GE Devenish The South African Constitution 2005 Cape Town Juta 
 
LM Du Plessis and H Corder Understanding South Africa’s transitional bill of rights 
1994 Cape Town Juta  
 
E Du Toit, FJ de Jager, A Paizes, AStQ Skeen and SE Van der Merwe Commentary 
on the Crriminal Procedure Act 1996 Cape Town Juta 
 
M Finkelstein and N Finkelstein Constitutional Rights in the Investigative Process 
1991 Toronto & Vancouver Butterworths 
 
I Glasser Visions of Liberty: The Bill of Rights for all Americans 1991 New York 
Arcade Little Brown 
 
JJ Joubert Criminal Procedure handbook  2007 Cape Town Juta  
159 
 
 
JD Harr and KM Hess Constitutional Law and the Criminal Justice System 2001 
Belmont Wadsworth  
 
VG Hiemstra Introduction to the Law of Criminal Procedure 1985 Kenwyn Juta 
 
JH, Israel and WR. LaFave Criminal Procedure: Constitutional Limitations 2001 St 
Paul Minn West 
 
PH King The Guide to American Law 1984 New York Foundation Press 
 
JC Klotter, JT Walker and C Hemmens Legal Guide for Police: Constitutional Issues 
2005 US Anderson 
 
J Kriegler Hiemstra Suid Afrikaanse Strafproses 5ed 1993 Durban Butterworths 
 
WR LaFave Search and Seizure: A treatise on the Fourth Amendment 1987 St Paul 
Minn West 
 
WR LaFave and JH Israel Criminal Procedure: Constitutional limitations in a nutshell 
6ed 2001 St Paul Minn West 
 
LR Minn Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment 1974 New York Foundation Press 
 
DJ McQuiod- Mason The Law of Privacy in South Africa 1978 Cape Town Juta 
 
M Nowak UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary 1993 
Strasborough, Arlington NP Engel  
 
DM Paciocco Charter Principles and Proof in criminal cases 1987 Toronto Carswell 
 
F Pollock and FW Maitland The history of English law 1968 Toronto Carswell  
 
IM Rautenbach and EFJ Malherbe Constitutional Law 2ed 1996 Durban Butterworths 
160 
 
 
RE Salhany Candian Criminal Procedure 5ed 1989 Ontario Canada Law Book INC. 
 
A Salzburg Introduction to American Criminal Procedure 1980 St Paul Minn West 
 
S Sharpe Search and Surveillance: the movement from information to evidence 2000 
de Montford Ashgate 
 
P Stephens Commentaries on the law of England (21ed) volume 4 1993 Wellington 
Carswell 
 
N Steytler Constitutional Criminal Procedure: a commentary on the Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa 1998 Durban Butterworths 
 
PH King The Guide to American Law (1984) vol 8, 288 New York Foundation Press 
 
T Quigley Procedure in Canadian Criminal Law 1997 Toronto Carswell 
 
RH Woody Search and seizure: The Fourth Amendment for law enforcement officers 
2006 Illinois Charles C Thomas  
 
Articles 
 
E Cameron “Rights, constitutionalism and the Rule of Law” (1997) 114 SALJ 504-
508 
 
M Chaskalson The Third Bram Fischer Memorial Lecture 2000 (16) SAJHR 193 
 
D Crawford and A Kimberly Crime Scene Searches: The need for Fourth 
Amendment  Compliance 1999 FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin Volume 68 no.1 
 
M Cowling Search and seizure 2007 SACJ 400 
 
161 
 
A Goldstein “The Search Warrant” The Magistrate and Judicial Review 1987” 62(6) 
New York University Law Review 1173 
 
 P Maditsi “The Right of Privacy in America: What does it mean?” 1992 De Rebus 
659 
 
Z  Motala The Constitutional Court’s approach to international law and its method of 
interpretation in the ‘Amnesty Decision’: Intellectual honesty or political expediency? 
21 SAYIL 1996 29 
 
LM Mubangizi “The constitutional right of prisoners in South Africa: a critical review” 
2002 De Jure 42. 
 
P Swanepoel “Warrantless search and seizure in criminal procedure: a constitutional 
challenge” 1997 CILSA 340 
 
Internet sources 
 
“Congressional Record” US Government Printing Office. (accessed on 10 March 
2009) 
 http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getpage.cgi.2001_record&page. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
162 
 
TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
Canadian Charter    Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 
     Constitution Act 1982 
Constitution    Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,  
    1996 Act 108 of 1996 
ECHR    European Convention for the Protection of    
                                                      Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
Fourth Amendment    USA Constitution, the Fourth Amendment  
     (ratified December 15, 1971) 
ICCPR    International Covenant on Civil and Political  
    Rights 
Interim Constitution   Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
    1993 
SAPS Act    South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995 
United States   United States of America 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
163 
 
TABLE OF CASES 
 
Agnello v US 23 US 20 (1925) 
 
Alabama v White 496 US 325 (1990) 
 
Andresen v Maryland 427 U.S. 463 (1976) 
 
Beheermaatschappij  Helling I NV v Magistrate, Cape Town 2007 (1) SACR 99 
(C) 
 
Bennett and Others v Minister of Safety and Security and Others 2006 (1) 
SACR 523 (T) 
 
Bernstein and Others v Bester and Others 1996 (4) BCLR 449 (CC) 
 
Bowers v Hardwick 478 US 186 
 
Brinegar v US 338 US 160 (1949) 
 
Carrol v United States 267 US 132 45 S.Ct. (1925) 
 
Case v Minister of Safety and Security; Curtis v Minister of Safety and Security 1996    
5 BCLR 
 
Cason v Commonwealth 530 S.E. 2d 920 (Va. Ct. App. 2000) 
 
Cheadle, Thompson and Haysom and Others v Minister of Law and Order and 
Others 1986 (2) SA 279 (W 609 (CC) 
 
Chimel v California 395 US 752 762-763 (1969) 
 
Cine Films (Pty) Ltd and others v Commissioner of Police and Others 1972 (2) 
SA 254 (A) 
164 
 
City of West Covina v Perkins 525 U.S. 234 (1999) 
 
Cloutier v Langlois (1990) 53 CCC (3d) 257 (SCC) 
 
Comité paritaire de l’industrie v Potash 1994 168 N.R (S.C.C) 
 
Commonwealth v Rodriguez 732 N.E. 2d 906 Mass. 2000 
 
Community Repeater Services CC v Minister of Justice 2000 (2) SACR 592  
 
Connally v Georgia 429 US 245 (1977) 
 
Control Magistrate, Durban v AZAPO 1986 (3) 394 (A) 
 
Coolidge v New Hampshire 403 US 433 (1971) 
 
D v K 1997 2 BCLR 209 (N) 
 
Descoteau et al v Mierzwinski and AG Que [1982] 1 SCR 860 at 870-875 
(1982) 70 CCC 385 (SCC) 
 
Divisional Commissioner SAP Wits v Saan 1996 (2) SA 503 (A) 
 
Divisional Commissioner of SA Police, Witwatersrand Area and Others v SA 
Associated Newspapers Ltd and Another 1966 (2) SA 503 (A) 
 
Dixon v State 327 A. 2d 516 (Md. Ct. App. 1974) 
 
Dow Chemical Co v United States 476 US 227 (1986) 
 
Draper v United States 358 US 307 1959 
 
Du Plessis v de Klerk 1996 5 BCLR 658 (CC) 
 
165 
 
Dumbra v United States 268 US 435 (1925) 
 
Durdeau v McDowell (1921) 256 US 465  
 
Dyani v Minister of Safety and Security and Others 2001 (1) SACR 634 
 
Eccles v Bourque (1974), 19 C.C.C. (2d) 129 (S.C.C.) 
 
Entick v Carrington (1765), 95 E.R. 807 (Eng. K.B.) 
 
Ferreira v Levin NO and Others and Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others 
1996 (1) BCLR 1(CC) 
 
Ferucci and others v Commissioner, South African Revenue Services 2002 (6) SA 
219 (C) 
 
Financial Mail (Pty) Ltd v Sage Holdings Ltd 1993 2 SA 451 (A) 
 
Florida v Jimeno 499 US 934 (1991)  
 
Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 7 BCLR 851 (CC)  
 
Funke v France 25 February 1993 Series A no 256-A 
 
Furman v Georgia 408 US (1972) 
 
G6-Bart Important Co v United States 282 U.S. 344 (1987) 
 
Gooding v United States, 316 U.S. 129, 62 S. Ct. (1942) 
 
Goncalves v Minister of Law and Order 1993 (1) SA 161 (W) 
 
Griswold v Connecticut 402 US 352 (1993) 
 
166 
 
Hako v Minister of Safety and Security and Another 1996 (2) SA 891 (Tk) 
 
Haley v Canada (1986), 27 C.C.C. (3d) 454 (Ont. C.A.) 
 
Highstead Entertainment (Pty) Ltd t/a ‘The Club v Minister of Law and Order 
1994 1 SA 387 (C) 
 
Hunter et al v Dolphin Delivery Ltd (1987) 33 DLR (4th) 174 
 
Hunter v Southam (1984), 41 C.R. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.) 
 
Minister of Law and Order v Hurley 1986 3 SA 568 (AD) 
 
Illinois v Gates 462 US 213 (1983) 
 
Illinois v Lafayette 462 US 460 (1983) 
 
Illinois v McArthur 531 US 326 (2001) 
 
Illinois v Rodriguez 497 US 177 (1990) 
 
Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor 
Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit 2000 BCLR  1079 (CC) 
 
Janit v Motor Industry Fund Administrators (Pty) Ltd and Anor 1995 (4) SA 292 
AD 
 
Janse Van Rensburg NO v Minister van Handel en Nywerheid NO 1999 (2) 
BCLR 204 (T) 
 
Johnson v United 333 U.S. 10 (1948) 
 
Klass v Germany 6 September 1978 Series A no 28 
 
167 
 
Katz v United States 389 US 347 361 (1967) 
 
Kourtessis v Minister of National Revenue (1993), 20 C.R. (4th) 104 (S.C.C.) 
 
Lee v State, 2 P.3d 517 (Wyo. 2000) 
 
Lo-Ji Sales Inc. v New York 442 US. 319 (1979) 
 
LSD Ltd v Vachell 1918 WLD 127 
 
Magajane v Chairperson, Northwest Gambling Board 2006 (2) SACR 
 
Malone v United Kingdom 2 August 1984 Series A no 82 
 
Mandela v Minister of Safety and Security 1995 2 SACR 397 (W) 
Marron v United States 235 U.S. 192 (1927) 
 
Maryland v Buie 494 US 325 334 (1990) 
 
Maryland v Garrison 480 U.S. 79 (1987) 
 
Mincey v Arizona 437 US 385 (1978) 
 
Minister of Justice v Desai 1948 (3) SA 395 (A) 
 
Minister of Justice v Hofmeyr 1993 3 SA 141 (A) 
 
Minister of Safety and Security and Another v Gaqa 2002 (1) SACR 654 (C) 
 
Minister of Safety and Security v Xaba [2003] 1 All SA 596 (D) 
 
Minister van Polisie en ‘n Ander v Gamble en ‘n Ander 1979 (4) SA 759 
(A) 
 
168 
 
 Minnesota v Dickerson 508 US 366 (1993) 
 
Mistry v Interim Medical and Dental Council of South Africa and Others 1998 (4) SA 
1127 (CC) 
 
Mnyungula v Minister of Safety and Security and Others 2004 (1) SACR 219 
 
Mollet v State 939 P.2d 1 (Okla.1997) 
 
Moran v Canada 1988 36 CCC (93d) 
 
Morgentaler v Fauteux, Church of Scientology (NO.6) 21 CCC 1985 
 
Morgenthaler Smoling and Scott v R (1988) 31 CRR 1 
 
Mthembu v S 2008 4 All SA 522 (SCA) 
 
Naidoo and Another v Minister of Law and Order and Another 1990 (2) SA 158 (W) 
 
National Director Public Prosecutions and Another v Mahomed 2008 (1) SACR  
309 (SCA) 
 
National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others v  Zuma and Another 2008 1 All 
SA 197 (SCA) 
 
Ndabeni v Minister of Law and Order 1984 (3) SA 500 (D) 
 
Ndlovu v Minister of Police, Transkei 1993 2 SACR 33 (T) 
 
Nel v Deputy Commissioner of Police, Grahamstown 1953 (1) SA 487 (E) 
 
New York v P.J. Video, Inc., 475 U.S. 868 (1986) 
 
Niemitz v Germany 16 December 1992 Series A no 251-B 
169 
 
Ntantiso and Another v Minister of Law and Order NO 1995 (1) SACR 119 (E) 
 
Ntoyakhe v Minister of Safety and Security 2000 (1) SA 257 (E) 
 
Olmstead v United States 277 US 438 478 (1928) 
 
Parker Ross and Another v Director: Office for Serious Economic Offences 1995 (2) 
BCLR 198 (C) 
 
People v Bradford 65 Cal. R ptr. 2d 145 (1997) 
 
People v Gale 46 Cal. 2d 253 (1956) 
 
People v Randolph, 4 P.3d 477 (Colo. 2000) 
 
Plummer v Canada (1929), 52 C.C.C.288 (Man. C.A.) 
 
Posternak v Canada (1929), 51 C.C.C. 426 (Alta. S.C. App. Div.) 
 
Powell and Others v Van der Merwe NO and Others 2005 (5) SA 62 (SCA) 
 
President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 6 BCLR 708 (CC) 
 
Protea Technology Ltd v Wainer 1997 9 BCLR 1225 (W) 
 
Pullen NO and Others v Waja 1929 TPD 
 
R v Baylis 1988 65 CR (3d) 209 (CCC) 
 
R v Beghin 1933 EDL 24 
 
R v Benz 51 C.R. (3d) 363 (Ont. C.A.) 1986 
R v C 1952 (4) SA 117 (0) 
 
170 
 
R v Chauk (1990) 62 CCC (3d) 193 (SCC) 
 
R v Church of Scientology 31 (CCC). 1987 
 
R v Collins (1987), 56 C.R. (3d) 193 (SCC) 
 
R v D. (I.D.) (1987) 61 C.R. (3d) 292 (Sask. C.A) 
 
R v Dyment (1988) 55 DLR (4th) 503: US v Weir (1981) 657 F2d (8th Cir) 1005 
 
R v Garfoli (1990) 60 CCC (3d) 161 (SCC) 
 
R v Evans (1996) 45 CR (4th) 210 (SCC) 
 
R v Grant (1993) 84 CCC (3d) 173 (SCC) 
 
R v Gray 1993 22 CR (4th) 114 (CCC) 
 
R v Handcock 1925 OPD 147 
 
R v Harris 57 C.R. (3d) 356 (Ont. C.A.) 1987 
 
R v Ladouceur (1990) 77 CR (3d) 110 (SCC) 
 
R v LaPlante 40 C.C.C. (3d) 63 (Sask. C.A.) 1987 
 
R v Lerke (1986) 49 C.R. (3d) 324 (Alta. C.A.) 
 
R v Mellenthin (1992) 76 CCC (3d) 481 (SCC) 487 
 
R v Morrison (1987) 58 C.R. (3d) 63 (Ont. CA) 
 
R v Multiform Manufacturing Company (1990) 79 C.R. (3d) 390 (SCC) 
 
171 
 
R v Oakes (1986) 19 CRR 308 
 
R v Pohorestsky (1987) 39 DLR (4th) 699 
 
R v Silveira (1995) 97 CCC (3d) 450 (SCC) 
 
R v Simmons [1988] 66 C.R. (3d) 297 (S.C.C.) 
 
R v Turcotte 2 W.W.R. 97 (Sask. C.A) 1988 
 
R v Williams (1923) KB 340 
 
Rajah and Others v Chairperson: North West Gambling Board and 
Others [2006] 3 All SA 172 (T) 
 
Rakas v Illinois (1978) 439 US 128 
 
Regina v Debot (1986) 26 C.R.R 275 
 
Robinson v State 730 N.E 2d 185 (Ind.2000) 
 
Rudolph and Another v Commissioner for Inland Revenue and Others 1996 4 SA 
552 (CC) 
 
S v Coetzee 1997 1 SACR 379 (CC) 
 
S v Cornelissen; Cornelissen v Zeelie NO 1994 2 SACR 41 (W) 
 
S v Gumede and Others 1998 (5) BCLR 530 (D) 
 
S v Hammer 1994 2 SACR 496 (C) 
 
S v Huma (2) 1995 2 SACR 411 (W) 
 
172 
 
S v Madiba 1998 1 BCLR 38 (D) 
 
S v Makwanyane 1995 6 BCLR 665 (CC) 
 
S v Mayekiso en Andere 1996 (2) SACR 298 (C) 
 
S v Mhlungu 1995 7 BCLR 793 (CC) 
 
S v Motloutsi 1996 (1) SA 548 (C) 
 
S v Nader 1963 (1) SA 843 (0) 
 
S v Nortje 1996 2 SACR 308 (C) 
 
S v Safatsa and Others 1988 (1) SA 868 (A) 
 
S v Scholtz 1996 2 SACR 623 (C) 
 
SA Police v SA Associated Newspapers 1966 2 SA 503 (A) 
 
Sanderson v Attorney-General 1997 12 BCLR 1675 (CC) 
 
Sasol (Edms) Bpk v Minister van Wet en Orde 1991 (3) SA 766 (T) 
 
Schneckloth v Bustamonte 412 US 218 (1973) 
 
Schönenberger and Durmaz v Switzerland 20 June 1988 Series A no 137 
 
Shabalala v Attorney-General of Transvaal 1995 2 SACR 761 (CC) 
 
Shadwick v City of Tampa 407 U.S. 443 (1971) 
 
Sithonga v Minister of Safety and Security and Others 2008 (1) SACR 376 
 
173 
 
Smith, Tabata and Van Heerden v Minister of Law and Order 1989 (3) SA 627 (E) 
 
Spinelli v United States 393  US 410 (1969) 
 
Stanford v Texas 379 U.S. 476, 85 S. Ct. 506 (1965) 
 
State v Hillesheim 291 N.W.2d 314 (Iowa 1980) 
 
State v Mitchell, 20 S.W. 3d 546 (Mo. 2000) 
 
State v Pallone 613 N.W. 2d 568 (Wis 2000) 
 
State v Ravotto 755 A.2d 602 (N.J.2000) 
 
State v Samarghandi 680 N.E. 2d 738 (Ohio 1997) 
 
State v Sullivan 16 S.W. 3d 551 (Ark 2000) 
 
Steel v U.S. 267 U.S. 498 1925 
 
Swarts v Canada 1916 27 CCC  
 
Terry v Ohio 392 US 1 (1968) 
 
Texas v Brown 460 US 730 103 S.Ct. (1983) 
 
Thomson Newspapers Ltd v Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) (1990) 
76 C.R. (3d) 129 (S.C.C.) 
 
Times Square Book Store and R., Re 48 C.R. (3d) 132 (Ont. C.A.) 1985 
 
Toich v The Magistrate, Riversdale and Others 2007 (2) SACR 235 (C) 
 
Turner v State 745A.2d 1074 (Md.Ct.App. 2000) 
174 
 
 
United States v Abell, 963 F. Supp 1178 (S.D. Fla. 1997) 
 
United States v Blair 214 F. 3d 690 (6th Cir. 2000) 
 
United States v Grant 218 F.3d 72 (1st Circuit 2000) 
 
United States v Jacobsen, 466 US S.Ct (1984) 
 
United States v Joseph, 278 F. 2d 504 (3d Cir. 1960). 
 
United States v Leon 468 US 897 (1984) 
 
United States v Martinez-Fuerte 428 US 543 (1976) 
 
United States v McKibben 928F. Supp. 1479 (D.S.D. 1996) 
 
United States v Pierce 893 F 2d 669 (5th cir 1990) 
 
United States v Robinson 414 US 218 (1973) 
 
University of Pretoria v Tommy Meyer Films (Edms) Bpk1979 (1) SA 441 (A) 
US v Abell, 963 F. Supp.1178 (1997) 
 
US v Medenhall 446 US 544 (1980) 
 
US v Verdugo-Urquidez 110 S.Ct. 1056 (1990) 51. 
 
Van der Merwe v Minister of Justice 1995 2 SACR 471 (O) 
 
Washington v Chrisman 455 US 1 (1982) 
 
Watson v Commissioner of Customs and Excise 1960 (3) SA 212 (N) 
 
175 
 
Welch v Gilmour and Blackstock 111 CCC 221 (BCSC) 1955 
 
Welsh v Wisconsin 466 US 740 (1984) 
 
Whren v United States 517 US 806 (1996) 
 
Wiring v Horall 85 Cal. App. 497 (1948) 
 
Wolpe v Officer Commanding South African Police, Johannesburg 1955 (2) SA 87 
(W) 
 
Worall v Canada 1965 2 CCC 
 
Young and another v Minister of Safety and Security and others 2005 (2) SACR 437 
 
Zuma and Another v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others 2006 (1) 
SACR 468 (D) 
 
Zurcher v Stanford Daily 436 U.S. 547 1978 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
176 
 
TABLE OF STATUTES 
 
South African statutes 
 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993 Act 200 of 1993 (interim 
Constitution) 
 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 Act 108 of 1996  
 
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 
 
National Instruction South African Police Service 2 of 2002 
 
National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998  
 
Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related Activities 
Act 33 of 2004 
 
South African Police Act 68 of 1995 
 
South African Police Service Amendment Act, 1997 (Act 41 of 1997) 
 
International human rights instruments 
 
Global 
 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (1966) 
 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (1948) 
 
UN Human Rights Committee General Comment 16/32 of 23 March 1988 
 
 
 
177 
 
Regional 
 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR) (1950) 
 
Foreign legislation 
 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982) 
 
Canadian Criminal Code (1985) 
 
Canadian Food and Drugs Act, section 42(1) 
 
Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure 110.2(2) (1975) US 
 
USA Constitution, The Fourth Amendment (ratified December 15, 1971) 
 
USA Patriot Act of 2001 
 
 
 
